Category Archives: Zacarias Moussaoui

Open Letter to Stand-By Counsel in the Moussaoui Case

Open Letter to Stand-By Counsel in the Moussaoui Case

Today, May 4, 2006, the media announced that Zacarias Moussaoui was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Contrary to received opinion, this decision does neither render justice nor fulfill security needs.

I appreciate that you have pleaded Moussaoui’s insanity and difficult childhood as mitigating circumstances. However, there are a number of grave irregularities in the proceedings, which should have compelled the dismissal of the case in its entirety.

The first irregularity is that the Court admitted Moussaoui’s endorsement of a so-called Statement of Facts. By signing this Statement, Moussaoui formally “agreed” that “[i]f this case were to go to trial, the Government would prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moussaoui thus effectively allowed the U.S. Government to escape the need to prove its own allegations. Moussaoui’s signature was, however, no more than a statement of opinion.

Take, for example, the third statement of fact. There Moussaoui claims that “[c]amps in Afghanistan were used to instruct members and associates of Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups in the use of…chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction.” But even the U.S. Government has not made such a formidable allegation. Was Moussaoui simply trying to embellish the case against himself?

By Statements 17-21, Moussaoui apparently “agreed” with the official narrative on the hijacking of four aircraft by Al Qaeda members on 9/11. Yet he was not a witness to these events and was therefore incompetent to opine, whether these acts took place as described. On the day of 9/11 he sat in prison.

Yet the Court admitted Moussaoui’s signature on the Statement of Fact as if it represented a bona fide certification of facts, made in good faith.

The second major irregularity is the introduction into the proceedings of “evidence” attempting to link Moussaoui to the events of 9/11. I appreciate the objection by the Stand-By Counsel that legal causality existed between Moussaoui’s alleged “silence” in custody and the harmful consequences of the events of 9/11. This objection apparently did not deter Judge Brinkema from directing the jury to consider this link in determining Moussaoui’s sentence. By such an unwarranted direction, and by introducing emotionally loaded evidence from 9/11 into the proceedings, Judge Brinkema deliberately induced the jury to conclude that the “Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions of […] Moussaoui…in fact did cause, tremendous disruption to the function of the City of New York and its economy,” as well as “tremendous disruption to the function of the Pentagon.” 

Yet, there exists absolutely no causal link between Moussaoui’s acts (of commission or omission) and the crime of 9/11. More disturbing still is that the Court directed the jury to assume that the official narrative on the events of 9/11 had been proven beyond reasonable doubt and needs not be further questioned, as if the Court had taken judicial notice of this narrative. These assumptions comprise particularly the manner in which the crime of 9/11 was executed as well as the identity of the perpetrators. Remember that none of the facts surrounding the crime of 9/11 has ever been judicially determined, let alone proved beyond reasonable doubt, as is the practice in criminal cases. Judge Brinkema expected the members of the jury to rely – with regard to the events of 9/11 – on what they had read in newspapers.

Unfortunately, the Moussaoui case is now widely hailed as the “first conviction” of a 9/11 terrorist. While everybody is rightly shocked by Moussaoui’s obscene shoutings, these alone do not justify the inhumane sentence inflicted on this person. I share his family’s grief and anger.

More serious in terms of policy is that this trial may induce in the public a false sense of vindication, as if the families of the victims could now feel relieved that justice had been rendered. This is far from being the case. Moussaoui did not participate in the mass murder. His trial was an attempt to show some result in the war on terror. The various irregularities accompanying the trial, including those mentioned above, only served to undermine public confidence in the judicial process. The trial did not increase public security: The real planners and perpetrators of 9/11, whoever they are, still roam at large, and represent a true threat. The trial did not either contribute to a better insight into what actually happened on 9/11. Moussaoui’s inexplicable confessions were seized by the Government as one more occasion to refrain from proving its case on the events of 9/11.

I urge you, respectfully, to consider seriously the above shortcomings, if an Appeal is going to be lodged on behalf of Moussaoui.

Sincerely yours,

Elias Davidsson
Reykjavik, Iceland

Scholars Call Moussaoui Trial a ‘Charade’

Scholars Call Moussaoui Trial a “Charade;?

See Constitutional Rights on Trial; Describe Accused as Patsy
1/3/06

Witness tampering, faked evidence, inflammatory testimony display political motives and confirm Charlie Sheen’s concerns, experts claim.

Washington, DC (PRWEB) April 22, 2006 ? The trial holding Zacarias Moussaoui responsible for the horrors of 9/11 has all the marks of a political charade, according to Scholars for 9/11 Truth, a society of experts devoted to exposing falsehoods and establishing truths about the events of that day. “Even the most basic elements of due process have been violated,” according to James H. Fetzer, its founder and co-chair, “by failing to prove that the accused had anything to do with 9/11. What we are seeing here tends to substantiate Charlie Sheen’s allegations.”

Fetzer insists there has been a clever ruse to confuse the jury by using a confession to one plot as though it were evidence of complicity in another. As The New York Times (April 27, 2005) reported, Moussaoui “confessed? to having been involved in a plot to fly a plane into the White House to free Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who is serving a life sentence for terrorist acts. He denied that he was part of the 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C.

A Judicial “Shell Game?

The mentally instable Moussaoui has now “confessed” that he and shoe-bomber Richard Reid were going to hijack a fifth aircraft and fly it into the White House, which was not the plot of which he was convicted. The Scholars believe government prosecutors have been playing a deceptive “shell game? by tying him to 9/11. Even the FBI has expressed doubts about Moussaoui’s new version of events, since Reid left a will naming Moussaoui as his beneficiary, which was very odd if they were going to participate in a suicide mission together.

The government claims Moussaoui should be put to death for failing to report everything he knew about 9/11, which it claims would have saved lives. “This is blatantly unconstitutional,” says 9/11 Truth Scholar Webster Tarpley. “Under the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, nobody can be prosecuted for a failure to incriminate themselves.”?

“This entire trial has been a farce,” says Fetzer, a professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. “Government prosecutors have contaminated witnesses, elicited testimony they cannot corroborate, and ? according to multiple reports ? even forced Moussaoui to wear a “stun belt”. 50,000 volts should be enough to keep anyone from straying from the script,” he said. “It is very difficult to imagine how testimony taken under duress is admissible.”

The 9/11 Truth Movement

The fast-growing, over 200-member strong society is only the tip of an iceberg of a ?9/11 Truth? movement which has produced dozens of books and scores of websites assailing the official version of 9/11. According to those involved, it’s an uphill battle. John Leonard, a member of S9/11T and the publisher of several books on 9/11, including one by Webster Tarpley, insists that at least one basic element of the ?9/11 Truth? idea can be conveyed in less than a minute, but he finds most Americans have psychological barriers to it.

“When we hit a fact that contradicts our world view, we usually pause, rationalize it and keep going. But sometimes we stumble onto something and want to dig deeper. That’s where 9/11 researchers get started.” Psychologists describe the resistance to ideas that threaten our sense of security as “cognitive dissonance”, which can occur when, for example, a mother discovers evidence her husband has been molesting their daughter.

To demonstrate his position, Leonard asks people to consider three points:

First, as the video-clip on this page (wtc7.gif) reveals, when WTC-7, a 47-story building that was not hit by any airplane, collapsed at 5:20 PM on 9/11, it displayed all of the signs of a controlled demolition, including sudden and complete collapse at virtually the rate of free fall into its own footprint, precisely as old casinos and hotels are brought down in Las Vegas.

Second, the collapse of WTC-7 is not even mentioned in The 9/11 Commission Report and has yet to be explained by the government. When Steven Jones, professor of physics at BYU, wanted the video of the collapse played on Tucker Carson’s MSNBC program, only a single frame was shown, which is typical of the attention it has drawn from the national media.

Third, for WTC-7 to be brought down by controlled demolition implies the existence of previously positioned explosives. That raises the possibility there were previously positioned explosives in WTC-1 and WTC-2 as well. Jones? own physics research, archived on the Scholar’s web site at st911.org, suggests that all three must have been brought down by controlled demolition.

Appeals to Fabricated Evidence

The most stunning example of government mendacity in the Moussaoui trial, Fetzer explains, came with the inflammatory recordings, allegedly the last moments of Flight 93, which went down in Pennsylvania. “Not only should they not have been admitted into evidence,” he said, “but Allen Green has noted that much of the conversation is from the passenger cabin ” which would not have been picked up in by the cockpit voice recorder, even through an open door. Yet the cockpit door was supposed to be closed before it was finally broken open using a drink cart.”

Another blunder was noted by a Muslim member of S9/11T. The last words of the “hijackers” that the tape are “Allah is great! (Allahu akbar!?). Muhammad Columbo says, “The last words of a Muslim cannot be these! They are used in the call to prayer, or in an attack at war. On the moment of death, a Muslim must confirm that “There is but one God, Allah, and that Mohammed is his prophet!? The government’s own evidence proves either the tapes or the Muslims are fake.

Fetzer has also been struck by the use of phrases that appear to come from Hollywood scripts. “It’s not enough that he talks about “making his day? as though he were a fan of Dirty Harry, but he also parodies “Born in the USA? with his rendition of “Burn in the USA” and has described his trial as a “cyberlynching”. We are so used to movies that we may not notice this is supposed to be real life, where this trial appears to be following a script.

Patsies and Moles

Another perception of the events taking place in Alexandria, VA, comes from Webster Tarpley. “Moussaoui represents the classic case of the patsy ?- part double agent consciously working for the government, part psychotic, part fanatic, part dupe,” Tarpley observes. “His lawyers tried to save him by suggesting he is a delusional paranoid schizophrenic, and this may be accurate.” (See www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/17/AR2006041700637.html.)

“Like shoe bomber Richard Reid, Moussaoui is a product of Finsbury mosque in London, long notorious as a British intelligence recruiting center for expendable patsies”? In his book, ?9/11: Synthetic Terror,” Tarpley explains that, “Again and again, terrorist groups with US-UK backing have intervened against progressive nationalists in the Arab world, in favor of fundamentalists.”

Of “false-flag? operations (a term from sailing ship days, when a war could be begun by raising an enemy flag and attacking one’s own side), Tarpley observes, “The patsies ultimately have three vital functions. The first is that they have to be noticed. They must attract lots and lots of attention. They may issue raving statements.” That description does seem to fit Moussaoui.

Secondly, they must stay out of jail, not to carry out the terrorist attack ” that is a job for the professionals ? but only to be blamed for it. Keeping them out of jail is a job for “the moles.”

After the terror act is complete, the moles turn on the patsies and destroy them. In this case, the situation may be more complex, since Moussaoui has expressed the belief that he is going to be pardoned by President Bush, possibly in exchange for Americans captured in the war in Iraq.

Painwashing and Propaganda

On March 21, 2006, CBS reported the prosecutors? allegation that Moussaoui’s lies to FBI agent Harry Samit had prevented the FBI from thwarting or at least minimizing the 9/11 attacks. Samit himself, however, in one of the most embarrassing twists of the trial with regard to the government’s case, testified that he had already “warned higher-ups and others in the government at least 70 times that Moussaoui was a terrorist.”

This nullifies the entire prosecution, Fetzer observes. “Ignoring five or six reports of this kind might reflect incompetence. Twenty or thirty, criminal neglect. But ignoring 70 reports has to be a matter of deliberate policy.” Samit’s testimony proves that, even if Moussaoui had come forward to incriminate himself in a plot in which he was not involved, it would not have helped. “Which means,” Fetzer adds, “that this trial is simply an exercise in propaganda.”

Jerry Mazza, Online Journal (April 14, 2006), has described the trial as a “painwashing,” which he defines as repeating the same painful stories over and over again until the audience’s resistance to questioning their authenticity is overcome. Leonard adds, ?9/11 was what Pavlov called “traumatic conditioning,” a way of reversing your normal characteristics by deep shock.”

“If our findings are correct,” Fetzer observed, “then the American government has been using acts of violence to instill fear into the American people in order to manipulate us for political purposes. That, however, is the definition of “terrorism?; which means that the American government has been practicing terrorism on the American people. That may be difficult for many Americans to accept, but the evidence is clear and compelling. Charlie Sheen was right!?

***

Moussaoui is innocent!

Moussaoui is innocent!
by Elias Davidsson
4 May 2006

Today, the media announced that Zacarias Moussaoui was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for allegedly contributing to the mass murder of 9/11. Thus ended the Moussaoui saga, which began in August 2001, when he was arrested.

The entire Moussaoui trial was punctuated by irregularities and unfairness: Moussaoui was not entitled to choose his own defense lawyer. The trial judge, Leonie Brinkema, accepted inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding the commission of the mass murder of 9/11, and accepted that the Government link Moussaoui’s statements with such hearsay evidence. She also admitted a Statement of Facts signed by Moussaoui, which includes alleged facts that Moussaoui could not in any way certify (when these alleged facts occurred, he sat in prison) and which were also unproved by themselves. His appointed judges did not ask that such a document be rejected as inadmissible. The Government did not bother to prove the facts “admitted” by Moussaoui. It relied on his own ravings as if they were the truth. Moussaoui was not permitted to have alleged Al Qaeda members in US detention testify in his case, on the absurd allegation by the US Government that their testimony might endanger US national security. The jury was never told that the whole official account on 9/11 remains until today heresay, in that the most fundamental facts concerning the commission of this crime have not been judicially established but determined by a political body.

Zacarias Moussaoui has not killed anyone. His alleged silence in custody did not cause – according to legal rules of causation – the death of anyone. His contradictory and bizarre statements should not have been taken at face value by the court. He may have been brainwashed. He may have been bribed or coerced to say what he said. He may be mentally insane. He may be megalomanic. In trying to demonstrate that finally one person was convicted for the mass murder of 9/11, the US Government found no one better to convict that this wreck, while the accused planners of the mass murder, Ramzi Binsalshibh and Khaled Mohammed Sheikh, who find themselves incommunicado in US custody, have neither been indicted nor presented to a judge. We do not know whether they have been tortured, brainwashed, or killed. We don’t know and the Moussaoui court did not ask, while accepting a summary of their alleged testimony.Judge Brinkema accepted to play this dirty game. 

Whether Moussaoui will remain in prison all his life, or compelled to kill himself, is anyone’s guess. His conviction has not furthered the quest for the truth on the events of 9/11 nor justice for the victims. 

The decision to sentence Zacarias Moussaoui to life imprisonment will remain a historical stain on US justice. Meanwhile the real planners and perpetrators of the mass murder are still roaming free and capable of committing further atrocities.

Moussaoui asks to withdraw guilty plea

Moussaoui’s Move to Recant Guilty Plea Is Denied

By NEIL A. LEWIS, New York Times
Published: May 9, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/09/us/09moussaoui.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fM%2fMoussaoui%2c%20Zacarias&oref=slogin

WASHINGTON, May 8 ? Zacarias Moussaoui, who was sentenced last week to life in prison for his role in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, filed a motion on Monday asking to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial again.

Judge Leonie M. Brinkema quickly rejected Mr. Moussaoui’s motion, noting that under federal law a defendant may not withdraw a plea after sentencing. Nonetheless, the motion contained some interesting tidbits.

Mr. Moussaoui said he pleaded guilty in April 2005, over the advice of his court-appointed lawyers, because his "understanding of the American legal system was completely flawed." He said he was "extremely surprised" that the jury in the federal court in Alexandria, Va., decided to spare his life.

As a result, Mr. Moussaoui said he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea "because I now see that I can receive a fair trial even with Americans as jurors and that I can have the opportunity to prove that I did not have any knowledge of and was not a member of the plot to hijack planes and crash them into buildings on Sept. 11."

He said, "I had thought that I would be sentenced to death based on the emotions and anger toward me for the deaths on Sept. 11, but after reviewing the jury verdict and reading how the jurors set aside their emotions and disgust for me and focused on the law and the evidence that was presented during the trial, I came to understand that the jury process was more complex than I had assumed."

Last Wednesday, the jury rejected the Justice Department’s argument that Mr. Moussaoui, the only person charged in an American courtroom with involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks, be given a death sentence. On Thursday, Judge Brinkema sentenced him to life in prison.

In the affidavit attached to his motion, Mr. Moussaoui also said he lied when he testified during his trial that he had planned to fly a fifth plane into the White House as part of the Sept. 11 plot. He was also lying, he asserted, when he said he had been an intimate of Mohammed Atta, the pilot of one of the hijacked planes that day.

Mr. Moussaoui is expected to be moved shortly to a maximum security federal prison in Florence, Colo., where he will be kept in solitary confinement for the rest of his life. There is no parole in the federal system.

Moussaoui: The Patsy Effect

The Patsy Effect <!– (3.00 / 0) –> <!– (#1) –>

by DurandoKid
gsenne<ta>myDurango<tod>ne
 

25 April 2006

I can’t completely dismiss the notion that Zakarias Moussaoui is a patsy.  He seems to fit the criteria such as being a flake, saying anything that pops into his head, devotion to a cause he doesn’t appear to understand.  Perhaps he’s the Lee Harvey Oswald that made it to trial.  The whole issue of cause and effect in the 9-11 story is muddled by official secrets, non-independent non-investigations, outright lies and a trail of evidence that is claimed to be the opposite of what your eyes tell you it is.  If the trial of Moussaoui was another attempt to get at the truth of 9-11, it failed. I have to conclude that the Moussaoui trial was another instance of the propaganda system’s attempt to define reality.  This is the reality where every piece of information is just an opinion, all opinions are of equal weight, and loyal Americans should believe the official opinion.  I can’t bring myself to believe that anyt

Zacarias Moussaoui finally makes his dreams come true

Yet because of Moussaoui’s false testimony, the government’s nutty conspiracy theory, and the nation’s need for closure, Moussaoui’s name will be in the history books and the law books for all time; inextricably linked with 9/11, just as it has always been in his dreams.
http://www.slate.com/id/2139185/

When You Wish Upon a Scar
Zacarias Moussaoui finally makes his dreams come true.
By Dahlia Lithwick
Posted Monday, April 3, 2006, at 7:12 PM ET


Hand it to Zacarias Moussaoui, who managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory with his fantastical eleventh-hour trial testimony last week about a never-before-mentioned fifth 9/11 airplane; the one that he would apparently have co-piloted with Richard Reid and flown into the White House. In a trial featuring some of the most spectacular episodes of government overreaching and misconduct we will ever see, Moussaoui managed to persuade the jurors that he was a key figure in the 9/11 attacks?even though he was in jail at the time and had always claimed before that Sept. 11 was "not my conspiracy."

When it looked like little Moussaoui was too small to play the outsized role the prosecutors had scripted for him, he simply grew himself to fit into it. Moussaoui’s lies don’t appear to have actually advanced the conspiracy of 9/11, but they have certainly forwarded the conspiracy to put him to death as a perpetrator of 9/11.

Faced with the choice of believing the combined wisdom of Waleed bin Attash, Sayf al-Adl, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, or that of the defendant, jurors finally opted to believe Moussaoui and today found him eligible for the death penalty. And why shouldn’t they believe him? One terrorist in the hand is better than three in undisclosed overseas locations.

Put aside the uncomfortable fact that Moussaoui was always willing – even eager?to die as a martyr. Put aside also the fact that Moussaoui told the prosecution that he wanted to be executed. And that he was willing to testify against himself if it would mean avoiding a life sentence – because it was "different to die in a battle … than in a jail on a toilet," as he put it.

Why shouldn’t his jurors make his dreams come true?

This was what negotiators describe as a Pareto-optimal result: a win-win, in which Moussaoui, the government, and Americans craving vindication all got what they wanted. In the end, the verdict’s only casualties are a few impossible-to-explain facts. Facts that should have added up to just this: We don’t execute people for fanciful happenings that may have followed from imaginary conversations.

Nobody will dispute that Moussaoui would have happily done anything at all to help the 9/11 plot succeed. But he did nothing to help it succeed because, as everyone but Moussaoui now agrees, he was flaky, wifty, and weird. It’s not a capital crime to be flaky, wifty, or weird. Nor is it a capital crime to wish you were a hero instead of a dud.

Yet because of Moussaoui’s false testimony, the government’s nutty conspiracy theory, and the nation’s need for closure, Moussaoui’s name will be in the history books and the law books for all time; inextricably linked with 9/11, just as it has always been in his dreams. And perhaps we will all sleep better for believing that if Moussaoui had come forward and told what little he knew, we could have stopped those terrible attacks, just as it happens in our own dreams.

How lucky for Moussaoui that his fantasies and ours are such a perfect match.

Dahlia Lithwick is a Slate senior editor.

Moussaoui: It’s About Us, Not Him

It’s About Us, Not Him

April 17, 2006

Attorney Andrew Cohen analyzes legal issues for CBS News and CBSNews.com.

Zacarias Moussaoui’s jurors should resist the sweet temptation to judge him based upon the beastly words he used in court last Thursday during the waning days of his federal sentencing trial in Alexandria, Va. Indeed, to the extent humanly possible, the brave men and woman of the jury should ignore what the al Qaeda conspirator says altogether — dismiss it like the rantings of a six-year-old child — and base their life-or-death decision about him solely upon which message they wish to send to their fellow citizens and the rest of the world.

It is becoming increasingly clear with each blustery outburst from Moussaoui that his fate ultimately is about us, as a people, and not about him, a low-grade failure in the dark world of terror. It is about how experienced we have become in perceiving the terror threat around us; how capable we now are of separating true terrorists from wannabe terror punks like Moussaoui. It’s about whether we are smart enough to see through his shtick; through what his own lawyers call “manipulation;” through the bluffs and the threats and the grade-school insults. He says inhuman things. How human will be our reaction to them?

Several jurors in court Thursday looked away from Moussaoui as he mocked 9/11 and its victims. I wish more had done so. In fact, I wish the jurors in a moment of drama had simply turned their back on the guy or even walked out of the courtroom. For Moussaoui now is worthy of no more attention or respect from the panel than that. He is saying what he is saying, all the ugly words and false bravado, because he wants the world to think he is brave, a true-believer in the cause of al Qaeda, a warrior who will fight until the fight is done. He wants to do with words what he could not do in deed.

But his jurors know, and we know, that when Moussaoui was free to fight he did not. He could not. The guy who ridiculed the victims of 9/11 by telling jurors Thursday “no pain, no gain” was, is and forever will be all show and no go. He wasn’t going to the 20th hijacker; he wasn’t going to fly into the White House; he wasn’t even going to get anywhere near a plane. Every organization has its share of losers, of men and women who just don’t cut it for one reason for another. For al Qaeda, Moussaoui was that guy. Only now, with everyone who could contradict him either dead, on the run, or on government-inspired ice, suddenly he’s Genghis Khan. Please.

Some of his jurors were laughing at him in court, the Associated Press reported, and that’s because they know now, as if they did not before, that he is merely a punk — either loony or a jerk or some combination of both. Think of him as the insecure kid who, craving for attention, hectors both his friends and his enemies. Think of him as the student who tries out for the team but comes up woefully short and thus becomes an obnoxious rah-rah cheerleader. Think of him as the guy who tries to get into the exclusive club by telling the bouncer that he knows the celebrities inside.

Remember that all of Moussaoui’s al Qaeda leaders except one — Osama bin Laden himself — couldn’t stand the guy and couldn’t wait to be rid of him. The guy is a rube, elevated to the status he currently occupies only because of monumentally poor judgment by the White House and Justice Department, which picked him, of all people, to endure a 9/11 show trial. The feds should forever be ashamed of themselves for making that choice all those years ago, and for sticking to it so stubbornly since. But that doesn’t mean that jurors have to endorse it. Even Moussaoui couldn’t stick to his own script. He told jurors that he came to believe that it ultimately “was useless to differentiate” himself from 9/11 as if it were a choice.

Moussaoui tells the jury that he has “no regret, no remorse” about 9/11, as though he played a central role in its planning and execution. Notwithstanding Moussaoui’s false confession a few weeks ago, in which he planted himself at the center of the hijacking plot, the truth is that the guy didn’t know who the other hijackers were, when they would strike, which planes they would use, or any other material operational details of the plot. He said what he wanted to say back then because he was smart enough to sense that the government’s case against him was falling apart. Now, he is saying what he is saying because he figures he’ll meet the real hijackers in Paradise and at the same time become a martyr in the madrasahs of Pakistan and Iraq.

He’d be happy to see another 9/11? Sure, he told the defense attorney he had just scorned, “every day until we get you.” This from a guy whose of idea of “getting” us was to draw immediate attention to himself by asking his flight instructor in Minnesota in August 2001 whether the doors of a jet plane could be opened automatically once in flight. This from a guy who tried to train to fly 747s without ever flying a Cessna. This from a guy who kept asking his terror bosses for more money even as the real hijackers were sending their unspent funds back to the Middle East in the hours before 9/11. If Moussaoui were in the Mob he long ago would have been whacked for being soft.

He’d be happy to hear sobbing again like what he heard in court from prosecution witnesses during the second phase of this proceeding? “Make my day,” he told an attorney. “I am glad there was pain and I wish there will be more pain.” This from a guy who reportedly told his terror bosses that he didn’t want a hijacking gig on the East Coast and who made a mess of his terror training opportunities in Asia long before 9/11. Moussaoui isn’t bin Laden Light. He’s not even Richard Reid, the failed shoebomber. No, Moussaoui is a stooge; the guy who tripped over his own shadow, fell into a hole, and is about to come out a poster child for, as he so self-inflatingly puts it, one man’s crusade against a Superpower.

Jurors should forget about Moussaoui’s taunts. They should forget about his hatred. They should forget about his boasts. They should forget about the lack of empathy or compassion he showed to the innocents of 9/11. They should instead decide what punishment would be worst for him and best for America; what punishment would best differentiate our society, our culture, and our legal system from the one Moussaoui thinks it is — or wishes it would be. They should think not of the immediate outcome of their decision but upon its long-term influence on the war on terror. They should not sink to his level or allow his level to become the baseline for this and future terror trials.

If Moussaoui is going to act like a child, a petulant, spoiled, silly, bragging brat of a child, then his jurors should take a stand and act like adults. They owe it to us, to him, and in the end to themselves.

 

Scholars Call Moussaoui Trial a ‘Charade; Describe Accused as Patsy

Scholars Call Moussaoui Trial a "Charade;" See Constitutional Rights on Trial; Describe Accused as Patsy

http://news.yahoo.com/s/prweb/20060421/bs_prweb/prweb375105_2

Fri Apr 21, 9:16 AM ET

(PRWEB) – Washington, DC (PRWEB) April 22, 2006 — The trial holding Zacarias Moussaoui responsible for the horrors of 9/11 has all the marks of a political charade, according to Scholars for 9/11 Truth, a society of experts devoted to exposing falsehoods and establishing truths about the events of that day. "Even the most basic elements of due process have been violated," according to James H. Fetzer, its founder and co-chair, "by failing to prove that the accused had anything to do with 9/11. What we are seeing here tends to substantiate Charlie Sheen's allegations."

Fetzer insists there has been a clever ruse to confuse the jury by using a confession to one plot as though it were evidence of complicity in another. As The New York Times (April 27, 2005) reported, Moussaoui "confessed" to having been involved in a plot to fly a plane into the White House to free Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who is serving a life sentence for terrorist acts. He denied that he was part of the 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C.

A Judicial "Shell Game"

The mentally instable Moussaoui has now "confessed" that he and shoe-bomber Richard Reid were going to hijack a fifth aircraft and fly it into the White House, which was not the plot of which he was convicted. The Scholars believe government prosecutors have been playing a deceptive "shell game" by tying him to 9/11. Even the
FBI has expressed doubts about Moussaoui's new version of events, since Reid left a will naming Moussaoui as his beneficiary, which was very odd if they were going to participate in a suicide mission together.

The government claims Moussaoui should be put to death for failing to report everything he knew about 9/11, which it claims would have saved lives. "This is blatantly unconstitutional," says 9/11 Truth Scholar Webster Tarpley. "Under the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, nobody can be prosecuted for a failure to incriminate themselves.'"

"This entire trial has been a farce," says Fetzer, a professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. "Government prosecutors have contaminated witnesses, elicited testimony they cannot corroborate, and — according to multiple reports — even forced Moussaoui to wear a 'stun belt'. 50,000 volts should be enough to keep anyone from straying from the script," he said. "It is very difficult to imagine how testimony taken under duress is admissible."

The 9/11 Truth Movement

The fast-growing, over 200-member strong society is only the tip of an iceberg of a "9/11 Truth" movement which has produced dozens of books and scores of websites assailing the official version of 9/11. According to those involved, it's an uphill battle. John Leonard, a member of S9/11T and the publisher of several books on 9/11, including one by Webster Tarpley, insists that at least one basic element of the "9/11 Truth" idea can be conveyed in less than a minute, but he finds most Americans have psychological barriers to it.

"When we hit a fact that contradicts our world view, we usually pause, rationalize it and keep going. But sometimes we stumble onto something and want to dig deeper. That's where 9/11 researchers get started." Psychologists describe the resistance to ideas that threaten our sense of security as "cognitive dissonance", which can occur when, for example, a mother discovers evidence her husband has been molesting their daughter.

To demonstrate his position, Leonard asks people to consider three points:

First, as the video-clip on this page (wtc7.gif) reveals, when WTC-7, a 47-story building that was not hit by any airplane, collapsed at 5:20 PM on 9/11, it displayed all of the signs of a controlled demolition, including sudden and complete collapse at virtually the rate of free fall into its own footprint, precisely as old casinos and hotels are brought down in Las Vegas.

Second, the collapse of WTC-7 is not even mentioned in The 9/11 Commission Report and has yet to be explained by the government. When Steven Jones, professor of physics at BYU, wanted the video of the collapse played on Tucker Carson's MSNBC program, only a single frame was shown, which is typical of the attention it has drawn from the national media.

Third, for WTC-7 to be brought down by controlled demolition implies the existence of previously positioned explosives. That raises the possibility there were previously positioned explosives in WTC-1 and WTC-2 as well. Jones' own physics research, archived on the Scholar's web site at st911.org, suggests that all three must have been brought down by controlled demolition.

Appeals to Fabricated Evidence

The most stunning example of government mendacity in the Moussaoui trial, Fetzer explains, came with the inflammatory recordings, allegedly the last moments of Flight 93, which went down in Pennsylvania. "Not only should they not have been admitted into evidence," he said, "but Allen Green has noted that much of the conversation is from the passenger cabin — which would not have been picked up in by the cockpit voice recorder, even through an open door. Yet the cockpit door was supposed to be closed before it was finally broken open using a drink cart."

Another blunder was noted by a Muslim member of S9/11T. The last words of the "hijackers" on the tape are "Allah is great! (Allahu akbar!"). Muhammad Columbo says, "The last words of a Muslim cannot be these! They are used in the call to prayer, or in an attack at war. On the moment of death, a Muslim must confirm that "There is but one God, Allah, and that Mohammed is his prophet!" The government's own evidence proves either the tapes or the Muslims are fake.

Fetzer has also been struck by the use of phrases that appear to come from Hollywood scripts. "It's not enough that he talks about "making his day" as though he were a fan of Dirty Harry, but he also parodies "Born in the USA" with his rendition of "Burn in the USA" and has described his trial as a 'cyberlynching'. We are so used to movies that we may not notice this is supposed to be real life, where this trial appears to be following a script.

Patsies and Moles

Another perception of the events taking place in Alexandria, VA, comes from Webster Tarpley. "Moussaoui represents the classic case of the patsy ? part double agent consciously working or the government, part psychotic, part fanatic, part dupe," Tarpley observes. "His lawyers tried to save him by suggesting he is a delusional paranoid schizophrenic, and this may be accurate." (See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/17/AR2006041700637.html.)

"Like shoe bomber Richard Reid, Moussaoui is a product of Finsbury mosque in London, long notorious as a British intelligence recruiting center for expendable patsies…." In his book, "9/11: Synthetic Terror," Tarpley explains that, "Again and again, terrorist groups with US-UK backing have intervened against progressive nationalists in the Arab world, in favor of fundamentalists."

Of "false-flag" operations (a term from sailing ship days, when a war could be begun by raising an enemy flag and attacking one's own side), Tarpley observes, "The patsies ultimately have three vital functions. The first is that they have to be noticed. They must attract lots and lots of attention. They may issue raving statements." That description does seem to fit Moussaoui.

Secondly, they must stay out of jail, not to carry out the terrorist attack — that is a job for the professionals — but only to be blamed for it. Keeping them out of jail is a job for "the moles."

After the terror act is complete, the moles turn on the patsies and destroy them. In this case, the situation may be more complex, since Moussaoui has expressed the belief that he is going to be pardoned by
President Bush, possibly in exchange for Americans captured in the war in
Iraq.

Painwashing and Propaganda

On March 21, 2006, CBS reported the prosecutors' allegation that Moussaoui's lies to FBI agent Harry Samit had prevented the FBI from thwarting or at least minimizing the 9/11 attacks. Samit himself, however, in one of the most embarrassing twists of the trial with regard to the government's case, testified that he had already "warned higher-ups and others in the government at least 70 times that Moussaoui was a terrorist."

This nullifies the entire prosecution, Fetzer observes. "Ignoring five or six reports of this kind might reflect incompetence. Twenty or thirty, criminal neglect. But ignoring 70 reports has to be a matter of deliberate policy." Samit's testimony proves that, even if Moussaoui had come forward to incriminate himself in a plot in which he was not involved, it would not have helped. "Which means," Fetzer adds, "that this trial is simply an exercise in propaganda."

Jerry Mazza, Online Journal (April 14, 2006), has described the trial as a "painwashing," which he defines as repeating the same painful stories over and over again until the audience's resistance to questioning their authenticity is overcome. Leonard adds, "9/11 was what Pavlov called 'traumatic conditioning,' a way of reversing your normal characteristics by deep shock."

"If our findings are correct," Fetzer observed, "then the American government has been using acts of violence to instill fear into the American people in order to manipulate us for political purposes. That, however, is the definition of 'terrorism'; which means that the American government has been practicing terrorism on the American people. That may be difficult for many Americans to accept, but the evidence is clear and compelling. Charlie Sheen was right!"

***

How a 9/11 conspirator gave himself away

How a 9/11 conspirator gave himself away

Flight managers explain the many red flags raised by Moussaoui

CNN, Friday, March 3, 2006 Posted: 0419 GMT (1219 HKT)

MINNEAPOLIS, Minnesota (CNN) — He spoke fluent Arabic but rusty English. He had plenty of cash, but didn’t seem like the playboy type. He said he wanted to learn to fly a jumbo jet simply to impress his pals.

But when al Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui asked a flight instructor how to turn off the oxygen and transponder on a jet, two managers at the flight school had a hunch something was up.

That hunch may be the reason that Moussaoui — the only person indicted in the U.S. in connection with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — is awaiting a death penalty trial next week.

The managers — Hugh Sims, 65, and Tim Nelson, 45 — said they saw red flags before Moussaoui even showed up at the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, 29 days before the attacks that toppled the World Trade Center and left a smoldering hole in the Pentagon. (Watch the men who suspected Moussaoui — 6:53)

Those instincts earned the men, both Air Force veterans, a Senate proclamation last year commending them for their bravery that "possibly prevented another attack against our nation."

It was an e-mail from Moussaoui to the flight school’s Miami, Florida, headquarters that first piqued their suspicion. In it, Moussaoui — using the handle "zuluman tango tango" — said he wanted to learn how to fly 747 passenger jets.

"I need to know if you can help me achieve my ‘goal,’ my dream," Moussaoui wrote, listing five types of Boeing and Airbus jets. "To be able to pilot one of these Big Birds, even if I am not a real professional pilot."

Moussaoui further claimed to be a British businessman, and in the e-mail — laced with grammatical errors — he said he wanted to learn how to take off and land, communicate with air traffic controllers and navigate between London, England, and New York City.

But Moussaoui had no pilot’s license and only 55 hours of flying time on small aircraft at a flight school in Oklahoma. He had never flown solo.

"I know it could be better, but I am sure you can do something. After all, we are in AMERICA, and everything is possible," Moussaoui wrote.

Nonetheless, Moussaoui was allowed to sign up for classes and flight-simulator training for the Boeing 747. He paid $1,500 of the $8,300 for the class with a credit card, the rest with cash when he showed up at the school.

Nelson said he was suspicious because cash is so difficult to track, but he set aside his concerns, figuring the man was a wealthy thrill seeker.

However, when Moussaoui, who claimed to be an international consultant, arrived wearing a T-shirt, jeans and a baseball cap, Sims was confused.

"I was expecting this guy to show up very well-dressed," Sims said. "He just didn’t fit the profile of what I would think he would be, for want of a better word, a rich playboy type."

Sims said Moussaoui’s English skills were fair, but didn’t seem up to snuff for an international businessman.

"His demeanor was not that sophisticated," Sims said.

He also had a weird reason for wanting to learn to fly a jumbo jet, said Nelson — he told them that he merely wanted to be able to boast to his friends that he could fly a 747.

"He was telling us that it’s an ego thing," Nelson said. "That’s a lot of money to spend to play."

But Moussaoui’s overall demeanor — often characterized as brash and abrasive because of his condescending remarks to the judge and attorneys involved in his case over the past four years — was friendly, even shy, Sims and Nelson recall. (Read how Moussaoui was barred from the courtroom for his antics)

The next day — August 14, 2001 — Moussaoui continued to earn the suspicion of the flight school staff, first when Nelson saw some Syrian airline students speaking to Moussaoui in Arabic. The students later told Nelson that Moussaoui, who was born to Moroccan parents, was a native speaker.

"That bothered me," Nelson said. "It’s just one more red flag."

At a manager’s meeting at the school, instructor Clancy Prevost said that Moussaoui had asked him how to turn off the oxygen in the passenger cabin and how to disconnect the transponder used to track the plane.

"There was an unease that was beginning to spread out among all the people who had come into contact with him," Sims said.

Nelson had recently seen a training video about a 1999 hijacking in Japan in which a deranged hijacker stabbed a pilot to death and took over the controls of a 747 with 500 people aboard to prove that he could fly.

"I’m thinking, do I have that or do I have something worse on my hands?" Nelson recalled, but he and Sims were both reluctant to call authorities when they had yet to pinpoint anything illegal Moussaoui had done.

But the next day, August 15, they both called the FBI without knowing the other had the same inclination.

"I don’t know what this guy is up to, but he is paying a lot of money for nothing he can use legitimately," Nelson recalls telling the FBI. "You need to understand this aircraft weighs 900,000 pounds. It carries between 50 and 57,000 gallons of jet fuel.

"If you fly it at 350 knots into a heavily populated area, you’re going to kill a boatload of people."

Sims called later and spoke to the same agent, telling him Moussaoui wanted training "that could become dangerous."

The following day, FBI and immigration agents went to Moussaoui’s hotel and arrested him. He had no visa, and his French passport allowed him to stay in the country only 90 days. He had exceeded it.

Moussaoui was indicted in December 2001 in connection with the 9/11 attacks, and upon pleading guilty to terrorism conspiracies last year, Moussaoui revealed he had been less than forthcoming when he told flight instructors his dream was to "pilot one of these Big Birds."

In fact, Moussaoui told the court, his dream was to pilot a big bird right into the White House in what he hoped was a second wave of attacks to follow the ones in New York and Washington.

"Maybe we did stop something from happening," Nelson said. "I was hoping I was wrong, because being right — we saw what being right was — 9/11."

Moussaoui Tells Court 9/11’s Toll Was Too Low

Moussaoui Tells Court 9/11’s Toll Was Too Low

By Jerry Markon and Timothy Dwyer
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, April 14, 2006; Page A01

Zacarias Moussaoui proudly reaffirmed his involvement in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist plot yesterday and said his only regret was that more Americans didn’t die.

Taking the stand for the second time at his death-penalty trial, Moussaoui calmly and matter-of-factly said that the sobbing Sept. 11 survivors and family members who testified against him were "disgusting," that the testimony of one man who crawled out of his burning Pentagon office was "pathetic" and that executed Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was "the greatest American."

In this image released by the U.S. District Court, a government exhibit shows a photo of an airplane part found in a crater at the scene in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, where United Air Lines Flight 93 crashed on Sept. 11, 2001, that was introduced at the sentencing trial of admitted terrorist conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. (AP Photo/U.S. District Court)
In this image released by the U.S. District Court, a government exhibit shows a photo of an airplane part found in a crater at the scene in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, where United Air Lines Flight 93 crashed on Sept. 11, 2001, that was introduced at the sentencing trial of admitted terrorist conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. (AP Photo/U.S. District Court) (AP)
Special Report

A 12-member jury has determined that Zacarias Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty last April to six counts of conspiring with al Qaeda in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, is eligible to be executed.

His cool demeanor was on display throughout his cross-examination. Moussaoui laughed when Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert A. Spencer asked if he thought the United States was destined to fall. "I know it, I know it," he said. He stared at Spencer as the prosecutor inquired, "You wake up every day to destroy the United States, don’t you?"

"To the best of my ability," Moussaoui responded.

"It was your choice to accept a suicide mission from Osama bin Laden," Spencer stated.

"It was my pleasure," Moussaoui clarified.

The exchange between the prosecutor and the terrorist came as Moussaoui’s attorneys began their case to spare the convicted al-Qaeda operative’s life. But, just as he did when he testified in the trial’s first phase, Moussaoui may have hamstrung that argument before it began.

His words triggered tears from one family member of a Sept. 11 victim. An official from the U.S. attorney’s office put her arm around the woman and escorted her out. Outside the U.S. District Courthouse in Alexandria, Abraham Scott of Springfield, whose wife, Janice Marie Scott, died at the Pentagon on Sept. 11, said that hearing Moussaoui again left him feeling "like raw meat, like a pincushion."

"I can’t go beyond that or I’ll go insane," Scott said. "All I care about is putting him to death . . . regardless of what he wants."

What Moussaoui wants, he indicated yesterday, was to live to fight another day. He said he hopes jurors sentence him to life in prison, adding that he told the truth when he testified several weeks ago that he planned to fly a fifth hijacked plane into the White House on Sept. 11. "If I testify truthfully, I know that God will help me and I will not be executed," he said.

He said he was convinced that President Bush would free him in a prisoner exchange and that he would be allowed to return to Europe.

It was unclear how Moussaoui thought his statements would help his case and whether they represented his real feelings. He has gone back and forth on the subject of execution several times since he was charged with conspiring with al-Qaeda in 2001, often seeming to embrace the possibility of death. Some legal experts wondered if he was using reverse psychology with the jurors yesterday, expressing a wish for life when his real aim was to die a martyr.

What was clear was that the more familiar Moussaoui — known for his fiery courtroom speeches and vitriolic pleadings filed from jail — was back. He had sat quietly for most of the trial, but yesterday he proclaimed his hatred for the United States, saying he didn’t care what the jury thought about him because he would be judged only by God.

Moussaoui, 37, pleaded guilty last year to conspiring with al-Qaeda in the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. He is the only person convicted in a U.S. courtroom on charges stemming from Sept. 11. After three weeks of testimony, federal jurors this month said Moussaoui was eligible for execution, finding that his lies to federal agents when he was arrested in August 2001 allowed the attacks to go forward. The jury is now hearing testimony about whether Moussaoui should be put to death.
 

His testimony yesterday was another significant moment in a sentencing hearing that has had its share of gut-wrenching emotion. Jurors heard from more than 35 family members of Sept. 11 victims who told how the attacks shattered their lives. On Wednesday, prosecutors played a tape of the cockpit voice recorder depicting the struggle of passengers to retake control of United Airlines Flight 93, one of the four planes hijacked Sept. 11.

Yesterday featured more of the role reversals that have come to mark the proceedings. In the trial’s first phase, defense attorneys portrayed their client as a liar after he testified about his planned attack on the White House, while prosecutors said he was telling the truth. Yesterday, prosecutors portrayed Moussaoui as perfectly sane — he happily agreed — while his attorneys, who had fervently opposed his testimony, tried to leave jurors with the impression that he is irrational and delusional.

Questioned by his court-appointed attorney, Gerald T. Zerkin, Moussaoui declared that he thought his attorneys were trying to kill him. He denounced members of the defense team, saying they were more interested in fame than in saving his life and had refused his repeated requests for a Muslim attorney.

Moussaoui said his previous statements, including his wish to be executed as a martyr, were all part of his battle against America. "This is what I call psychological war or propaganda," he said.

Invited by Zerkin to explain why he hates America, Moussaoui said much of the reason is U.S. support for Israel, saying the Jewish state was "a creation of the Jewish community of New York and London. . . . For me, the Jewish state of Palestine is a missing star in the American flag. You are the head of the snake for me. If I want to destroy the Jewish state of Palestine, I have to destroy you."

Staring directly at Zerkin, who is Jewish, Moussaoui calmly said that he and other Muslims want to "exterminate" American Jews. Zerkin stared impassively back.

More incendiary statements followed. Moussaoui said that he had no regrets to offer the Sept. 11 family members who testified and that he finds it "disgusting that some people would come here to share their grief at the death of someone else. . . . Many of them, they will cry, be very emotional, but when they pass by me, they stare at me and they don’t cry."

Asked by Spencer whether he had any regrets at all, Moussaoui said, "There is no regret for justice."

Asked about the testimony of U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Thurman, who recalled how he fled his burning Pentagon office Sept. 11, Moussaoui said: "It was pathetic. I was regretful that he didn’t die."

After Moussaoui endorsed suicide bombing missions as "not crazy but based on Islam," Spencer said softly, "You would do it again tomorrow if you could, wouldn’t you?"

"Today," Moussaoui answered, smiling.

Government in Moussaoui trial admits no evidence that he, shoe-bomber Reid planned attack

Government in Moussaoui trial admits no evidence that he, shoe-bomber Reid planned attack

 

By MATTHEW BARAKAT Associated Press Writer
20 April 2006

(AP) – ALEXANDRIA, Virginia-The government conceded Thursday it had no evidence that would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid was to have conducted a terrorist hijacking with Zacarias Moussaoui, as Moussaoui has claimed.

 

The defense introduced a statement, agreed to by the government, that was presented to the jury considering whether Moussaoui should be executed or imprisoned for life.

news230(); Click here to find out more!

Moussaoui had stunned his trial on March 27 by claiming for the first time that he had intended to participate in the Sept. 11 attacks before his arrest a month earlier, and Reid was to have been an accomplice.

 

His lawyers hoped the statement would help undercut that claim and bolster their argument that their client is lying about his role in the attacks to inflate his place in history or achieve martyrdom through execution.

 

Earlier, defense lawyers tried to bring Reid to court from the federal prison in Colorado, where he is serving a life sentence for attempting to detonate a shoe bomb on a trans-Atlantic flight in late 2001.

 

That bid was thwarted, but defense attorneys were able to obtain from the government its agreement on the statement about Reid.

 

"No information is available to indicate that Richard Reid had pre-knowledge of the Sept. 11 operation or was instructed by al-Qaida leaders to conduct an operation in coordination with Moussaoui," the statement said.

 

The statement also said Reid had named Moussaoui as the beneficiary in his will and two FBI analysts concluded that was an unlikely decision for him to make had they planned a joint suicide mission.

 

The statement also said the FBI has learned from al-Qaida sources that Reid had been ordered to undertake shoe-bombing attacks in late 2001 with another operative, Saajid Badat, who pulled out of the operation and has never been heard from again.

 

The two FBI analysts also said that it was unlikely Reid was part of a Sept. 11 plot with Moussaoui because he spent the period from May to September 2001 traveling abroad, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey and Amsterdam and The Hague in the Netherlands.

 

By contrast, the statement said, all members of the Sept. 11 operation were in the United States by July 2001.

 

The courtroom development followed a second round of testimony from families of Sept. 11, 2001, victims, who were brought forward by the lawyers trying to spare Moussaoui’s life. These witnesses pressed their point that they sought no revenge for their loss.

 

Testimony from about a dozen relatives was meant to counter the emotional punch of nearly four dozen witnesses who gave heartbreaking testimony for prosecutors about the impact of the attacks that killed close to 3,000 people.

 

Among defense witnesses Thursday was Andrea LeBlanc of New Hampshire, who lost her husband Robert, a retired geography professor, on the United Airlines plane that struck the second of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York.

 

She recalled having watched television when that plane hit and finding out hours later that her husband had been on it. She also remembered the pain of having to tell her children.

 

"To their credit, they’re all their father’s children," said LeBlanc, an opponent of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. "There’s never angry words, no recrimination or vengeance-seeking."

 

Court rules prohibited witnesses on either side from opining on the choice the jurors will face when deliberations begin next week: whether Moussaoui should be sentenced to death or life in prison.

 

Still, the defense witnesses left the unmistakable message that they opposed Moussaoui’s execution, as they talked about how they have devoted their lives to reconciliation rather than vengeance.

 

Alice Hoglan, mother of a public relations man, Mark Bingham, who died on United Flight 93 in Pennsylvania, said she had tried since Sept. 11 to embody the values of her son, "who embraced everyone."

 

Bingham was flying to San Francisco that day for the wedding of a fraternity brother, an Egyptian Muslim.

 

His mother said she and other relatives of Flight 93 victims now sponsor athletic events and hope to create a scholarship in Bingham’s name.

 

Moussaoui is the only person charged in this country in the attacks. The jury deciding his fate already has declared him eligible for the death penalty by determining that his actions caused at least one death on Sept. 11.

 

Even though Moussaoui was in jail in Minnesota at the time of the attacks, the jury ruled that lies he told federal agents a month before the attacks kept authorities from identifying and stopping some of the hijackers.

 

Moussaoui has pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaida to fly planes into U.S. buildings, but not on Sept. 11.

 

 

AP Writer Michael J. Sniffen contributed to this story.

Moussaoui jury hears 9/11 cockpit recordings .

 

Moussaoui jury hears 9/11 cockpit recordings .

Staff and agencies
Wednesday April 12, 2006
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,,1752514,00.html

Jurors deciding whether Zacarias Moussaoui should be executed were today played recordings from the cockpit of one of the planes hijacked on September 11.

 

US federal prosecutors played a tape of the last 31 minutes in the cockpit of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in western Pennsylvania during the 2001 terror attacks on the US.

The recordings revealing the terror of the passengers after al-Qaida hijackers took control of the plane, one of four to be simultaneously hijacked. It was the first time they had been heard in public.

Two planes were flown into the World Trade Centre twin towers and another into the Pentagon, killing almost 3,000 people.

The recording began at 9.31am with a hijacker’s voice clearly stating: “Ladies and gentlemen, this is the captain … we have a bomb on board, so sit.”

For the next few minutes, passengers were repeatedly told “don’t move” and “shut up”.

The hijackers alternated between Arabic and English, and a translation of their Arabic words was provided to the jury. At one point, a hijacker was heard to say: “In the name of Allah, most merciful, most compassionate.”

A voice in the cockpit was heard saying: “Please don’t hurt me. Oh God.” A few seconds later, somebody said: “I don’t want to die.”

As the tape proceeded, it became clear that passengers were gaining the upper hand in their attempts to regain control of the aircraft.

A hijacker’s voice said: “They want to get in”, and the sounds of a struggle could be heard. At that point, the plane appeared to go out of control.

At 10.02, a hijacker said: “Give it to me. Give it to me.” At 10.03, the plane dived amid crashing sounds.

The last sound heard as the plane neared the ground was a voice saying: “Allah is the greatest.” All 44 people on board died.

As the jury heard the recording, prosecutors played a video presentation that simultaneously showed the flight path, speed and direction of the aircraft. It had been heading for the US Capitol, according to the September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

Jurors have already decided that Moussaoui, an admitted terrorist conspirator and the only person to be prosecuted in connection with the September 11 2001 attacks, is eligible for the death penalty.

This phase of the trail is to determine whether he deserves it.

Even though he was in jail in Minnesota at the time of the attacks following immigration irregularities, the jury ruled that lies he had told federal agents a month before September 11 had kept them from identifying and stopping some of the hijackers.

Prosecutors must prove the victims suffered heinous and cruel physical abuse and that his acts resulted in “serious physical and emotional injuries, including maiming, disfigurement and permanent disability” to numerous survivors, and injured or harmed the victims’ families, friends and co-workers.

Moussaoui’s defence team is likely to claim that the jury should spare his life because of his limited role in the attacks, evidence that he is mentally ill and because his execution would only play into his dream of martyrdom.

During earlier court sessions, the 37-year-old French citizen at various times appeared distracted, animated and recalcitrant. He has thwarted the efforts of his defence lawyers to depict him as a deranged would-be terrorist.

Moussaoui said he wants to be executed to avoid a life sentence because it is “different to die in a battle … than in a jail on a toilet”.

The case continues.

Link: http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,,1752514,00.html

Moussaoui’s trial: Open letter to Judge Leonie Brinkema

I am concerned that your contradictory directions to the jury and the failure by your Court to establish, according to standards of evidence required in criminal law, that the crime of 9/11 was committed by the nineteen alleged hijackers,  may represent a gross miscarriage of justice.  
Open letter to Judge Leonie Brinkema,
U.S. District Court,
Alexandria, Virginia

Your Honor, Judge Brinkema,

I feel compelled to address you this letter regarding the Moussaoui case. I hope this is not yet too late to avoid a terrible miscarriage of justice.

In the Jury Questionnaire Proceedings of February 6, 2006, which was posted on the web, you gave the following direction to the jury:

"I assume every one of you is aware of what happened on September 11, 2001, and has watched or read extensive media coverage about that day and has watched news reports or read about Al Qaeda."

Yet in the same directions you said:

"Persons on trial must be judged not on the basis of what is in the news or popular media, but rather on the hard evidence presented in the courtroom during the trial."

To my knowledge, no evidence was presented to the Moussaoui court which establishes the true facts on the events 11 September 2001, and the identities of the perpetrators of the crime committed on that day.  Nor did the Court refer to any authoritative findings regarding these events by other courts. The Court simply assumed and asked the jury to assume that the facts reported in the media and in non-judicial reports were true.  Such reliance on hear-say is contrary to principles of criminal law.

On the base of these assumed facts, your Court asks the jurors to determine whether Moussaoui’s silence while in detention had the causal effect to allow the perpetration of the above crime by nineteen named individuals, who have never been found guilty for the crime they are accused, and whose identities remain in question.  

I am concerned that your contradictory directions to the jury and the failure by your Court to establish, according to standards of evidence required in criminal law, that the crime of 9/11 was committed by the nineteen alleged hijackers,  may represent a gross miscarriage of justice.    I urge you, in the name of justice, to reconsider your decisions.

 Respectfully,

 Elias Davidsson
 Rekjavik, Iceland
 17 March 2006

Was Moussaoui outfitted with a hidden ?stun belt? at trial?

If you’re wondering why Zacarias Moussaoui suddenly confessed to have been selected to fly the fifth aircraft on 9/11, you might find the answer in the linked video…

MSNBC VIDEO: Moussaoui wore ‘stun belt’ for new testimony
See video:   
 http://prisonplanet.com/articles/march2006/280306_b_belt.htm

Was Moussaoui outfitted with a hidden “stun belt? at trial?


By Jerry Mazza
Online Journal Contributing Writer

April 5, 2006

 This stunning fact was a slip of the tongue on MSNBC’s March 28 Abrams Report by NBC news reporter Pete Williams. He said he believed Zacarias Moussaoui was wearing a “stun belt? underneath his clothing and that same stun belt was controlled by US Marshals. MSNBC host Dan Abrams immediately asked Williams for some more details on the stun belt in this exchange . . .

WILLIAMS: The old outbursts were gone . . . He was very docile today . . . We believe that he’s wearing one of those stun belts, and it may be that he was very worried about doing anything that would cause those marshals to press the button. . . .

ABRAMS: A stun belt? They literally have something around his waist? That they can push a button and?

WILLIAMS: [Pause] Well . . ."

Well, swell, nothing like a jolt of hot electric to melt the truth and get the untruth told. That is exactly what seems to have happened to Moussaoui, succumbing to the stun belt, saying whatever he was supposed to say on the stand.

Unfortunately, this piece of information came to me from a reader not long after my last article The Moussaouian Candidate had gone up at Online Journal, too late for inclusion then. Fortunately, the truth can be told now.

The information confirmed my surmise that someone was messing with Moussaoui’s mind or body, leading him to change his story, demeanor, and admit to any and everything. Which lead to Monday’s jury decision reported by Richard A Serrano in the LA Times, Terrorist a Step Closer to Death, though this story did not mention anything about the “stun belt.”

Serrano did report the stunning details that occurred inside and outside the Alexandria, Virginia, courtroom that day. “A federal jury concluded Monday that terrorist Zaccharias Moussaoui is eligible for the death penalty, sending his trial into a final stage that will decide whether he deserves to forfeit his life for the deaths of Sept. 11, 2001, or is too unstable mentally to warrant execution.”

What was thoroughly mind-boggling was that no federal authority responded to Williams’ revelation on MSNBC?s nationally broadcast Abrams Report or took action to investigate and/or arrest the federal marshals if they had concealed and used a “stun belt? around Moussaoui’s waist. This is physically and mentally abusing a defendant on trial for his life. If this is true, why aren’t these marshals arrested? And when they?re brought to trial, do we “stun belt? them into confessing who put them up to their actions? That would be interesting in this off-handed pursuit of justice.

Sarrano also reported that “Moussaoui’s testimony, over his lawyer’s objections, dramatically changed the tenor of the trial. He claimed he was scheduled to hijack a fifth airplane and fly it into the White House on Sept. 11. He explained matter-of-factly how he had looked forward to killing Americans. He said after his arrest that he lied to the FBI so that the plot could go forward.”

I suppose any one of us wearing a “stun belt” and getting painfully zapped into a confession might spill some nasty stuff, if that’s what our accusers wanted. Not to mention the fact that as a pilot Moussaoui would be lucky to get a Piper Cub off the ground.

Nevertheless Serrano reports that outside the courtroom, “Rosemary Dillard, an American Airlines manager, recalled losing four flight attendants under her supervision as well as her husband, Eddie Dillard. All were aboard the plane that struck the Pentagon. She said her husband was sitting next to one of the hijackers.”

That’s very sad and also very interesting. Especially since the latest evidence I?ve seen on the Pentagon hit, especially photos and text from writer/researcher Jon Carlson, show the remains of a Pratt and Whitney JT8D engine (one of two) found at the Pentagon. JT8Ds are never used on 757s.

Rather the JT8D is used on 737s or a  Navy A3 Sky Warrior that can be configured as a 737 (right down to the logos and paint job). The A3 can also be flown by remote control and could carry a bunker buster missile, capable being fired by remote control into the west wall of the Pentagon before the A3 hit. An A3, by the way, is about 60 percent the size of a 757, not all that different. When the Navy retired the A3, they sold the fleet of them to Raytheon, the military supplier, who housed them in Van Nuys, California.

The A3?s wings were also made to fold for carrier use. And it’s entirely possible they did exactly that as it disappeared into the building. It’s also possible that the A3 came from the carrier, the George Washington, docked off the coast of Long Island on 9/11, and flown by remote control by an overhead helicopter seen in photos. So there would be no need for terrorists to hijack and fly any airlines-as-missiles, as was the case with the other 9/11 planes.

What’s more on 9/11, the JT8D engines along with remains of fuselage were removed from the Pentagon hit site by some 500 FBI personnel and transported first to the north parking lot within 15 minutes, then whisked away to who knows where.

I also submit that JT8D engines were found in New York City and at the Pentagon. At least one damning part of a JT8D engine was found in a large wire garbage basket near the World Trade Center attack and one identical engine came from the Pentagon attack. The bent street sign in the photo on the left is for Murray Street near the WTC. A similar engine (to the right) was cleaned out of the Pentagon.

But let me not digress now and dig further in this rich soil of inquiry. Hopefully I have presented a reason to doubt the ongoing 9/11 mythology. Let’s return to outside the courthouse in Alexandria. Here the grieving Mrs. Dillard went on to say, “The 2,972 people [9/11 victims] deserve this,” that is, the jurx’s decision. And in her grief and anger, albeit misinformed in my opinion, she also said, “This man has no soul. He has no conscience.” I would suspect the real homegrown perpetrators of 9/11 fit that description even more aptly than the patsy Moussaoui.

Another beleaguered family victim, Abraham Scott, whose wife, Janice Marie Scott, died in the Pentagon when the purported American Flight 77 was flown into the building, said of Moussaoui, “I describe him like a dog with rabies, one who could not be cured. The only cure is to put him to death.” I wonder if his wish and description would hold if he knew it was perhaps members of the US government who were behind the whole scenario, as terribly painful as that might be to swallow.

Perhaps we can get them to confess publicly one day soon. If and when they go on trial, would we stoop so low as to put “stun belts? around their expanding waistlines, bloated with the profits of the death machines of two wars and 9/11? Or do we simply, truthfully, let the real evidence decide whether they spend the rest of their lives in prison or go to any of the painfully convenient forms of termination todax’s prospering penal system provides.

Jerry Mazza is a freelance writer residing in New York. Reach him at gvmaz@verizon.net.

 

Moussaoui did not commit a capital offense

Subject: Moussaoui did not commit a capital offense.
From: JohnLex7
Date: Mar 14 2006 3:32P

Source: http://fray.slate.com/?id=3936&m=17137156&

Perhaps, he didn’t commit an offense at all. Dahlia focuses on the federal conspiracy law, and only tangentially refers to the two far more compelling legal arguments for why he cannot be sentenced to death, and possibly why his guilty plea should not stand. Duty and the 5th Amendment.


First, duty. Person A generally does not have a legal duty to report that Person B is going to commit a crime or is committing a crime. (there are exceptions for mental health professionals, and even lawyers aren’t bound by attorney client privilege if a client says that he is going to commit a crime) In other words, if I’m sitting at the bar, and the guy next to me says "I’m going to shoot my old lady tonight, here’s the gun" I have no legal duty to report that to anyone. Whether or not I have a moral duty is a subject for the faith-based fray, not for this one. However, the law is pretty clear that I don’t have a legal duty to do anything. So, Moussaoui had no legal duty to report anything to anyone, and failure to do so is not a crime.

Second, the 5th Amendment. Conspirators get caught all the time. Their statements to the police are often used against the other co-conspirators. However, they cannot be forced to a) talk or b) tell the truth. Any answer other than that violates the 5th Amendment’s prohibition against forced self-incrimination. Caselaw says that not only can you not be forced to incriminate yourself, but you can’t be punished later if you didn’t incriminate yourself. But wait, you say, there is a difference between refusing to answer and affirmatively lying, shouldn’t that make a difference? No. Self-incrimination means just that. Self-incrimination. If telling the truth requires you to incriminate yourself, then you can’t be forced to do it, and you can’t be punished for doing it.

This prosecution has been about overreaching from day 1. Moussaoui is mentally disturbed, to be sure, but he is not guilty of a capital offense, and possibly not of any offense at all.

Moussaoui’s indictment

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

 ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-v-

ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI,
 a/k/a "Shaqil,"
 a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,"

Defendant.
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CRIMINAL NO:

Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism
 Transcending National Boundaries
 (18 U.S.C. ßß 2332b(a)(2) & (c))
 (Count One)

Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft Piracy
 (49 U.S.C. ßß 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B))
 (Count Two)

Conspiracy to Destroy Aircraft
 (18 U.S.C. ßß 32(a)(7) & 34)
 (Count Three)

Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction
 (18 U.S.C. ß 2332a(a))
 (Count Four)

Conspiracy to Murder United States Employees
 (18 U.S.C. ßß 1114 & 1117)
 (Count Five)

Conspiracy to Destroy Property
 (18 U.S.C. ßß 844(f), (i), (n))
 (Count Six)

 

DECEMBER 2001 TERM – AT ALEXANDRIA

 INDICTMENT

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:

COUNT ONE
 (Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries)

Background: al Qaeda

     1. At all relevant times from in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, an international terrorist group existed which was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence. This organization grew out of the "mekhtab al khidemat" (the "Services Office") organization which had maintained offices in various parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan (particularly in Peshawar), and the United States. The group was founded by Usama Bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, a/k/a "Abu Hafs al Masry," together with "Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri," and others. From in or about 1989 until the present, the group called itself "al Qaeda" ("the Base"). From 1989 until in or about 1991, the group (hereafter referred to as "al Qaeda") was headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In or about 1991, the leadership of al Qaeda, including its "emir" (or prince) Usama Bin Laden, relocated to the Sudan. Al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately 1991 until approximately 1996 but still maintained offices in various parts of the world. In 1996, Usama Bin Laden and other members of al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan. At all relevant times, al Qaeda was led by its emir, Usama Bin Laden. Members of al Qaeda pledged an oath of allegiance (called a "bayat") to Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda. Those who were suspected of collaborating against al Qaeda were to be identified and killed.

     2. Bin Laden and al Qaeda violently opposed the United States for several reasons. First, the United States was regarded as an "infidel" because it was not governed in a manner consistent with the group’s extremist interpretation of Islam. Second, the United States was viewed as providing essential support for other "infidel" governments and institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel, and the United Nations organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, al Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. In particular, al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Fourth, al Qaeda opposed the United States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to al Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or those with whom it worked. For these and other reasons, Bin Laden declared a jihad, or holy war, against the United States, which he has carried out through al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations.

     3. One of the principal goals of al Qaeda was to drive the United States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members of al Qaeda issued  fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary.

     4. Al Qaeda functioned both on its own and through some of the terrorist organizations that operated under its umbrella, including: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and at times, the Islamic Group (also known as "el Gamaa Islamia" or simply "Gamaa’t"), and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and the Kashmiri region of India and the Chechnyan region of Russia. Al Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Malaysia, and the United States.

     5. Al Qaeda had a command and control structure which included a majlis al shura (or consultation council) which discussed and approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations. Al Qaeda also had a "military committee" which considered and approved "military" matters.

     6. Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hizballah, for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.

     7. Since at least 1989, until the filing of this Indictment, Usama Bin Laden and the terrorist group al Qaeda sponsored, managed, and/or financially supported training camps in Afghanistan, which camps were used to instruct members and associates of al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups in the use of firearms, explosives, chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. In addition to providing training in the use of various weapons, these camps were used to conduct operational planning against United States targets around the world and experiments in the use of chemical and biological weapons. These camps were also used to train others in security and counterintelligence methods, such as the use of codes and passwords, and to teach members and associates of al Qaeda about traveling to perform operations. For example, al Qaeda instructed its members and associates to dress in "Western" attire and to use other methods to avoid detection by security officials. The group also taught its members and associates to monitor media reporting of its operations to determine the effectiveness of their terrorist activities.

     8. Since in or about 1996, Usama Bin Laden and others operated al Qaeda from their headquarters in Afghanistan. During this time, Bin Laden and others forged close relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. To that end, Bin Laden informed other al Qaeda members and associates outside Afghanistan of their support of, and alliance with, the Taliban. Bin Laden also endorsed a declaration of jihad (holy war) issued by the "Ulema Union of Afghanistan."

The September 11 Hijackers

     9. On September 11, 2001, co-conspirators Mohammed Atta, Abdul Alomari, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, bound from Boston to Los Angeles, and crashed it into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. (In this Indictment, each hijacker will be identified with the flight number of the plane he hijacked.)

     10. On September 11, 2001, co-conspirators Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Ahmed, a/k/a "Banihammad Fayez," Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Mohald al-Shehri hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, bound from Boston to Los Angeles, and crashed it into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York.

     11. On September 11, 2001, co-conspirators Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Hani Hanjour, Salem al-Hamzi, and Majed Moqed hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, bound from Virginia to Los Angeles, and crashed it into the Pentagon.

     12. On September 11, 2001, co-conspirators Ziad Jarrah, Ahmed al-Haznawi, Saaed al-Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Nami hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, bound from Newark to San Francisco, and crashed it in Pennsylvania.

The Defendant

     13. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," was born in France of Moroccan descent on May 30, 1968. Before 2001 he was a resident of the United Kingdom. MOUSSAOUI held a masters degree from Southbank University in the United Kingdom and traveled widely.

MOUSSAOUI’s Supporting Conspirators

     14. Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a/k/a "Ahad Sabet," a/k/a "Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah Omar," was born in Yemen on May 1, 1972. He entered Germany in or about 1995 and afterwards lived in Hamburg, where he shared an apartment with hijacker Mohammed Atta (#11) in 1998 and 1999. Bin al-Shibh also was employed with Atta as a warehouse worker at a computer company in Hamburg.

     15. Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, a/k/a "Mustafa Ahmed," was born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1968.

The Charge

     16. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," with other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to kill and maim persons within the United States, and to create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to other persons by destroying and damaging structures, conveyances, and other real and personal property within the United States, in violation of the laws of States and the United States, in circumstances involving conduct transcending national boundaries, and in which facilities of interstate and foreign commerce were used in furtherance of the offense, the offense obstructed, delayed, and affected interstate and foreign commerce, the victim was the United States Government, members of the uniformed services, and officials, officers, employees, and agents of the governmental branches, departments, and agencies of the United States, and the structures, conveyances, and other real and personal property were, in whole or in part, owned, possessed, and leased to the United States and its departments and agencies, resulting in the deaths of thousands of persons on September 11, 2001.

Overt Acts

     In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the following overt acts:

The Provision of Guesthouses and Training Camps

     1. At various times from at least as early as 1989, Usama Bin Laden, and others known and unknown, provided training camps and guesthouses in Afghanistan, including camps known as Khalden, Derunta, Khost, Siddiq, and Jihad Wal, for the use of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.

The Training

     2. At various times from at least as early as 1990, unindicted co-conspirators, known and unknown, provided military and intelligence training in various areas, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Sudan, for the use of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Financial and Business Dealings

     3. At various times from at least as early as 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, Usama Bin Laden, and others known and unknown, engaged in financial and business transactions on behalf of al Qaeda, including, but not limited to: purchasing land for training camps; purchasing warehouses for storage of items, including explosives; purchasing communications and electronics equipment; transferring funds between corporate accounts; and transporting currency and weapons to members of al Qaeda and its associated terrorist organizations in various countries throughout the world.

The Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons and Their Components

     4. At various times from at least as early as 1992, Usama Bin Laden, and others known and unknown, made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons.

The Fatwahs Against American Troops in Saudi Arabia and Yemen

     5. At various times from in or about 1992 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, Usama Bin Laden, working together with members of the fatwah committee of al Qaeda, disseminated fatwahs to other members and associates of al Qaeda that the United States forces stationed on the Saudi Arabian peninsula, including both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, should be attacked.

The Fatwah Against American Troops in Somalia

     6. At various times from in or about 1992 until in or about 1993, Usama Bin Laden, working together with members of the fatwah committee of al Qaeda, disseminated fatwahs to other members and associates of al Qaeda that the United States forces stationed in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, should be attacked.

The Fatwah Regarding Deaths of Nonbelievers

     7. On various occasions, an unindicted co-conspirator advised other members of al Qaeda that it was Islamically proper to engage in violent actions against "infidels" (nonbelievers), even if others might be killed by such actions, because if the others were "innocent," they would go to paradise, and if they were not "innocent," they deserved to die.

The August 1996 Declaration of War

     8. On or about August 23, 1996, a Declaration of Jihad indicating that it was from the Hindu Kush mountains in Afghanistan entitled, "Message from Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula" was disseminated.

The February 1998 Fatwah Against American Civilians

     9. In February 1998, Usama Bin Laden endorsed a fatwah under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders." This fatwah, published in the publication Al-Quds al-`Arabi on February 23, 1998, stated that Muslims should kill Americans – including civilians – anywhere in the world where they can be found.

     10. In an address in or about 1998, Usama Bin Laden cited American aggression against Islam and encouraged a jihad that would eliminate the Americans from the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Laden Endorses the Nuclear Bomb of Islam

     11. On or about May 29, 1998, Usama Bin Laden issued a statement entitled "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam," under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and the Crusaders," in which he stated that "it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God."

Usama Bin Laden Issues Further Threats in June 1999

     12. In or about June 1999, in an interview with an Arabic-language television station, Usama Bin Laden issued a further threat indicating that all American males should be killed.

Usama Bin Laden Calls for "Jihad" to Free Imprisoned Terrorists

     13. In or about September 2000, in an interview with an Arabic-language television station, Usama Bin Laden called for a "jihad" to release the "brothers" in jail "everywhere."

MOUSSAOUI Trains at Al Qaeda Training Camp

     14. In or about April 1998, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was present at the al Qaeda-affiliated Khalden Camp in Afghanistan.

The German Cell

     15. Beginning in and about 1998, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Mohammed Atta (#11), Marwan al-Shehhi (#175), and Ziad Jarrah (#93), and others, formed and maintained an al Qaeda terrorist cell in Germany.

Hijackers Travel to the United States

     16. On or about January 15, 2000, Khalid al-Midhar (#77) and Nawaf al-Hazmi (#77) traveled from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California.

Atta (#11) Inquires About Aerial Application of Pesticides

     17. At various times in 2000 and 2001, in Florida, Mohammed Atta (#11) made inquiries regarding starting a crop dusting company.

Hijackers Receive Flight Training

     18. On or about June 3, 2000, Mohammed Atta (#11) traveled to the United States from Prague, Czech Republic.

     19. In or about early July 2000, Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) visited the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma.

     20. Between in or about July 2000 and in or about December 2000, Mohamed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) attended flight training classes at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida.

Money is Moved to the Hijackers

     21. On or about June 29, 2000, $4,790 was wired from the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") to Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) in Manhattan.

     22. On or about July 19, 2000, $9,985 was wired from UAE into a Florida SunTrust bank account in the names of Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175).

     23. On or about July 26, 2000, in Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh wired money to Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) in Florida.

     24. On or about August 7, 2000, $9,485 was wired from UAE into a Florida SunTrust bank account in the names of Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175).

     25. On or about August 30, 2000, $19,985 was wired from UAE into a Florida SunTrust bank account in the names of Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175).

     26. On or about September 18, 2000, $69,985 was wired from UAE into a Florida SunTrust bank account in the names of Mohamed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175).

Jarrah (#93) Attempts to Enroll Bin al-Shibh in Flight Training Courses

     27. In or about August 2000, Ziad Jarrah (#93) attempted to enroll Ramzi Bin al-Shibh in a flight school in Florida.

     28. On or about May 17, 2000, in Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh applied for a visa to travel to the United States, listing a German telephone number ("German Telephone #1") . This visa application was denied.

     29. On or about June 15, 2000, in Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh applied for a visa to travel to the United States. This visa application was denied.

     30. On or about August 14, 2000, in Yemen, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh arranged to wire money from his account in Germany to the account of a flight training school in Florida.

     31. On or about September 15, 2000, in Yemen, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh applied for a visa to travel to the United States, listing a residence in Hamburg, Germany. This visa application was denied in September 2000.

     32. On or about October 25, 2000, in Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh applied for a visa to travel to the United States. This visa application was denied.

Bin al-Shibh Sends Money to al-Shehhi (#175)

     33. On or about September 25, 2000, in Hamburg, Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh sent money via wire transfer to Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) in Florida.

MOUSSAOUI Inquires About Flight Training

     34. On or about September 29, 2000, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI contacted Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma using an e-mail account he set up on September 6 with an internet service provider in Malaysia.

     35. In or about October 2000, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI received letters from Infocus Tech, a Malaysian company, stating that MOUSSAOUI was appointed Infocus Tech’s marketing consultant in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe, and that he would receive, among other things, an allowance of $2500 per month.

Atta (#11) Purchases Flight Training Equipment

     36. On or about November 5, 2000, Mohammed Atta (#11) purchased flight deck videos for the Boeing 747 Model 200, Boeing 757 Model 200, and other items from a pilot store in Ohio ("Ohio Pilot Store").

Bin al-Shibh Travels to London

     37. Between on or about December 2 and December 9, 2000, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh traveled from Hamburg, Germany to London, England.

MOUSSAOUI Travels from London to Pakistan

     38. On or about December 9, 2000, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI flew from London, England to Pakistan.

Atta (#11) Purchases More Flight Training Equipment

     39. On or about December 11, 2000, Mohammed Atta (#11) purchased flight deck videos for the Boeing 767 Model 300ER and the Airbus A320 Model 200 from the Ohio Pilot Store.

Flight Training and Exercise

     40. Between in or about January 2001 and March 2001, Hani Hanjour (#77) attended pilot training courses in Phoenix, Arizona, including at Pan Am International Flight Academy.

     41. Between on or about February 1, 2001, and on or about February 15, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) took a flight check ride around Decatur, Georgia.

     42. In or about February 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) and Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) attended a health club in Decatur, Georgia.

MOUSSAOUI Comes to the United States

     43. On or about February 7, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI flew from Pakistan to London, England.

     44. On or about February 23, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI flew from London, England to Chicago, Illinois, declaring at least $35,000 cash on his Customs declaration, and then from Chicago to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

     45. On or about February 26, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI opened a bank account in Norman, Oklahoma, depositing approximately $32,000 cash.

     46. Between on or about February 26, 2001, and on or about May 29, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI attended the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, ending his classes early.

Nawaf al-Hazmi (#77) Purchases Flight Training Equipment

     47. On or about March 19, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi (#77) purchased flight deck videos for the Boeing 747 Model 400, the Boeing 747 Model 200 and the Boeing 777 Model 200, and another video from the Ohio Pilot Store.

MOUSSAOUI Joins a Gym

     48. In or about March 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI joined a gym in Norman, Oklahoma.

Hijackers Travel to and Within the United States

     49. On or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi (#77) was in Oklahoma.

     50. Between on or about April 23, 2001, and on or about June 29, 2001, Satam alSuqami (#11), Waleed al-Shehri (#11), Ahmed al-Ghamdi (#175), Majed Moqed (#77), Marwan al-Shehhi (#175), Mohammed Atta (#11), Ahmed al-Nami (#93), Hamza al-Ghamdi (#175), Mohald al-Shehri (#175), Wail al-Shehri (#11), Ahmed al-Haznawi (#93), Fayez Ahmed (#175), and Salem al-Hazmi (#77) traveled from various points in the world to the United States.

MOUSSAOUI Contacts a Commercial Flight School

     51. On or about May 23, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI contacted an office of the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Miami, Florida via e-mail.

Hijackers Open Bank Accounts

     52. In Summer 2001, Fayez Ahmed (#175), Saeed al-Ghamdi (#93), Hamza al-Ghamdi (#175), Waleed al-Shehri (#11), Ziad Jarrah (#93), Satam al-Suqami (#11), Mohald al-Shehri (#175), Ahmed al-Nami (# 93), and Ahmed al-Haznawi (#93) each opened a Florida SunTrust bank account with a cash deposit.

MOUSSAOUI Inquires About Aerial Application of Pesticides

     53. In or about June 2001, in Norman, Oklahoma, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI made inquiries about starting a crop dusting company.

Other Hijackers Attend Gym Training

     54. Between May and July 2001, in Florida, Ziad Jarrah (#93) joined a gym and took martial arts lessons, which included instruction in kickboxing and knife fighting.

     55. In or about June 2001, in Florida, Waleed al-Shehri (#11), Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) and Satam al-Suqami (#11) joined a gym.

MOUSSAOUI Purchases Flight Training Equipment

     56. On or about June 20, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI purchased flight deck videos for the Boeing 747 Model 400 and the Boeing 747 Model 200 from the Ohio Pilot Store.

Al-Hawsawi and Fayez Ahmed (#175) Open UAE Bank Accounts

     57. On June 25, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi used a cash deposit to open a checking account at a Standard Chartered Bank branch in Dubai, UAE.

     58. On June 25, 2001, at the same Standard Chartered Bank branch in Dubai, UAE, Fayez Ahmed (#175) used a cash deposit to open a savings account and also opened a checking account.

Atta (#11) and al-Shehhi (#175) Purchase a Knife

     59. On or about July 8, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) purchased a knife in Zurich, Switzerland.

MOUSSAOUI Pays for Flight Lessons

     60. On or about July 10 and July 11, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI made credit card payments to the Pan Am International Flight Academy for a simulator course in commercial flight training.

Fayez Ahmed (#175) Gives Al-Hawsawi Control Over UAE Account

     61. On July 18, 2001, Fayez Ahmed (#175) gave power of attorney to Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi for Fayez Ahmed’s Standard Chartered Bank accounts in UAE.

     62. On July 18, 2001, using his power of attorney, Al-Hawsawi picked up Fayez Ahmed’s VISA and ATM cards in UAE.

     63. Between July 18 and August 1, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi caused Fayez Ahmed’s VISA and ATM cards to be shipped from UAE to Fayez Ahmed in Florida. (The VISA card was then used for the first time on August 1, 2001, in Florida.)

Jarrah (#93) Travels to Germany

     64. On or about July 25, 2001, Ziad Jarrah (#93) traveled from the United States to Germany.

Bin al-Shibh Moves Money to MOUSSAOUI from UAE

     65. Between on or about July 29 and August 2, 2001, in Norman, Oklahoma, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI made several telephone calls from public telephones to a number in Duesseldorf, Germany ("German Telephone # 2").

     66. On or about July 30 and 31, 2001, in Hamburg, Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, using the name "Ahad Sabet," received two wire transfers, totaling approximately $15,000, from "Hashim Abdulrahman" in UAE.

     67. On or about August 1 and 3, 2001, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, using the name "Ahad Sabet," wired approximately $14,000 in money orders to ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI in Oklahoma from train stations in Dusseldorf and Hamburg, Germany.

MOUSSAOUI Purchases Knives

     68. On or about August 3, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI purchased two knives in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Jarrah (#93) Returns to the United States from Germany

     69. On or about August 4, 2001, Ziad Jarrah (#93) traveled from Germany to the United States.

MOUSSAOUI Travels from Oklahoma to Minnesota

     70. On or about August 9 and August 10, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was driven from Oklahoma to Minnesota.

MOUSSAOUI Takes Commercial Flying Lessons in Minnesota

     71. On or about August 10, 2001, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI paid approximately $6,300 in cash to the Pan Am International Flight Academy.

     72. Between August 13 and August 15, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI attended the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for simulator training on the Boeing 747 Model 400.

MOUSSAOUI Possesses Knives and Other Items

     73. On or about August 16, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI possessed, among other things:
    ?     two knives;

    ?     a pair of binoculars;

    ?     flight manuals for the Boeing 747 Model 400;

    ?     a flight simulator computer program;

    ?     fighting gloves and shin guards;

    ?     a piece of paper referring to a handheld Global Positioning System receiver and a camcorder;

    ?     software that could be used to review pilot procedures for the Boeing 747 Model 400;

    ?     a notebook listing German Telephone #1, German Telephone #2, and the name "Ahad Sabet;"

    ?     letters indicating that MOUSSAOUI is a marketing consultant in the United States for Infocus Tech;

    ?     a computer disk containing information related to the aerial application of pesticides; and

    ?     a hand-held aviation radio.

MOUSSAOUI Lies to Federal Agents

     74. On or about August 17, 2001, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, while being interviewed by federal agents in Minneapolis, attempted to explain his presence in the United States by falsely stating that he was simply interested in learning to fly.

Jarrah (#93) Undertakes "Check Ride" At Flight School

     75. On or about August 17, 2001, Ziad Jarrah (#93) undertook a "check ride" at a flight school in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Final Preparations for the Coordinated Air Attack

     76. On or about August 22, 2001, Fayez Ahmed (#175) used his VISA card in Florida to obtain approximately $4,900 cash, which had been deposited into his Standard Chartered Bank account in UAE the day before.

     77. On or about August 22, 2001, in Miami, Florida, Ziad Jarrah (#93) purchased an antenna for a Global Positioning System ("GPS"), other GPS related equipment, and schematics for 757 cockpit instrument diagrams. (GPS allows an individual to navigate to a position using coordinates pre-programmed into the GPS unit.)

     78. On or about August 25, 2001, Khalid al-Midhar and Majed Moqed purchased with cash tickets for American Airlines Flight 77, from Virginia to Los Angeles, California, scheduled for September 11, 2001.

     79. On or about August 26, 2001, Waleed al-Shehri and Wail al-Shehri made reservations on American Airlines Flight 11, from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, scheduled for September 11, 2001, listing a telephone number in Florida ("Florida Telephone #1") as a contact number.

     80. On or about August 27, 2001, reservations for electronic, one-way tickets were made for Fayez Ahmed and Mohald al-Shehri, for United Airlines Flight 175, from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, scheduled for September 11, 2001, listing Florida Telephone Number #1 as a contact number.

     81. On or about August 27, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi booked flights on American Airlines Flight 77.

     82. On or about August 28, 2001, Satam al-Suqami purchased a ticket with cash for American Airlines Flight 11.

     83. On or about August 28, 2001, Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari reserved two seats on American Airlines Flight 11, listing Florida Telephone #1 as a contact number.

     84. On or about August 29, 2001, Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Ghamdi reserved electronic, one-way tickets for United Airlines Flight 175.

     85. On or about August 29, 2001, Ahmed al-Haznawi purchased a ticket on United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, scheduled for September 11, 2001.

     86. On or about August 30, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) purchased a utility tool that contained a knife.

     87. On or about September 3, 2001, in Hamburg, Germany, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, using the name "Ahad Sabet," received approximately $1500 by wire transfer from "Hashim Ahmed" in UAE.

     88. On or about September 4, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) sent a FedEx package from Florida to UAE.

     89. On or about September 5, 2001, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh traveled from Dusseldorf, Germany, to Madrid, Spain, and did not return to Germany.

     90. On or about September 6, 2001, Satam al-Suqami (#11) and Abdulaziz Alomari (#11) flew from Florida to Boston.

The Hijackers Return Excess Money to Al-Hawsawi in UAE

     91. On or about September 6, 2001, approximately $8,055 was wired from Fayez Ahmed’s (#175) Florida SunTrust account to the Standard Chartered Bank account over which Al-Hawsawi had power of attorney.

     92. On or about September 8, 2001, an Arab male retrieved the package from Mohammed Atta (#11) at FedEx in Dubai, UAE.

     93. On September 8, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) wired $2,860 to "Mustafa Ahmed" in UAE.

     94. On September 8, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) wired $5,000 to "Mustafa Ahmed" in UAE.

     95. On September 9, 2001, Waleed M. al-Shehri (#11) wired $5,000 to "Ahamad Mustafa" in UAE.

     96. On September 10, 2001, Marwan al-Shehhi (#175) wired $5,400 to "Mustafa Ahmad" in UAE.

     97. On September 11, 2001, in UAE, approximately $16,348 was deposited into Al-Hawsawi’s Standard Chartered Bank account.

     98. On September 11, 2001, in UAE, at about 9:22 a.m. local time (the early morning hours of Eastern Daylight Time), Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi moved approximately $6,534 from the $8,055 in Fayez Ahmed’s (#175) Standard Chartered Bank account into his own account, using a check dated September 10, 2001 and signed by Fayez Ahmed; Al-Hawsawi then withdrew approximately $1,361, nearly all the remaining balance in Ahmed’s account, by ATM cash withdrawal.

     99. On September 11, 2001, in UAE, approximately $40,871 was prepaid to a VISA card connected to Al-Hawsawi’s Standard Chartered Bank account.

The September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks

     100. On or about September 11, 2001, the hijackers possessed a handwritten set of final instructions for a martyrdom operation on an airplane using knives.

     101. On or about September 11, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) and Abdulaziz Alomari (#11) flew from Portland, Maine to Boston, Massachusetts.

     102. On or about September 11, 2001, Mohammed Atta (#11) possessed operating manuals for the Boeing 757 and 767, pepper spray, knives, and German travel visas.

     103. On or about September 11, 2001, Ziad Jarrah (#93) possessed flight manuals for Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft.

     104. On or about September 11, 2001, Mohammed Atta, Abdul Aziz Alomari, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed M. al-Shehri, and Waleed al-Shehri hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, which had departed Boston at approximately 7:55 a.m. They flew Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 8:45 a.m., causing the collapse of the tower and the deaths of thousands of persons.

     105. On or about September 11, 2001, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Fayez Ahmed, Mohald al-Shehri, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, and Marwan al-Shehhi hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which had departed from Boston at approximately 8:15 a.m. They flew Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 9:05 a.m., causing the collapse of the tower and the deaths of thousands of persons.

     106. On or about September 11, 2001, Khalid al-Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, and Hani Hanjour hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, which had departed from Virginia bound for Los Angeles, at approximately 8:10 a.m. They flew Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Virginia at approximately 9:40 a.m., causing the deaths of 189 persons.

     107. On or about September 11, 2001, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Nami, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757, which had departed from Newark, New Jersey bound for San Francisco at approximately 8:00 a.m. After resistance by the passengers, Flight 93 crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania at approximately 10:10 a.m., killing all on board.

Al-Hawsawi Flees the U.A.E. for Pakistan

     108. On September 11, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi left the U.A.E. for Pakistan.

     109. On September 13, 2001, the VISA card connected to Al-Hawsawi’s account was used to make six ATM withdrawals in Karachi, Pakistan.

A Co-Conspirator Calls On Muslims To Fight The United States

     110. On or about October 7, 2001, in Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Muslims to join the battle against the United States.

Bin Laden Praises The September 11 Attack And Threatens More Attacks

     111. On or about October 7, 2001, in Afghanistan, Usama Bin Laden praised the September 11 attack, and vowed that the United States would not "enjoy security" before "infidel armies leave" the Saudi Gulf.

A Co-Conspirator Solicits Violence Against United States Nationals

     112. On or about October 10, 2001, Sulieman Abu Ghaith announced, on behalf of al Qaeda, that all Muslims had a duty to attack United States targets around the world.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2332b(a)(2) and 2332b(c).)

COUNT TWO
 (Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft Piracy)

     1. The allegations contained in Count One are repeated.

     2. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," and other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to commit aircraft piracy, by seizing and exercising control of aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States by force, violence, threat of force and violence, and intimidation, and with wrongful intent, with the result that thousands of people died on September 11, 2001.

Overt Acts

     3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.

(In violation of Title 49, United States Code, Sections 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B).)

COUNT THREE
 (Conspiracy to Destroy Aircraft)

     1. The allegations contained in Count One are repeated.

     2. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," and other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to willfully destroy and wreck aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, and to willfully perform acts of violence against and incapacitate individuals on such aircraft, so as likely to endanger the safety of such aircraft, resulting in the deaths of thousands of persons on September 11, 2001.

Overt Acts

     3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 32(a)(7) and 34.)

COUNT FOUR
 (Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction)

     1. The allegations contained in Count One are repeated.

     2. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," and other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to use weapons of mass destruction, namely, airplanes intended for use as missiles, bombs, and similar devices, without lawful authority against persons within the United States, with the results of such use affecting interstate and foreign commerce, and against property that was owned, leased and used by the United States and by departments and agencies of the United States, with the result that thousands of people died on September 11, 2001.

Overt Acts

     3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a).)

COUNT FIVE
 (Conspiracy to Murder United States Employees)

     1. The allegations contained in Count One are repeated.

     2. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," and other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to kill officers and employees of the United States and agencies and branches thereof, while such officers and employees were engaged in, and on account of, the performance of their official duties, and persons assisting such employees in the performance of their duties, in violation of Section 1114 of Title 18, United States Code, including members of the Department of Defense stationed at the Pentagon.

Overt Acts

     3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1114 and 1117.)

COUNT SIX
 (Conspiracy to Destroy Property of the United States)

     1. The allegations contained in Count One are repeated.

     2. From in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant, ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, a/k/a "Shaqil," a/k/a "Abu Khalid al Sahrawi," and other members and associates of al Qaeda and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles, and other real and personal property used in interstate and foreign commerce and in activities affecting interstate and foreign commerce, and buildings, vehicles, and other personal and real property in whole and in part owned and possessed by, and leased to, the United States and its departments and agencies, and as a result of such conduct directly and proximately caused the deaths of thousands of persons on September 11, 2001, including hundreds of public safety officers performing duties as a direct and proximate result of the said damage and destruction.

Overt Acts

     3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 844(f), (i), and (n).)

 __________________________

 FOREPERSON

 

___________________________

 MICHAEL CHERTOFF
 ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

___________________________

 PAUL J. McNULTY
 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

 

___________________________

 MARY JO WHITE
 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Moussaoui jurors get differing portraits

Moussaoui’s mother, Aicha el-Wafi, here for the trial, told CNN on Monday: "All they can have against him is the things that he said, the words that he has used, but actual acts that he committed, there aren’t any."

Moussaoui jurors get differing portraits

International Herald Tribune
7 March 2006

by Neil A. Lewis

(…)Moussaoui’s actual role has remained a mystery to investigators and officials. The trial has the potential to clarify that issue, although it is uncertain that the prosecution can provide any new information.

(…) Moussaoui’s mother, Aicha el-Wafi, here for the trial, told CNN on Monday: "All they can have against him is the things that he said, the words that he has used, but actual acts that he committed, there aren’t any."

Defense: Moussaoui described as a ‘buffoon’

Prosecutor: Moussaoui Did His Part for 9/11

By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN, Associated Press Writer Mon Mar 6, 2006

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – Opening its argument for executing al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui, the government said Monday he "lied so that murders could follow" on Sept. 11, 2001.
[0]
 
But the defense portrayed Moussaoui as a buffoon isolated even by al-Qaida and urged jurors to deny him the martyrdom of a death sentence.

In a heavily guarded courthouse just miles from the
Pentagon, where some of the 2,972 victims of Sept. 11 died, prosecutor Rob Spencer opened his case by telling the jury that "even though he was in jail on Sept. 11, he did his part as a loyal al-Qaida soldier."

"Had he not lied to agents in 2001, the U.S. government would have stopped those deaths, or at least some of them," Spencer asserted.

Court-appointed defense attorney Edward MacMahon scoffed at that idea. He termed Moussaoui’s dreams of being a terrorist "sound and fury signifying nothing."

Considered a headache and even called "cuckoo in the head" by one al-Qaida leader, Moussaoui "was intentionally isolated from the real hijackers in the United States," MacMahon argued. "Nothing Moussaoui did or said ? even a lie ? caused anyone to die that day."

Now Moussaoui yearns for martyrdom, MacMahon asserted. "The only way he can appear as a smiling face on an al-Qaida recruiting poster is by your verdict," MacMahon told jurors. "Please don’t make him a hero. He doesn’t deserve it."

The 37-year-old Frenchman of Moroccan descent, who faces either execution or life in prison without release, stroked his beard and intently studied the faces of jurors and the audience during opening statements.

Empaneled hours earlier, 10 men and seven women listened from the jury box. Across the hall, watching on closed circuit TV, Moussaoui’s mother, Aicha, wept quietly when he entered court. One floor above, families of the Sept. 11 victims also watched on TV. Outside, snipers clad in black fatigues guarded the building.

Wearing a green prison jumpsuit and a white knit cap, Moussaoui remained quiet during proceedings, but as he left for a recess he told the lawyers, "All your stories, all your American creations have nothing to do with me."

Prosecutor Spencer said Moussaoui, the only man charged in this country in the Sept. 11 plot, should be held responsible for not stopping it after the
FBI arrested him Aug. 16, 2001, while he was training in Eagan, Minn., to fly jetliners.

Moussaoui, Spencer said, was such an inexperienced pilot that the FBI suspected he might be a terrorist, but Moussaoui told them he was a tourist pursing a dream. That lie made him responsible for the deaths "as surely as if he had been at the controls of one of the planes" that al-Qaida hijacked and flew into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania, the prosecutor said.

If Moussaoui had told the FBI the same plot details he described last April when he pleaded guilty to six conspiracy counts, that would have been "all the government needed to know to stop 9/11," Spencer said.

Moussaoui himself says he conspired with al-Qaida to fly planes into U.S. buildings but he wasn’t part of the Sept. 11 planning. Instead, he says, he was training instead to fly into the White House as part of a possible later attack.

If Moussaoui had come clean in 2001, Spencer said, the FBI would have been able to use his records to locate 11 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers, including all four pilots. He also said the government would have keep those conspirators off airplanes and would have altered airport screeners to confiscate small knives and boxcutters.

MacMahon argued that Moussaoui knew less about the Sept. 11 plot than the government did. The inept government handling of the intelligence it had, he said, shows it would never have mounted the flawless probe Spencer described. "What the government wants you to believe is only a dream."

MacMahon said the U.S. government was told in 1995 that al-Qaida terrorists in the Philippines who had participated in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center were discussing hijacking a commercial jet and flying it into
CIA headquarters, but they never changed their aviation security to prevent that.

He pointed out that the government knew two of the hijackers were in the United States for months before Sept. 11 and never put them on a no-fly list.

"Nothing they were told by some Muslim loner in Minnesota would have changed that" response by the government, MacMahon said.

He said the Sept. 11 hijackers traveled in teams and trained together, but Moussaoui traveled alone, didn’t train with them and was never in the presence of a real hijacker.

He played videotapes of then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft describing how the FBI and CIA didn’t share information before the attacks, and of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice saying any way to prevent Sept. 11 would have had to have been in place years earlier.

The 17 jurors included a high school math teacher who has traveled widely in the Middle East, a Navy veteran of the first
Gulf War and an Iranian-born Sunni Muslim woman. The judge will later designate five as alternates.

The final group included only two of 21 prospective jurors who had some connection to the Sept. 11 attacks or victims.

One was a woman whose brother-in-law works for the New York City Police Department and helped with rescue at the World Trade Center. The math teacher had a more remote connection: The fathers of two of her pupils are firefighters who responded to the crash at the Pentagon. She helped freshmen make a quilt to give to the fire department.

One woman who was seated said earlier that she would tend to assume an al-Qaida member is evil. Jurors also included a mental health researcher, a man whose father retired from the CIA just before Sept. 11, a man who serves in the military reserves and a federal government employee who said he thought there was a lack of communication between the FBI and CIA before the attacks.

Outside the courthouse, D. Hamilton Peterson of Bethesda, Md., who lost his father, Donald, and stepmother, Jean, on the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, declared, "I want accountability."

"I believe Moussaoui is an excellent candidate for the death penalty," he said outside the courtroom. "He is nothing less than a mass murderer."

___

Associated Press reporters Matthew Barakat and Pete Yost contributed to this story.

Transcript of Moussaoui’s appearance in court 22 April 2002

Reading through the following transcript, one is perplexed by the ability of Moussaoui to use technical law terms with great facility, while at the other hand, engaging in religious discourse which makes him appear as a Muslim fanatic.  Moussaoui did not study law nor is there any indication that he did so after being incarcerated.   (The Webmaster)

24 April 2002
Source: Digital file purchased from Eastern District of Virginia official reporter Anneliese Thomson; (703) 299-8595 by way of www.exemplaris.com for $66.00. File digitally signed by Ms. Thomson.


0001
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
2 ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, . Criminal No. 01-455-A
.
4 vs. . Alexandria, Virginia
. April 22, 2002
5 ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, . 10:00 a.m.
a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a .
6 Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, .
.
7 Defendant. .
.
8 . . . . . . . . . . .
9 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEONIE M. BRINKEMA
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11 APPEARANCES:
12 FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ROBERT A. SPENCER, AUSA
KENNETH M. KARAS, AUSA
13 DAVID J. NOVAK, AUSA
United States Attorney’s Office
14 2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
15
16
17
(APPEARANCES CONT’D. ON FOLLOWING PAGE)
18
19
20
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: ANNELIESE J. THOMSON, RDR, CRR
21 U.S. District Court, Fifth Floor
401 Courthouse Square
22 Alexandria, VA 22314
(703)299-8595
23
24 (Pages 1 – 65 )
25 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
0002
1 APPEARANCES: (Cont’d.)
2 FOR THE DEFENDANT: FRANK W. DUNHAM, JR.
Federal Public Defender
3 Office of the Federal Public
Defender
4 1650 King Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
5 and
EDWARD B. MAC MAHON, ESQ.
6 P.O. Box 903
107 East Washington Street
7 Middleburg, VA 20118
and
8 GERALD THOMAS ZERKIN
Assistant Federal Public Defender
9 Office of the Public Defender
One Capital Square
10 830 East Main Street, Suite 1100
Richmond, VA 23219
11 and
JUDY CLARKE
12 Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Defenders of Eastern
13 Washington and Idaho
10 N. Post, Suite 700
14 Spokane, WA 99201
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
0003
1 P R O C E E D I N G S
2 THE CLERK: Criminal Case 2001-455-A, United States of
3 America v. Zacarias Moussaoui.
4 (Defendant in.)
5 THE CLERK: Will counsel please state their appearance
6 for the record.
7 MR. SPENCER: Good morning, Your Honor. Rob Spencer,
8 Ken Karas, and Dave Novak for the United States.
9 THE COURT: Good morning.
10 MR. DUNHAM: Good morning, Your Honor. Frank Dunham,
11 the Federal Public Defender, Jerry Zerkin and Ed MacMahon.
12 THE DEFENDANT: Ma’am.
13 MR. DUNHAM: And Judy Clarke for the defense.
14 THE DEFENDANT: No, I am sorry to note they are not
15 anymore my lawyer.
16 THE COURT: Mr. Moussaoui, go up to the lectern,
17 please.
18 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
19 THE COURT: Mr. Moussaoui, before you say anything, you
20 have a right to speak in court, and I want to advise you that
21 anything you say may be used against you by the government in the
22 prosecution of its case. Do you understand that, sir?
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, thank you.
24 THE COURT: All right.
25 (Pause.)
0004
1 THE COURT: Just one minute.
2 Just speak up loudly, Mr. Moussaoui. Go ahead.
3 THE DEFENDANT: Zacarias Moussaoui, (Arabic spoken.)
4 In the name of Allah, I, Zacarias Moussaoui, today the 22nd of
5 April, 2002, after being prevented for a long time to mount an
6 effective defense by overly restrictive and oppressive condition
7 of confinement, take the control of my defense by entering a pro
8 se defense set for presentation in order to mount a significant
9 defense of the defense of the life that Allah, the most
10 masterful, has granted to me.
11 I, slave of Allah, Zacarias Moussaoui, reject
12 completely the imposition of the U.S. so-called appointed lawyer
13 Dunham, Zerkin, MacMahon, and denounce their misconduct and their
14 intentional ineffective assistance.
15 I, slave of Allah, Zacarias Moussaoui, will engage
16 action against the U.S. Department of so-called Justice for very
17 serious misconduct reason that I will only explain in open court
18 today.
19 I, slave of Allah, Zacarias Moussaoui, have the
20 intention in the shortest time practically possible to hire my
21 own chosen Muslim lawyer to assist me in matters of procedure and
22 understanding of the U.S. law. This Muslim lawyer chosen by me
23 will only assume — will not assume any representation in the
24 Court.
25 So physically I have to go through some events before I
0005
1 can explain the reason I have chosen with — of making this
2 decision, and if you will allow me, I will explain to you in a
3 short time.
4 I’m sure that you will recall that I did try to contact
5 you on the 27th of March. I sent a message through the jail so
6 that I would place a phone call to your office or direct to you.
7 And at the end of the message that I have here, I made clear that
8 I didn’t want my lawyer to be informed, because a very serious
9 development have happened. So this is, in a sense, the letter
10 that I wanted — I tried to send to you.
11 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Moussaoui, before you
12 publish that in open court, I want to make sure you understand
13 that once you’ve announced it, everybody’s going to know. And
14 there may be private things that went on between you and your
15 counsel that it would not be to your advantage to have the
16 government be aware of.
17 THE DEFENDANT: I’m fully aware that on my right that
18 some people were seeking my death. I’m fully aware. Thank you.
19 THE COURT: But do you nevertheless want to make this
20 public like this?
21 THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely.
22 THE COURT: All right.
23 THE DEFENDANT: (Arabic spoken.) In the name of Allah,
24 oh, you who believe, take not as your Bitanah, advisor,
25 consultant, protector, helper, friend, those outside of your
0006
1 religion, pagan, Jew, Christian, and hypocrites, since they will
2 not fail to do their best to corrupt you.
3 They desire to harm you severely. Hatred has already
4 appeared from their mouth. But what their breast conceals is far
5 worse. Indeed, we have made plain to you the Ayat, the proof,
6 the evidence, the verse, if you understand.
7 Koran, Sura Al-i-Imran, Number 3, Ayat 118.
8 May Allah forgive me, I failed to fully understand.
9 Under the cover of assistance of the defense counsel,
10 the legal version of humanitarian assistance, the United States
11 are orchestrating my sending to the safe haven, Bosnia style.
12 What they have done is a sophisticated version of the
13 Troy horse or the kiss of death. Dead, injured, judge,
14 investigator, and the so-called defender are all federal
15 employee. I can’t wait for the jury.
16 They appointed, imposed the dream team. Greed, fame,
17 and vanity is their motivation. Their game is deception. Their
18 slogan is no scruple. The aim is SAMs appeal. Their plot: Oh,
19 you to whom the Koran has been sent down. Verily, you are a mad
20 man. Surah Hijr, Number 15, Ayat No. 6.
21 Of course, when they understood that I will not cave
22 in, they say we could go to the judge and say that you are not
23 fit or a bit paranoid. The government might agree, because in
24 the U.S., we do execute mentally retarded people, Mr. Moussaoui.
25 So what to do? Then fight. Then fight in the cause of
0007
1 Allah. You are not tasked, held responsible except for yourself,
2 and incite the believers to fight along with you. It may be that
3 Allah will restrain the evil of the disbeliever. And Allah is
4 stronger in might and stronger in punishment.
5 Surah An-Nisaa, Ayat 84.
6 Indeed, I want to fight against the evil force of the
7 federal government. And Allah say, verily those who disbelieve
8 spend their wealth to hinder men from the path of Allah and so
9 will they continue to spend it, but in the end it will become an
10 anguish for them. Then they will be overcome. And those who
11 disbelieve will be gathered into hell. Surah Al Anfal, Number 8,
12 Ayat 36.
13 No doubt they are spending million of their haram, evil
14 money, to kill me. Therefore, oh, you who believe, shall I guide
15 you to trade that will save you from a painful torment; that you
16 will believe in Allah and his messenger, peace be upon him, and
17 that you will fight in the cause of Allah with your wealth and
18 your lives that will be better for you but know. Surah As-Saff
19 61, Ayat Number 1011.
20 Inshallah, Allah willing, there will be some Muslims
21 who want to fight and spend for the money for the real day of
22 judgment. From the beginning, the United States is preventing
23 any Muslim help to reach me, so let me clarify a few points.
24 (Arabic spoken.) First I will not entertain the
25 illusion that a U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema is an honest
0008
1 broker. Reality tells me that this judge is here as a field
2 general, entrusted with the mission to get this matter over
3 quickly. Every general has a commander-in-chief, and I know how
4 much the U.S. commander-in-chief wants me to be over quickly.
5 No problem, because as Allah say, oh, you who believe,
6 when you meet those who disbelieve in the battlefield, never turn
7 your back to them.
8 THE COURT: Just a second.
9 Mr. Moussaoui, I’m going to let you finish in a second.
10 You’ve written out what you’re reading to the Court right now; is
11 that correct? You’re reading from text?
12 THE DEFENDANT: Partly.
13 THE COURT: All right. Because you are making
14 reference to, I assume, citations in Islamic writings —
15 THE DEFENDANT: It’s the Koran. I’m reading Koran.
16 THE COURT: You’re reading from the Koran.
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
18 THE COURT: All right. My court reporter, to make sure
19 we have an accurate transcript of these proceedings, is going to
20 request you give us a copy of what you’re reading from.
21 THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely.
22 THE COURT: All right, that’s fine. The marshals need
23 to make sure that’s done when this proceeding is over.
24 All right. Go ahead.
25 THE DEFENDANT: So yes, I will fight. I have no
0009
1 problem, because as Allah say, oh, you who believe, when you meet
2 those who believe in the battlefield, never turn their back to
3 them. Surah Al-Anfal, Ayat 15.
4 My rule of engagement as Allah say, invite to the way
5 of your Lord with wisdom and fair preaching. And argue with them
6 in a way that is better. Surah An-Nahl Number 16, Ayat 125.
7 These good Muslim manners have, of course, nothing to
8 do with a docile attitude. As Allah say, oh, you who believe,
9 when you meet an enemy force, take a firm stand against them.
10 And remember the name of Allah much, so that you might be
11 successful. Surah Al-Anfal, Number 8, Ayat 45.
12 I will not make your day by giving any excuse to your
13 marshal to assault me in court, but be sure that I do not fear
14 you. As Allah say, it is only Satan that suggested to you fear
15 of his friends. So fear them not, but fear Allah if you are
16 true believer. Surah Al-i-Imran, Number 3, Ayat 175.
17 My experience tells me that the U.S. will not hesitate
18 to have a trial without me. After all, they only need me for the
19 gas chamber. But Allah is my witness. Nobody will ever
20 represent me, Inshallah, because suicide is forbidden in Islam.
21 As Allah say, verily, my prayer, my sacrifice, my
22 living, and my dying are for Allah, the Lord of the Alamin.
23 Surah Al-An’am, Number 6, Ayat 162.
24 To Allah we belong and to Allah we return. I turn to
25 Allah, the almighty, for all the Muslim and all the Mujahedin I
0010
1 pray to Allah, the masterful, for all my brothers in jail like in
2 Algeria, everywhere in the land of Allah.
3 I pray to Allah for the return of Andalusia, Spain, to
4 the Muslim and the liberation of Ceuta and Medilla. I pray to
5 Allah for the return of India to the Muslims and to the
6 liberation of Kashimir.
7 I pray to Allah, Al Shadeed Al Y Rikab, Al Shadeed Al Y
8 Rikab, (phonetic), the severe in punishment for the destruction
9 of the Jewish people and states and for the liberation of
10 Palestine by the Muslim, for the Muslim.
11 I pray to Allah, the protector, for the destruction of
12 Russia and the return of the Islamic Emirates of
13 Chechnia. I pray to Allah, the powerful, for the return of the
14 Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan and the destruction of the United
15 States of America.
16 I pray to Allah, the forgiver, to forgive us, the
17 Muslim, for the occupation of the land of Haramain, the holy
18 land.
19 I pray to Allah, the all powerful, for the return of
20 Mecca, Medina and Al-Kuds in the hand of the Muslim.
21 (Arabic Spoken.)
22 Oh, Allah, you are my supporter and you are my helper.
23 By you I move, and by you I attack, and by you I battle. Prophet
24 Muhammad, peace be upon him, Saheeh Al Tirmedee.
25 So, America, America, I’m ready to fight in your Don
0011
1 King fight, even both hands tied behind the back in court. And
2 be sure Inshallah that all your ingenuity will not prevent me to
3 be in court in October. Inshallah, you will get the point.
4 The last word belongs to Allah as the all wise. And
5 remember, and remember when the disbeliever plotted against you
6 to imprison you or to kill you or to get you out from your home,
7 Mecca, they were plotting and Allah too was planning. And Allah
8 is the best of planner. Surah Al-Anfal, Number 8, Ayat 30.
9 Abukalid Sahrawi.
10 That was the essence of the letter that I wanted to
11 send you, to be read in open court. But the argument is coming.
12 It will be much shorter.
13 Can you stop speaking, please?
14 Yes, as you know, I have been arrested in Minnesota,
15 and I’ve been transferred by plane to New York and the jail in
16 Brooklyn. So when I arrived in Brooklyn, after a few day, I was
17 transferred to the Civic Center, the tribunal, to have a
18 pretrial.
19 So I was — I went to an office, and they have — in
20 this office, I met a, a clerk or an official. And he make me
21 fill some paper. So I filled the paper. He told me that it was,
22 my best recollection, is for the application for bail or
23 something of this. And I give all my detail, my financial
24 resources, my name, my address in France, different thing, okay?
25 Then after that, I went to the lobby, and there was a
0012
1 Saudi doctor, who made the front page at the time. He was also
2 there. And there was two Indian, okay? They were being charged.
3 Because I was very close to them, maybe from here to here, and
4 the FBI was saying that you have been indicted for an act of
5 terrorist or waging war or something like that, and he say that
6 he would write books. I said, “You are not going to sell a lot
7 of books in America with your story.”
8 When they decided to send me back to — to send me to
9 the judge for the first time, we went on the lift, and I was
10 expecting to see the judge. At this point, they have an order to
11 send me back to Brooklyn, so I never saw the judge.
12 I went back to Brooklyn. After a few day, again they
13 say, “You are going again for pretrial.” Okay. So they send me
14 to the tribunal, and at this point, I was sent directly to the
15 tribunal, to the courtroom. And as I entered the courtroom,
16 there was already Mr. DuBoulay, lawyer Donald DuBoulay, who was
17 sitting in the rail, and he was waiting for me. So he said, “I
18 have been appointed. I’ve just received a phone call. There was
19 a sense of urgency.
20 So I sit down. I say, “I don’t want a lawyer. I want
21 to speak for myself.”
22 He say, “It’s very administrative. It’s very quick.
23 There’s nothing going to happen here.”
24 Okay. So he spoke with the judge, and I went back to
25 Brooklyn after. I’ll try to summarize as much as I can.
0013
1 Then I was indicted — no, then after I was put on a
2 material witness, again the same thing. I went to the judge,
3 DuBoulay was there, and they were talking and everything. There
4 I argue my case. I say that I was illegally arrested and I have
5 a visa and so on. I tried to explain myself. The record shows
6 that in a better manner.
7 So after that, I was indicted, okay? At this point,
8 before I was indicted, all the time when I was speaking with
9 Donald DuBoulay, I say that I want a Muslim lawyer, and I said I
10 didn’t want to have a non-Muslim, because there would be no trust
11 at all.
12 He say, “You — in the first place, you don’t have
13 right of lawyer as of this moment,” because I was on INS. So he
14 say, “You don’t have a right to a lawyer.” He say that the
15 government have appointed a lawyer for you because maybe the
16 media, the media know that you don’t have a lawyer, they will
17 treat like you are some problem, and they say that they also want
18 to, maybe to propose things to you, but never — anyway, he say
19 that it’s just at the diligence of the government. I have no
20 rights when I was on INS.
21 So I said to DuBoulay that I want a Muslim lawyer.
22 Okay. He say, “At the moment, you don’t have the right.” He
23 say, “When you get on death penalty, you have right to two
24 lawyer.”
25 So I say, “I want you to make known to the judge that I
0014
1 want at least one Muslim lawyer,” and I said to him that there is
2 good cause for having one Muslim lawyer, because the case involve
3 the Muslim, and it involves somebody who is acquainted with the
4 Muslim environment, somebody who have knowledge of what is the
5 Muslim scene, the Mujahedin scene, what you call the terrorist
6 scene, somebody who is able quickly to understand what I am
7 talking about.
8 So he say that he will convey that message, but
9 unfortunately to me that there was nothing he could do. The
10 lawyer has been appointed. He told me there was lawyer Zerkin
11 and lawyer Dunham and lawyer MacMahon. Actually, he told me only
12 the name of Zerkin; that’s all.
13 So I said that I didn’t want them, because in first
14 place, again, I repeat myself, I didn’t want a non-Muslim.
15 Okay. When I — I was transferred — I was waiting for
16 them in New York to come to the — after I was indicted in New
17 York. (Arabic spoken.)
18 Wait a minute. When I was indicted to New York, I was
19 waiting for them to come to visit me, because I stayed for four
20 day. They didn’t show up. Okay. I find it strange. I thought
21 that maybe they would be eager to immediately make contact with
22 me, but I made a mistake, because I clearly indicated that I
23 didn’t want them. Later, later on, I regret this mistake.
24 So I arrive here, and I met them downstairs a few
25 minute before court, and I immediately told them that I wanted a
0015
1 Muslim lawyer. They told me, “You can’t have one, because the
2 Court has appointed this lawyer to you, and, and there’s nothing
3 you can do. Because they are appointed, you have no choice on
4 the religion of your lawyer.”
5 They say, “But we can have a consultant, a Muslim
6 lawyer that we will hire,” and he will work with you.
7 Okay. I say okay. Because what I wanted is to make a
8 contact with a Muslim person and to tell him like I told to
9 DuBoulay the name of two or three person I knew in America who I
10 trust to a certain degree, and they will be able to contact a
11 Muslim lawyer, that I will be confident that he’s representing my
12 interest in the best manner. That’s the only thing I wanted to
13 do: to meet a Muslim person so he can contact a Muslim cleric
14 who is in Oklahoma who I know and he will find a lawyer.
15 So — this never happened anyway.
16 So they say they will do it. Okay. I was in a very
17 difficult position. I had all the United States people against
18 me, and I don’t need to give detail, but I don’t know if you can
19 even imagine. But anyway, I have to enter the situation, so I
20 decided to be patient, okay?
21 So after a few day making discussion with them and
22 everything, okay, it became apparent that it will be extremely
23 difficult to have even this basic understanding about how we are
24 going to work, okay?
25 So the first encounter was with Zerkin. Lawyer Zerkin,
0016
1 after not even a week, we have a very direct discussion where I
2 said to him that if he doesn’t want to, to adapt, to follow the
3 guidance of my defense the way I want, according to my principle,
4 my belief, my understanding, and my religion, okay, he have to
5 make a professional judgment and withdraw from the case. He say
6 he can’t.
7 So he went on holiday to France, and I told him, “When
8 you go to, on holiday to France, you can think about the matter,
9 and when you come back, you give me a clear answer.” Okay.
10 Because the last thing I wanted is them doing what they want
11 according to their idea when they have no knowledge at all,
12 because they have no understanding of terrorism, Muslim,
13 Mujahedin. They have not any understanding. He has a few proof
14 here they stated themselves. Okay.
15 So me, I never confide, I never told them anything
16 about — of substance. My name, my address, where I come from,
17 where I study, that’s the kind of thing. And they state it in
18 the letter that I have here, okay? So there was no trust. It’s
19 here as well. There was no trust relation between me and them.
20 So at first, MacMahon have a very relaxed attitude. He
21 say, “This is your defense, Mr. Moussaoui. We are here to help
22 you, okay, and we will do as you wish. You want to do this
23 according to Islam principle,” so on and so forth, okay. Nice
24 talk. The same for Mr. Dunham.
25 But on January 30, the last day of the month, I
0017
1 believe, after like something of great importance, we have an
2 argument, a divergence of opinion about a tactical point, okay,
3 and Frank send them, MacMahon and Zerkin, to visit me, okay, to
4 clarify a situation.
5 When they came, they didn’t discuss the point they were
6 supposed to discuss. They wanted to assert their right as a
7 lawyer to define the strategy and the tactic on the defense of my
8 life. So they said basically, “Mr. Moussaoui” — because before
9 in a sense, I always told whatever I disagree with. They say,
10 “From now on, finished. We are going to do as we wish.”
11 I say, “This is my life, and you have not any
12 understanding of the situation. You have no information. You
13 have nothing from the FBI. You have nothing, and you want to be
14 in charge.”
15 He says, “We are the lawyer, and we are by statute or
16 whatever, we are in charge.”
17 So I say, “So are you sure?” So I asked them three
18 time, because this is the manner of the Muslim, to assert
19 something, we used to — we ask three time the same question.
20 And if he respond three time, it means that it’s okay now.
21 So they say, “Yes. Indeed, we will just inform you,
22 inform you when we believe that it’s important.” Okay.
23 So I say, “If it’s like that, I dismiss you. You are
24 not my lawyer anymore.” And I have a letter who can show this.
25 They say, “We are not your lawyer. We are the lawyer
0018
1 of the Court.”
2 Ah. They say yes. They say they are not my lawyer.
3 Okay. I have people who defend my life, and when I
4 tell them, “You are not my lawyer anymore,” they say, “Yes,
5 indeed, we are the lawyer of the Court.” That’s good.
6 So, so here a simple example. I will jump, because
7 it’s a very long story anyway. So I will jump to the moment I
8 send to you this letter requiring a phone call to talk to you,
9 and in here I say, as a decision relating to the death penalty
10 due to be made probably on Friday, could you arrange for me an
11 opportunity to call the U.S. District Judge, Leonie Brinkema, or
12 her office very quickly? I do not wish my lawyer to be informed
13 of this request. It’s here.
14 So I wanted to talk to you in order to dismiss the
15 lawyer and to go pro se, because I came to understand that after
16 heavy disagreement, they have decided to sideline me and to do
17 what they wanted because I’m in jail, I knew nothing anyway, and
18 that’s what transpired for that discussion, okay?
19 So at first, Frank Dunham didn’t have this attitude.
20 He had a pragmatic attitude. He was saying that we don’t have a
21 concrete reason to spat at the moment. Each time I disagreed, I
22 was able to show to him that my argument was well-founded, and
23 then he say, “Okay. Because it’s well-founded, it’s okay this
24 time.” He say, “At the moment, I don’t have really something
25 tell me, no, Mr. Moussaoui, I can’t accept your judgment. Either
0019
1 you dismiss us or we do what we want.”
2 That was the deal with Frank Dunham.
3 So he have this attitude, and for me, I could go along
4 with this, because I was waiting for this Muslim lawyer that they
5 said that they were looking for, and as well have the need that
6 my case was advancing, because time was ticking. So I was trying
7 to make patience.
8 But one day, Frank Dunham brought me a list of a
9 defense investigation, and this item on the list I have refused
10 before. I say no, no Muslim, no Muslim, no Muslim, okay, because
11 I didn’t want them to interact with the Muslim, because with the
12 harassment campaign by the government, I didn’t want to put
13 anybody that I knew on the spotlight, because any association
14 with me will be terrible for them.
15 So I say no, no, no. So at first in January, beginning
16 of January, they accept it. Then after, they came with the same
17 list, and they say, “We have to do this, Mr. Moussaoui. This is
18 compulsory under the AG (phonetic), the law, and blah, blah,
19 blah.
20 So I say to Frank Dunham, “This is — you want the
21 confrontation, so I go pro se immediately.” He say yes. Not
22 him. He was referring to Zerkin, and he was talking to McGrew
23 because I say this list has been drafted by Zerkin and McGrew.
24 He said yes. McGrew is an investigator. He didn’t refer to
25 MacMahon. But, anyway, he say yes.
0020
1 The idea behind was that I will go pro se immediately
2 and you will probably order a mental health examination. And
3 they had made the mistake to tell them that I will not entertain
4 any discussion with people who advance theories that man is
5 driven by an incestuous desire toward his mother, meaning that’s
6 the Freudian theory of psychiatry, so I have nothing to do with
7 this kind of people, to talk to them, so they knew that I was
8 somebody of very firm in his principle, I hope so, Inshallah, and
9 we knew that we have this disadvantage.
10 So I will come to you as pro se. You will say,
11 “Mr. Moussaoui, we have to examine you,” and I will refuse, and
12 they will be appointed standby lawyer.
13 And then somehow I will be removed completely through,
14 for whatever means America decide. And you will see that I have
15 a few letter of opinion on this point. But anyway, that’s not my
16 main point. If you believe that my main point that I didn’t get
17 a Muslim lawyer, that’s why I wanted the whole thing to be
18 stopped, that’s not the case. There’s a much stronger point, a
19 point that belong to you.
20 So I have a few letters that say that Mr. Moussaoui is
21 a very clever man, he’s very intelligent, he’s very educated.
22 That was the beginning of our relation. At the beginning,
23 Mr. Dunham and all of them would say: Mr. Moussaoui, you are
24 just fine. But then recently they started to say, basically to
25 smear me.
0021
1 But, anyway — so I have a few letters of this.
2 So concerning the case, since the beginning, the case
3 have not advanced. Why? Two reasons. First, because I don’t
4 say anything to them. And I have a letter to attest to this,
5 where they complain that you don’t confide with us, and we are
6 not able to advance and so on.
7 Second, because the government didn’t give them
8 anything until two weeks ago. So because I anticipate that you
9 will be saying that Mr. Moussaoui, the case is four months old
10 and now you come, okay, I have a very direct letter that attests
11 that Mr. Dunham say: Indeed, anything of substance about the
12 case, of the case, of Moussaoui case, we seem to be learning from
13 the press. At this point, at this point, we are reduced to asking
14 that if a document is leaked, at least leak one to us.
15 He was talking to Paul McNulty.
16 Second, I have a stronger document than this. It’s an
17 ex parte application —
18 THE COURT: Well, now, wait. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Those
19 ex parte applications —
20 THE DEFENDANT: I’m not going to read the name or
21 anything. I’m just going to read — I’m aware — I’ve become
22 aware. I’m just reading the phrase that says that they don’t
23 know nothing, there’s no name, there’s nothing, absolutely no
24 information that is under seal. I’m aware.
25 “As of today, we have not received a single document
0022
1 that relates in any way to any of the person alleged to be
2 hijacker on September 11, 2001. Not a single plane ticket,
3 flight manifest, car rental receipt, hotel, or other travel
4 document. We have no information regarding any of the events
5 relating to any of the hijacked plane. We have no intelligence
6 file relating, relating in any way to a single person alleged in
7 any way to be involved in this conspiracy.”
8 Such information has been requested but has not yet
9 been produced. Okay.
10 “So in short” — it’s written — “in short, we have
11 almost no discovery at this time but anticipate that an immense
12 volume of material is on the verge of production in this case,
13 leaving us with relatively limited period of time to analyze and
14 prepare that information of Mr. Moussaoui defense.”
15 This letter is two weeks old. So this letter, this ex
16 parte is two weeks old.
17 I have the handwritten of Dunham, of Dunham, and it is
18 dated 4/11. So if somebody wanted to claim that the case, the
19 reality of the case is four months old, I will object strongly,
20 because this was supposed to be filed to you, and I show — I’m
21 not showing — it’s United States of America, Zacarias Moussaoui,
22 under seal. I hide the name.
23 So that shows that the case is two weeks old.
24 But we didn’t get the point yet. Let’s make the other
25 point as well, because I never know if I will be in court again,
0023
1 now, so I will be quite clear.
2 (Arabic spoken.)
3 So this is a compound by your failure to trust —
4 sorry. Here I’m dealing with the fact that I never confide with
5 them. I never give them any information. I was in a complete
6 state of mistrust with them since the beginning. And this letter
7 is dated February 25, okay, by the Public Defender, Federal
8 Defender Office, okay, and written by Frank Dunham, okay.
9 So I received the fact that we don’t have — anyway,
10 this is a compound by your failure to trust us up to this point
11 with information critical to your defense, meaning that I didn’t
12 give them any information.
13 Here we go. “The government discovery in this case
14 will be so massive that no one person will be able to read and
15 digest it at all before trial.”
16 Already he say that he’s not capable of reading and
17 digesting the thing. That’s why they decided to change the
18 approach in this case, to create a theory. They have decided to
19 create a theory to put it in the air. They say, “We are going to
20 create a theory, we will make it hang in the air, and the jury
21 will be confused. That’s how you are going to save your life,
22 Mr. Moussaoui.”
23 Thank you very much.
24 “You will have a trial team searching through the
25 literal haystack provided by the government, looking for the
0024
1 proverbial needle without knowing that it is, indeed, a needle
2 being looked for. Since you are not able to search through the
3 material yourself, given your condition of confinement, the
4 defense must do the search for you.
5 “I know, I know you know this. It is my strong hope
6 that at some point you will see the wisdom in confiding the
7 information which is vital to your defense to counsel.”
8 So he attests that I never speak to them about
9 anything. I never did this anyway.
10 So let’s go to the final point. So we have to go back
11 to New York, because all of this starts in New York, the all
12 great American game.
13 Mr. Moussaoui is not an indigent. Mr. Moussaoui, he
14 have more than $30,000 in the United States. He has at least
15 $25,000 in a bank account in Pan Am escrow, holding some money,
16 at least $6,000, this account today worth more than $1,000.
17 So Mr. Moussaoui, when he went to pretrial the first
18 time and he filled out this paper, if they went to process it,
19 they realized that they can’t appoint a lawyer, because I have
20 the resources to hire my first lawyer.
21 So they say, Mr. Moussaoui, let’s go back to jail. And
22 then we make Moussaoui direct to court, and, Mr. Moussaoui, we
23 understand this, because thanks to Mr. Reid, because they gave me
24 an article — and I don’t read much of newspaper, because they
25 are all lie, so I don’t like to read much, but as he was a
0025
1 Muslim, I see Brother Reid, he came to in front of a judge and
2 the judge said to him: “Do you understand the charge?”
3 And he say “Yeah.”
4 Reid — Reid also asked for a court-appointed attorney.
5 So he asked for it. And he was asked — it was brought
6 in front of a judge. And a judge make him understand that this
7 charge, and do you want a lawyer, because it’s a right.
8 I never had the opportunity of this, because they sent
9 me back the second time. They brought me direct to court and
10 DuBoulay was standing and he say “I’m his lawyer.” The judge
11 never asked me if I want, because they knew from the government,
12 from the mentality, if you want, I have that we never have one
13 like that. So they knew that I will ask for a Muslim lawyer, and
14 they will be — I would like them to say that they didn’t have
15 file on me about the kind of ideology I have and did not
16 anticipate that I would refuse a lawyer and especially a Jewish
17 lawyer. Okay?
18 So they knew this. So they manipulated the whole thing
19 in order to bring me direct to trial. But it didn’t stop here,
20 because this right is, I believe, in your 14th Amendment.
21 Anyway, we will go there later on.
22 So the second time when I come to Virginia, the same
23 thing happened. I came to one judge first. What was the name of
24 the first judge? I don’t even remember. He never told me his
25 name.
0026
1 So, anyway, I was brought here. And they rise and they
2 say: “We are the lawyer for Mr. Moussaoui,” but, the judge — I
3 was indicted. It was a new indictment in Virginia. I should be
4 asked: “Do you want a lawyer, Mr. Moussaoui? Because,
5 Mr. Moussaoui, you have $30,000.”
6 But no, because the government doesn’t want me to have
7 my own lawyer. They want me to have their civil servant
8 appointed lawyer, officer of the court, like they told me.
9 So I knew that under your, your law, the United States
10 law, the Supreme Court say under the due process clause of the
11 14th Amendment, criminal prosecution must comport with prevailing
12 notion of fundamental fairness. We have long anticipated this
13 standard of fairness to require that a criminal defendant be
14 afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
15 So after a court, Washington v. Texas, the right to
16 present a defense is a fundamental element of due process of law.
17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Moussaoui, I’m giving you a
18 chance to speak, but I’m familiar with the law.
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but —
20 THE COURT: Let me ask you what else — you’re asking
21 the Court this morning to let you fire these attorneys and
22 proceed pro se —
23 THE DEFENDANT: No.
24 THE COURT: — or to hire for yourself a Muslim
25 attorney.
0027
1 THE DEFENDANT: No.
2 THE COURT: Well, then tell me exactly what you’re
3 asking for.
4 THE DEFENDANT: I’m asking you three things at least.
5 First of all, unless it will be proven to my satisfaction that I
6 will not be impeded in the future, I will make an appeal for the
7 old process, because since in the beginning, this process is
8 illegal under your law. I’ve never been asked it, this right
9 that I have under your law to decide if I wanted to be
10 represented by a lawyer, okay? That’s the first element.
11 But I’m not necessary in a delaying tactic, wanting to
12 start everything from scratch. If it will be proven to me that
13 you will supply to me all the elements to prepare my own defense,
14 I will reconsider your offer, because the second point I will say
15 is they knew under the law they are supposed to give me my right.
16 They are supposed to inform me that the process, what happened to
17 me was not according to your law. They are in charge of this.
18 But because of the vested interest they have in
19 representing me, they have no — they didn’t want to do this.
20 Because the first thing when I come, they will say,
21 Mr. Moussaoui, the judge didn’t do his job. The judge should
22 have asked you first if anywhere you indicated that, yes, you
23 want appointed lawyer. Then we enter the scene. And they knew
24 this from the beginning. The same thing for Mr. DuBoulay.
25 Because, of course, fame and money and so on and so forth.
0028
1 But that’s not only this is. This endangered my life,
2 because, because of this, they know that I don’t want them, that
3 I want a Muslim lawyer, they have put aside half of the case.
4 Half of — the Muslim case, they don’t want to deal with this.
5 If they can’t deal, because as Mr. DuBoulay — sorry, Mr. Dunham.
6 It’s a mistake, it’s not Mr. DuBoulay, it’s Mr. Dunham — say in
7 the newspaper apparently, apparently that he cannot send his
8 investigator, female investigator to Muslim country. That’s only
9 an example.
10 And I know that people who could have provided vital
11 evidence for me will never, never speak to a non-Muslim because
12 they have the same kind of understanding in life than me. And it
13 was made clear to them that if they accepted the logic that the
14 case has two parts at least, one in America and one in the Muslim
15 environment. If they cannot navigate in the Muslim environment,
16 they have nobody of any Islamic understanding at this stage in
17 that team, four months, and they were contacted by the
18 association, a Muslim association, who proposed their service to
19 them. And they forget to phone back, he told me, Dunham. Then
20 after they said, “No, no they were too peace and love, they are
21 not your kind of Muslim.”
22 But, anyway, that’s only a side point. But to the
23 first point for me and to others also, in case that you will
24 dismiss the whole thing, I will fight on these three points: The
25 fact that I was never asked — able to get my rights, to choose
0029
1 my own lawyer, because I had the financial means of this, okay,
2 and I’m innocent until proven guilty, okay, so even if the
3 government have blocked my money, I believe that they have no
4 right and this should be fought in court.
5 They say no. They say this is a civil matter. We
6 can’t. And then after they say it, well, we have to wait until
7 the end of the trial. That was very — we have a discussion
8 recently, because they open a bank account for me. They opened a
9 bank account for me, because I have $3,000 where I used to hold
10 in cash when I was arrested. And the government took it and give
11 them a check, okay? It was from the treasurer. So they wanted
12 me to buy my own law books. I have a letter here that says that
13 I requested a law book to defense pro se, and the dictionary,
14 Black dictionary, legal dictionary to understand more of the
15 judicial system. They said: “You have to buy it by your own
16 money. And, anyway, we are not sure that the sum will allow
17 you — or allow them to give it to me.”
18 So that’s the point. Okay.
19 They have denied any effective assistance of lawyer.
20 They have misconducted themselves, because their interests, their
21 private interests in front of my interest, and the first one I
22 say, my right to choose.
23 THE COURT: All right. Let me first advise you that
24 you do have an absolute right under our law to be your own
25 attorney, to proceed pro se. You already know that.
0030
1 You do not have a right to pick and choose the lawyer
2 you want appointed for you. Therefore, that request cannot and
3 will not be granted.
4 THE DEFENDANT: I didn’t make that request.
5 THE COURT: You have the right to hire an attorney at
6 your own expense of your own choice. However, in this type of
7 case where there are national security and classified documents,
8 you don’t have totally unrestricted choice even if you have the
9 money available to hire an attorney, because the attorneys, as
10 you know, because you’ve seen a copy of it, have to be able to be
11 cleared to receive some of the information in this case, not all
12 of it, but some of it.
13 Now with those parameters, based upon what you have
14 said — and I’m going to give your attorneys a second if they
15 want to respond to it — you will be granted the request — wait
16 a minute — you will be granted the request to proceed without
17 these attorneys, but let me talk to them first. You’ll get a
18 chance again.
19 THE DEFENDANT: No, just a very final point here. I do
20 not wish at all and I do not want you to refer to them as my
21 attorney. They are not my attorney.
22 THE COURT: I understand.
23 THE DEFENDANT: And this point is clear. And I do not
24 wish them to make any matter, any point of substance of the case.
25 If they want to refute whatever they want, that’s fine. But they
0031
1 should not mention any strategy, the same way —
2 THE COURT: These men will not. They’re experienced
3 attorneys.
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yeah, I believe that they’re
5 experienced. They’re experienced in deception.
6 THE COURT: Have a seat.
7 All right, Mr. Dunham.
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I’m going.
9 MR. DUNHAM: Well, Your Honor, if we were to address
10 this point by point, I think our view of things might be a little
11 different, but we do understand the lack of trust that the
12 individual has had in us from the beginning. We’ve tried hard to
13 earn it.
14 I think there are some things that should be addressed
15 with the Court, but I’m reluctant to do it in the presence of the
16 government, but the Court should know about the representational
17 issues.
18 THE COURT: Let me start, first of all, by going to the
19 motion that’s before us right now about the SAM. We’ll get back
20 to this other issue in a second, because some of this may make
21 things a little bit easier.
22 You have filed and the actual motion that’s on the
23 docket this morning is the defendant’s motion for relief from
24 conditions of confinement. And you had a series of issues that
25 you had complained about in that motion.
0032
1 My understanding, because, as you know, we sent some of
2 our staff with the marshal to the jail on Friday to check things
3 out so that we could see what was going on there, and it’s our
4 understanding that many of the issues complained about have been
5 or are about to be resolved.
6 MR. DUNHAM: My understanding is that there is an
7 agreement with the government — and Mr. Spencer can confirm
8 this — that we have worked it out that Mr. Moussaoui will be
9 allowed to have a computer, a desk-top model, stand-alone, which
10 will be provided by the defense; that he can have a keyboard and
11 a mouse and a monitor to go with that computer.
12 Now, there will be a separate secure room at the jail.
13 They’re installing power in the room at the present time, so it’s
14 not available as we speak, but it will be available in short
15 order. Sheriff Dunning and the U.S. Marshal Clark were over
16 there Friday working on this.
17 The government has agreed to provide CD-ROMs with the
18 discovery material as it’s made available. The defense will
19 provide copies of what we’ve already been given, and any new
20 production would be — the CD-ROM would be given directly by the
21 government to Mr. Moussaoui.
22 Now I do want to comment here briefly with an editorial
23 comment that the pleading that Mr. Moussaoui read from was not
24 filed with the Court, because it was about to be and we got a
25 boatload of discovery just as we were about to turn it in, so it
0033
1 became moot. There was no point in making that representation at
2 that point in time.
3 Up to about April 11, what he read was correct, but we
4 got a load of discovery from the government, and it’s coming
5 late, as we understand it, because they’re taking the time to put
6 it on CD-ROM, which is the only way you can manage this stuff.
7 And so I wouldn’t want the Court to think that we are of the —
8 you know, we are a little bit captive to them, but we agreed to
9 go this CD-ROM route, and discovery was slower than we wanted,
10 and we were about to bring it to the Court’s attention when
11 suddenly we got some. And it wasn’t a fair representation at the
12 time.
13 Now I will allude to the telephone. We were concerned
14 about the privileged nature of attorney-client privileged calls,
15 because Mr. Moussaoui was — his end of the call was constantly
16 being monitored by sheriff’s deputies. They worked that out so
17 that a phone could be — a headset at least could be run into his
18 cell and he’d be able to talk from inside his cell securely at
19 his end with us.
20 And while the telephone calls were going to be limited
21 to ten minutes each initially, because it was tying up a line
22 that they use in the ordinary course of business, the idea was in
23 about a month they’d have a second line there, and we would be
24 able to talk almost an unlimited basis by phone.
25 Third, our motion addressed the problem that his
0034
1 papers, papers we gave him and papers he returned to us, were
2 being searched by sheriff’s deputies, and we really couldn’t tell
3 whether they were reading them or not, but the report from
4 Mr. Moussaoui was they were certainly looking at them long enough
5 to have read them.
6 That was solved by an agreement that we can pass floppy
7 disks back and forth. He’s got a computer with a keyboard. We
8 can give him a disk; he can give us disks. The sheriffs can
9 inspect the disks, but they don’t need to stick them in a
10 computer.
11 So all of the issues in the case were resolved except
12 one, which was our efforts to try to arrange for a consultation
13 for Mr. Moussaoui with an individual by the name of John Doe,
14 whose name Mr. Moussaoui gave to us, and who we have interviewed
15 and who we have felt might have helped resolve some of the
16 problems that are apparent in what Mr. Moussaoui has presented to
17 the Court this morning.
18 On Friday afternoon, in an attempt to work this out
19 with Mr. Spencer, I offered to allow Christine Gunning, the court
20 security officer, to sit in on those conversations. And I had
21 previously discussed this with Mr. Moussaoui, and he didn’t have
22 any objection to it. She would monitor the call. She would not
23 know who John Doe was, but if she heard anything untoward being
24 mentioned during the call that didn’t sound like religious
25 consultation and the seeking of advice, she would be in a
0035
1 position to pull the plug on the call.
2 I was advised that she didn’t have enough training in
3 al Qaeda matters to be a good smoke detector, so to speak, and so
4 I asked Mr. Spencer: “Well, who would you suggest?” And he told
5 me that everybody that they had that could possibly perform this
6 function is sitting on the wrong side of the firewall at the
7 present time, and there’s nobody on the other side of the
8 firewall apparently that could fulfill this role.
9 But obviously it’s the kind of help I think we could
10 have used earlier, and we might not be in the situation that
11 we’re in at the present time.
12 Now I just want to point out that we have —
13 Mr. Moussaoui has been aware of his Faretta rights since the
14 beginning of the representation and that his assertion of them
15 today comes somewhat of a surprise, but not as a total surprise,
16 to defense counsel.
17 We believe that the case is sufficiently complicated
18 such that even if he could get the $35,000 that he talks about in
19 his bank account which has been frozen by the President of the
20 United States, even if he could get that money, it’s nowhere near
21 what this defense effort is going to cost.
22 I mean, I have been struggling for weeks with the
23 budget for this defense, and without going into the numbers, you
24 know, there are not many people in America that could afford the
25 defense that he’s going to need in order to have an effective
0036
1 defense in this case.
2 There are other things that I would want to talk about,
3 but I’m not going to rebut Mr. Moussaoui here openly in court in
4 front of the government point by point, except to say that we
5 have tried as hard as we can to work with him in a reasonable
6 manner, and apparently that is not going to work.
7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dunham, as you know, there
8 was some time ago a motion filed by the United States, I think
9 Mr. Zerkin actually responded to it, asking whether the defense
10 was going to defend on any kind of a mental health issue. And,
11 of course, they wanted notification about that.
12 In your dealing with the defendant, as an experienced
13 attorney, is there any reason in your opinion or in the opinion
14 of your co-counsel to believe that the defendant is in any
15 respect suffering from any mental illness that would make this
16 decision on his part to give up his current counsel, in any way
17 cloud the voluntariness or knowing aspect of such a decision?
18 MR. DUNHAM: I am — this defendant has been in
19 solitary confinement for a substantial period of time, and during
20 the course of that — with lights on 24 hours a day —
21 THE COURT: That, by the way, as you know, is being
22 also somewhat ameliorated.
23 MR. DUNHAM: That’s being ameliorated, but to say that
24 that has had no effect on him would not be a correct statement.
25 I mean, I can’t tell what the effect is, but I have
0037
1 seen the difference in the gentleman during the course of the
2 representation, so I would be — I’m not a psychiatrist or a
3 psychologist, you know, I’m not in a position to render an
4 opinion, but if you were to ask me could I say with 100 percent
5 certainty that he’s absolutely clear and mentally sound, I
6 couldn’t say that. I have some concerns in that regard.
7 We — our position was going to be we weren’t going to
8 raise it in connection with the penalty phase if we ever got
9 there in this case, because that is a delicate decision that has
10 to be made because of the things it opens up the door for the
11 government to say and do in that phase of the case.
12 You might have a person with mental health problems in
13 a death penalty case where you would never raise those mental
14 health problems in a punishment part of the case, because of what
15 it opens the door for the government to do.
16 So the issue of this gentleman’s competency, in my
17 view, had not reached the point where we were going to ask the
18 Court to have an examination for him, for example, for purposes
19 of participating in his own defense, understanding the charges
20 against him, or as a defense to the charges themselves, but I do
21 believe that under Faretta, a competency inquiry is warranted
22 before the motion to proceed pro se should be granted.
23 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Spencer, does the United
24 States want to be heard on this issue? And the issue is twofold.
25 One, of course, is the first one that is right before us right
0038
1 now is the issue about whether a competency evaluation ought to
2 be done at this point to ensure that this waiver is a knowing and
3 voluntary waiver.
4 And, secondly, I’d also like you to address the issue
5 about the John Doe situation.
6 MR. SPENCER: Excuse me, Your Honor. Can Mr. Karas
7 address the John Doe situation?
8 THE COURT: All right.
9 MR. SPENCER: And on the Faretta, on the question of
10 competency, Your Honor, we’ve had no contact with the defendant,
11 obviously. And we have no way of making the same judgment. Out
12 of an abundance of caution, I see no objection to having a
13 competency evaluation done in Alexandria on a quick time
14 schedule. And it may give the Court some peace of mind in
15 allowing him to go forward pro se.
16 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to address the John
17 Doe situation?
18 MR. KARAS: As Your Honor knows from the papers that we
19 submitted, we have deep concerns about permitting Mr. Moussaoui
20 to speak to somebody who is refusing to be vetted as would
21 normally be required by the restrictions.
22 The restrictions are based on really years of
23 investigative experience with respect to al Queda and what it is
24 that it trains its members and associates to do, even when
25 they’re in prison. And one of the things that it constantly
0039
1 seeks to do as an organization is to monitor the court
2 proceedings against those who have been charged with being
3 members or subjects of al Queda to learn what it is the
4 government knows or more importantly doesn’t know about what al
5 Queda is doing. That includes monitoring the press clippings on
6 any court proceedings as well as court documents.
7 And one of the primary purposes behind the special
8 administrative measures, Your Honor, is to make sure that
9 Mr. Moussaoui or any al Queda member or associate doesn’t have
10 the opportunity to pass on messages, subtly coded messages to
11 individuals who could pass on other messages to his cohorts on
12 the outside.
13 The procedure that is in place is not to deny
14 Mr. Moussaoui the access to individuals who might assist in his
15 defense but to put into place some sort of mechanism that allows
16 us to be sure that what the person is doing is actually helping
17 Mr. Moussaoui and not hurting the government and the national
18 security in the ongoing war against al Queda.
19 And the proposal on the table really undermines the
20 very purpose of the SAM. It just eliminates the purpose of the
21 SAM, because what it does is under the theory that’s been
22 presented by the defense, anybody including, as we mentioned, Bin
23 Laden or somebody who might be sympathetic to al Queda, unknowing
24 to defense counsel, would have an opportunity to speak to Mr.
25 Moussaoui, and even in a situation where Ms. Gunning might be
0040
1 listening in on a telephone conversation, in addition to the
2 concerns that Mr. Dunham raised, the other concern that we have
3 is that it would require 100 percent vigilance. And human error
4 being what it is, Your Honor, even one message could be something
5 that could be fatal.
6 So all that we ask is that John Doe go through the same
7 vetting procedure that other individuals who would see Mr.
8 Moussaoui would go through, and then we can determine whether or
9 not any additional restrictions are in place. At this point
10 we’re not saying he can’t go in. He’s saying he doesn’t want to
11 be vetted.
12 And Mr. Moussaoui doesn’t have a right to an individual
13 of his choosing to speak to about his case. There’s no right
14 whatsoever in the Constitution that gives him that opportunity.
15 And we think that given the grave security concerns, that there
16 really is an alternative that satisfies these concerns and at the
17 same time we think that protecting these concerns doesn’t
18 compromise any recognized constitutional right.
19 THE COURT: My understanding is that once the
20 vetting — if the vetting were done and the person were cleared,
21 if this person is coming in as a cleric, for example, then there
22 would not be any intrusion in the conversation between them.
23 MR. KARAS: That’s correct, Your Honor. In fact, my
24 understanding is that the prison officials have cleared an imam
25 to visit with Mr. Moussaoui, and that is something that would
0041
1 take place without any government supervision or monitoring.
2 I would say that there was an issue with the individual
3 that required us to perhaps suggest additional restrictions be
4 put in place. We could address those when it’s ripe. But right
5 now we don’t know anything about the individual to even make that
6 assessment.
7 THE COURT: Mr. Spencer.
8 MR. SPENCER: May I address several practical
9 considerations within the competency evaluation, if the Court’s
10 going to go down that road?
11 THE COURT: Yes. Let me finish with this motion first
12 of all. The defendant’s motion for relief —
13 MR. DUNHAM: Your Honor, I’m sorry.
14 THE COURT: Yes.
15 MR. DUNHAM: Can I just respond to one thing he said?
16 THE COURT: Yes.
17 MR. DUNHAM: The problem is that Islamic scholars are
18 not fungible, just like Protestant clerics are not fungible. You
19 have different sects, different beliefs, different organizations
20 under the heading Protestant. Even under the heading Catholic or
21 Jewish, you have different sects or segments.
22 This gentleman we’ve identified is somebody that we
23 believe Mr. Moussaoui would listen to and is somebody who I
24 believe would give him the advice that I think he needs, because
25 I’ve met with the gentleman.
0042
1 So just to say that the jail’s got a cleric doesn’t
2 solve the particular problem here. I understand the government’s
3 security needs, and I understand the dilemma that it puts
4 everybody in, but I don’t think that if you have Christine
5 Gunning listening to the call, that there are going to be a lot
6 of coded messages.
7 THE COURT: Well, based on the track record in this
8 case and the representations that the United States has made and
9 the allegations and that there’s probable cause at this point to
10 believe that the allegations are true, that’s all there is is
11 probable cause, but that means that it’s not an irrational
12 inference to believe that there may be truth to these comments,
13 makes it too dangerous to allow unfettered access.
14 Now again, this is one of those situations where the
15 whole problem or most of the problem can go away if John Doe
16 changes his or her mind. And if the advice of that person is so
17 critical to the well-being of Mr. Moussaoui and Mr. Moussaoui’s
18 case, you need to urge that person to change his opinion,
19 apparently — change his opinion and to go through the vetting
20 process.
21 If that person is unwilling to do so, there’s nothing
22 this Court is going to do to change the situation.
23 All right, Mr. Moussaoui, you can go back up there for
24 a second. Now we’re simply addressing the John Doe issue right
25 now.
0043
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I’m addressing the John Doe issue
2 because this motion doesn’t represent what was my concern in my
3 situation. Because I told them that, first of all, I didn’t want
4 to cry to the United States. I didn’t want to talk about light
5 and everything and door banging and everything, because this is a
6 normal condition of a prisoner. And I said to them that I know
7 brother were in far worse situations than me, so not at all.
8 And I can entertain this by this document I drafted to
9 them, I proposed to them as a base for discussion. And it is
10 here. There is nothing else, condition, light on, and
11 everything.
12 By the way, the only thing that was really annoying me
13 was the lack — because I have no window. It’s not even
14 mentioned in the document, okay? So that’s the kind of care.
15 In fact, this motion had been drafted to bring this
16 point that the situation is very difficult for Mr. Moussaoui and
17 he’s under an oppressive condition, because they sense this, they
18 could see me wanting to go pro se because I was becoming more
19 pressing on the requiring books, different elements of the trial
20 transcript, and I was asking more and more elements. And you
21 could very much see that this person was going to go pro se soon,
22 okay?
23 So that’s the reason — — and me, why I did this,
24 because that was the only way I could have access to the Court
25 without them anticipate this well in advance to have a very
0044
1 well-organized campaign, I would say, to smear me, to come to you
2 and say, “we are concerned about Mr. Moussaoui,” and this and
3 that.
4 If I give them a head start, they will have been able
5 to engineer this in a much better manner. So I accepted this
6 motion not for what is inside the motion, only to talk about
7 indeed the condition of confinement, would prevent me to go pro
8 se in a fair and free manner.
9 THE COURT: All right.
10 THE DEFENDANT: And the second point that he have
11 addressed here, he say that he have some concern for me and
12 especially because of the new condition.
13 Here you have a letter that is dated on the 29 March
14 where he say to the chief intelligence and investigative
15 operation of the Criminal Division, he say, Mr. Moussaoui
16 given — at no time have Mr. Moussaoui given any indication that
17 he would assault counsel, and he has conducted himself at all
18 times in a nonthreatening, peaceful manner, okay? Not in an
19 erratic manner, nothing mentioned. That’s one thing.
20 Concerning mental health, we had a meeting last week,
21 and we discussed this. We discussed the strategy. They said
22 that the benefit of using mental health — very quickly. And
23 then I told them basically the same thing, that I wasn’t going to
24 have mental test. And they said that at the moment we didn’t see
25 any reason for me to have one. And I have it in a hand-draft
0045
1 letter by — written by lawyer Zerkin, who say Zacarias
2 Moussaoui, by counsel, state that he has no intention to
3 introduce any mental health testimony at the guilt or penalty
4 phase of the trial.
5 So one week ago, they didn’t insist, say no,
6 Mr. Moussaoui, this is so crucial for us, okay? They came to
7 give me one story.
8 But thank you to the government, through its memoranda
9 for the mental health, its motion, I took — I got the
10 information that, in fact, indeed they wanted to introduce some
11 information.
12 So this is a very unfair way to proceed, because they
13 are claiming something one day and are doing something another
14 day.
15 So the last thing I want to address, that this motion,
16 I rejected the motion, okay, what is inside the memorandum. I
17 accept the motion but not the memorandum. The memorandum should
18 be taken from what I will draft, I would send to the Court in due
19 time, because I will address this issue. And I will go further
20 than the condition of the SAM in my, in my draft, because I want
21 just to be able to get the information.
22 I do not want to meet inmates. I do not want to have
23 contact with people outside. I want to study my case. I want to
24 defend my life. And I didn’t ask them to say about things they
25 talk about in the case, in this motion, okay?
0046
1 So the government should relax. And I have no
2 intention to speak with John Doe or John X, okay? John Doe was a
3 door for me to access you. When they say that we will do this, I
4 said okay, because I wanted to give a letter, this letter, send
5 it to you, and then the thing will start, okay?
6 But you have the intention to sideline me because you
7 already ask if he is still talking as my lawyer. That will be
8 fine, because you are in charge, but the record will show that I
9 have nothing to do with them.
10 And second thing, they have no knowledge of the case on
11 my side, okay, a nonvital piece, as they recognize in the letter
12 that I have here. Okay? I know what are my activity inside
13 United States, abroad, in Britain, in everywhere I was. They
14 have no knowledge. They want what they want. It’s a short case,
15 where they will be in court, then Mr. Zerkin will just fight for
16 death or no death. Because the guilt already is conceded, if I
17 read the different newspaper — piece of newspaper.
18 So I do not want them, because I do not believe they
19 have my best interests. They have shown direct hostility.
20 Mr. Dunham have used a rude word against me on three occasions
21 already, okay?
22 So I have no intention to have these people in any
23 manner to defend me.
24 THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Moussaoui, stay
25 there for a second. Let me explain to you that as I said
0047
1 earlier, you have a right if I’m satisfied that you’re doing this
2 in a knowing and voluntary manner to represent yourself, but I
3 have to warn you, as intelligent as you are, and you’re obviously
4 a very smart man, and you’re able to read American law books and
5 glean from some of the rulings, but I have to tell you that the
6 American legal system is complicated. An ordinary person or even
7 a very bright ordinary person who walks into court and tries to
8 defend himself — and I’ve had many other cases, including
9 capital cases, with defendants who have acted pro se.
10 You will have to follow the rules of law and procedure
11 of this Court. You said, for example, that in your culture, you
12 have to ask a question three times, and if the answer is the same
13 three times, it flies. Well, in this Court, you get to ask it
14 once.
15 THE DEFENDANT: (Arabic spoken.)
16 THE COURT: Just as an example of the cultural
17 difference, you are in a United States court.
18 Now if you can conduct yourself in accordance with the
19 rules and procedure of this Court, then assuming I have found
20 that this is a knowing and voluntary waiver under a right to be
21 represented by counsel, you can proceed pro se. That is your
22 right.
23 But the right is forfeited if you don’t follow the
24 rules. And the rules are complicated. And so the normal
25 practice — and apparently Mr. Dunham explained that to you — is
0048
1 that even when a person goes pro se, especially in a capital
2 case, the Court will continue to have as standby counsel
3 experienced lawyers who are there to help you if at some point
4 you realize you’re in over your head.
5 And I am not going to therefore excuse these attorneys
6 who already have invested a great deal of time and effort, who
7 have retained people to work on your behalf, from this case
8 entirely.
9 Now it’s your decision. If you don’t want to talk to
10 them, you proceed at your own risk. But I am not going to permit
11 you to be in a court of law without any legal resources
12 whatsoever.
13 Now, if you’re able to hire an attorney for yourself,
14 that could change the dynamic. And you have that right. And I’m
15 sure that these attorneys would help you —
16 THE DEFENDANT: No.
17 THE COURT: — in doing that.
18 That’s your decision. But I’m not going to grant your
19 motion quite yet to go pro se until I’ve had an expert in
20 psychiatry talk with you just for this record.
21 I will say that from what I’ve seen in court today, you
22 appear to know and understand what you’re doing. As I said, you
23 are very bright. You do come from a different cultural
24 background and tradition, and you need to be careful to
25 understand that in this court, you’ve got to follow these rules.
0049
1 And if you start citing to authorities or practices
2 that are not in conformance with what happens in an American
3 court, you will be stopped. All right?
4 I’ll try to arrange for the visit as soon as possible.
5 And at this point, therefore, unless the doctor comes up with
6 something, I will find on this record that this is a knowing and
7 intelligent waiver of counsel, but I am not releasing counsel
8 from this case, because it would be impossible for this man to,
9 in my view, defend himself at this point without some legal
10 resources.
11 Now, you are going to be getting access through the
12 Alexandria Jail, which has gone through extraordinary efforts to
13 try to accommodate you, to have a second room available for you
14 where you will have a computer, you will have access to the
15 CD-ROMs under certain controls and within the security needs of
16 the jail. Very few, if any, prisoners have ever had that kind of
17 access.
18 You will be able to mount a defense. And if you are
19 wise, you will use what resources — you can pick and choose what
20 you want to use from these attorneys, but if you choose to do
21 nothing with them, that’s also your choice. But they’re going to
22 be sitting in this courtroom throughout the trial proceedings
23 just in case, unless you have a different attorney who has been
24 retained.
25 You don’t have a right to pick and choose a
0050
1 court-appointed attorney.
2 THE DEFENDANT: First of all —
3 THE COURT: Well, now, I’ve ruled. When I rule, that’s
4 it. If you disagree with my ruling, when the case is over, you
5 take an appeal to the Fourth Circuit. That’s how the trial will
6 be conducted, too.
7 When I make a ruling, it’s no different for you than
8 any other attorney. If the government disagrees with what I’ve
9 said, they know they have to live with it through the course of
10 the proceeding. And then down the road, there’s a chance to have
11 that reviewed.
12 You may have a seat now, Mr. Moussaoui.
13 In terms then of the defendant’s motion for relief from
14 conditions of confinement, that motion is denied as moot in my
15 view, as to all conditions complained about except the John Doe,
16 and it’s denied as to that. As I said, the John Doe situation is
17 completely remedial as long as the individual wants to be vetted.
18 Now there are a couple of other what I will call
19 administrative matters that we need to get addressed and even
20 with the potential change of counsel’s situation is going to have
21 to be addressed.
22 First is the juror questionnaire. I assume, counsel,
23 you’ve been working on that. I know the government, and I don’t
24 know whether the defense got a copy of a questionnaire we used in
25 the Wills case. I’m going to set Friday, May 31st, as the
0051
1 deadline for proposed juror questionnaire from each side.
2 I’m going to direct that you submit the questionnaire
3 to the Court on CD-ROM — on a disk, rather, so that we can take
4 a look at it.
5 I would expect that the Court will go through both
6 proposed questionnaires, and we will determine the final
7 questions that are going to go on it. But that needs to be done
8 in — sufficiently in advance of the pulling together of the
9 jury.
10 So that everyone can have it on their calendars, we are
11 proposing to have the jury pool brought in on Tuesday, September
12 17. As I indicated previously, the jurors will fill out the
13 questionnaire under court supervision at one time. That’s the
14 best way of getting 100 percent return.
15 And then the plan is that you will be getting copies.
16 We are going to use a, obviously, an anonymous jury, but you will
17 be getting copies of all the questionnaires and have
18 approximately four or five days to go over the questions. We’re
19 going to do what I did in my last case, which is basically a desk
20 audit of the questionnaires; that is, the first review of
21 proposed jurors will be conducted by going over the
22 questionnaire.
23 Each side will be allowed to indicate which jurors they
24 want stricken and for what reasons. My experience is that a
25 certain percentage of the proposed jurors both sides will agree
0052
1 that they want stricken. And, therefore, I will strike them
2 without ever going beyond that.
3 There may be others where one side or the other is
4 pointing to a particular answer that they feel makes that juror
5 unqualified. And I may determine that that’s sufficient on
6 simply the responses or go ahead and let that juror come in for
7 personal voir dire. It depends on the particular questions.
8 That worked very well in the Wills case, and that’s what I intend
9 to do, something along those lines, here.
10 And then, as we indicated before, the actual voir dire
11 will begin in late September on the date that we previously had
12 given to you-all. That’s the proposed plan right now.
13 The other issues are that I want to make sure both
14 sides know that if either side files a pleading ex parte under
15 seal, the Court is not going to require a separate sealing order.
16 That caption is sufficient in my view to permit that matter to be
17 filed under seal ex parte.
18 I review every filing, and if I determine that there
19 really is no reason why it should not be part of the public
20 record, I’ll let you know. But that will shorten the number of
21 orders that you have to submit to the Court.
22 There was an issue raised informally by defense counsel
23 about civilian clothing for Mr. Moussaoui. The U.S. Marshal’s
24 Service will not be providing civilian clothing for Mr. Moussaoui
25 to attend to simply motions hearings of this sort. Obviously,
0053
1 for the trial, he will have the right to be in civilian clothing.
2 That can be taken care of at the trial time, but not before then.
3 Now, are there any other issues, Mr. Spencer, first of
4 all, from the United States, that you want the Court to address
5 since we’re together at this time?
6 MR. SPENCER: I just had some practical considerations
7 for any evaluation, competency evaluation the Court is going to
8 order.
9 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
10 MR. SPENCER: First of all, I take it that the expert
11 is going to be court-appointed?
12 THE COURT: Yes.
13 MR. SPENCER: And a copy of any report generated will
14 be provided to the government?
15 THE COURT: That’s the normal practice, although,
16 again, the only issue here is going to be competency to make this
17 decision about waiving counsel. That’s what I ruled.
18 MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, I see this as just a strict
19 Butner competency evaluation without the transportation and the
20 time down to Butner.
21 THE COURT: I would agree with that.
22 MR. SPENCER: All right. And then — so I’m presuming,
23 Your Honor, that the effect on the motions schedule, particularly
24 the death penalty motions coming up, the filing May 1st, it will
25 have no effect on that.
0054
1 THE COURT: That is correct. I’m holding the motion in
2 abeyance. I’m ruling on that in abeyance until I’ve made a
3 determination for certain that the defendant is not making the
4 decision under any kind of mental duress or mental infirmity that
5 might cloud it for purposes of voluntariness.
6 MR. SPENCER: Finally, Your Honor, just for purposes of
7 the record, we move that these counsel be retained as standby
8 counsel if the defendant chooses to go pro se. I take it that’s
9 the Court’s ruling on that?
10 THE COURT: That’s been our practice. I mean, again,
11 given the experience of these attorneys, even though
12 Mr. Moussaoui doesn’t appreciate it, he has a, he has an
13 extremely experienced set of attorneys working for him.
14 As I said, they’ve retained experts already in various
15 areas, and the only way he could even begin to have a fair
16 defense is to have access to those resources. If he chooses not
17 to do so, that’s his decision, but the Court’s obligation is to
18 make them available for him, and that’s what we’re going to do.
19 So you can just make it as an oral motion. I’m
20 granting that at this point.
21 Again, that may change. As I said, if he retains
22 counsel, that changes things.
23 MR. SPENCER: I understand, Your Honor.
24 THE COURT: That hasn’t happened at this point.
25 All right. Is there anything else?
0055
1 MR. SPENCER: No, thank you, Your Honor.
2 THE COURT: All right. Just one last thing. It hasn’t
3 happened yet and I don’t know what the status is going to be. I
4 understand that the House of Representatives is, is on the verge
5 perhaps of passing its version of Senator Allen’s bill. Is your
6 office going to take responsibility for coordinating the offsite
7 viewings with the victims and that sort of thing? I see
8 Ms. Spinks is here today.
9 Is your victims unit going to be in charge of that or
10 do you expect that’s going to be out of Main Justice?
11 MR. SPENCER: I expect that to be out of Main Justice,
12 but I don’t actually know the answer to that question.
13 THE COURT: All right. That’s another logistical issue
14 we’re going to be needing to address, I suspect, in the next
15 couple weeks. That’s not quite ripe yet, but it’s out there.
16 All right. Is there anything else?
17 MR. MAC MAHON: Your Honor, may I consult with
18 Mr. Dunham one second? There’s one additional matter.
19 THE COURT: Just one second, Mr. Moussaoui.
20 MR. MAC MAHON: Just one second, Your Honor, excuse me.
21 MR. DUNHAM: Your Honor, I do need to bring a couple of
22 things to the Court’s attention in dealing with the Faretta
23 issue.
24 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
25 MR. DUNHAM: There are CIPA issues in the case, and
0056
1 Mr. Moussaoui probably will not be granted a clearance.
2 THE COURT: Which is another reason, I should put that
3 on the record, why having standby counsel who are cleared to
4 receive that type of information is going to be important.
5 While I’ve got you both here, it will help the Court
6 and will move things faster if counsel can send us some names of
7 psychiatrists you’ve used recently in this area for these types
8 of forensic evaluations, because I want to get this done as
9 quickly as possible.
10 MR. DUNHAM: Your Honor, I also would suggest that the
11 psychiatrist needs to be given a briefing, I believe, by counsel
12 as to the issues in the case, because — and the complexity
13 involved, because the determination of competency has something
14 to do with the competency to handle this case. And, you know,
15 it’s a little more complicated than perhaps the Wills case was,
16 and I do think that that — the psychiatrist needs to look at it
17 against that framework.
18 And so I would suggest that we’ll submit some names and
19 maybe we can give them some observations that we have before they
20 conduct the examination.
21 THE COURT: Here’s what I suggest. The fastest and
22 best way of doing this is for you and Mr. Spencer with the
23 government team and the defense team to get together, draft, if
24 you can for us, an order with the guidelines that you want, if
25 you can come to an agreement on that.
0057
1 As I said, I’m not granting the defendant’s motion yet,
2 so you’re still, until I’ve granted it, the attorneys
3 representing him. We want to get this matter resolved quickly,
4 all right?
5 MR. DUNHAM: So that brings up another question. Your
6 Honor had addressed the jury questionnaire due on May 31, as if
7 we were the ones that were responsible for filing it. And what
8 I’m going to assume is that until we receive an order granting
9 Mr. Moussaoui’s motion, we will continue to do the things on the
10 deadlines that the Court has set.
11 THE COURT: That’s correct.
12 MR. DUNHAM: But once that motion is granted, I would
13 assume that we are relieved from doing those things, such as
14 filing motions in the case and filing jury questionnaires, if you
15 decide that before May 31st, and that it will be Mr. Moussaoui’s
16 obligation to fulfill those requirements.
17 THE COURT: You’ll be required to turn over to him any
18 drafts that you’ve worked on. And I’m still going to require if
19 you stay in, if you wind up becoming standby counsel, I’m still
20 going to require that you make efforts to communicate with the
21 defendant about some of these deadlines and what he has to do.
22 He can choose to reject it and then proceeds at his own
23 risk, but yes, we’ll proceed that way.
24 MR. DUNHAM: All right. And then I guess the last
25 thing that I wanted to mention was, Your Honor, on this — oh,
0058
1 you said work out the details with Mr. Spencer. We’ll try to do
2 that.
3 THE COURT: Right.
4 MR. DUNHAM: We are concerned about just having the raw
5 report go to the government in the event there is material in
6 there that should remain privileged until trial. So we’ll work
7 that out with the government.
8 THE COURT: One way of doing it is having it submitted
9 to the Court for an ex parte review. If I find that parts of the
10 report have to be redacted to make sure there’s no issue, we can
11 do that.
12 MR. DUNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
13 THE COURT: Is there anything further?
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
15 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Moussaoui, I’ll let you have
16 the last word. Go ahead.
17 Don’t say anything yet. We have to change paper.
18 Go ahead, sir.
19 THE DEFENDANT: Concerning the so-called test of
20 competency, I have to say that, according to my information, it
21 is to assure such a presentation so that the record will
22 establish that he knows, the defendant, what he’s doing and the
23 choice he’s making with eye open. And his technical and legal
24 knowledge as such is not relevant, okay?
25 So my ability to try the case is not really what is in
0059
1 question in the competency, competency information. Because we
2 have in this case very, very different approach. And it’s
3 impossible to have two teams trying the same case, because they,
4 for example, okay, they want to try by jury. And me, I want to
5 try by a judge. Because of all of information and the complexity
6 of the case make it, make it very, very difficult for a simple
7 person to comprehend in a very short time, and a judge —
8 THE COURT: Let me stop you. You want to waive a trial
9 by jury?
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Okay? And I’ve been thinking of
11 this since the beginning, because the complexity of the case make
12 it that very — you have to collate information and be able to
13 understand concepts very quickly, and this is not very easy for a
14 simple person. And the only person who can grasp this kind of
15 thing is maybe a judge, okay?
16 So I was thinking for long time, because I was reading
17 the transcript of embassy bombing and everything, everything is
18 in my cell, and I discovered that the government just overwhelmed
19 the Court of information and the people just naturally lose track
20 of what has been said. And at the end, they just are lost, and
21 it’s just a question of feeling you become, okay?
22 But the judge can see through the trick of the
23 government and will be able to assess the validity of the
24 argument. And also you will have documents to be able to see, to
25 see this contradiction during the first day to the tenth day,
0060
1 because inside the transcript I show to them contradiction during
2 the trial.
3 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Moussaoui, stop for
4 just one second.
5 Each side in a criminal case has a right to trial by
6 jury. You can’t waive the jury on your own. The United States
7 would have to agree with that. That’s something down the road
8 that both sides may want to think about, whether it’s even
9 possible in a capital case; we haven’t looked at yet.
10 Mr. Zerkin, do you know from your experience?
11 MR. ZERKIN: It is indeed possible.
12 THE COURT: In a federal capital case?
13 MR. ZERKIN: Yes, ma’am, a jury can be waived.
14 THE COURT: For both phases?
15 MR. ZERKIN: For both phases, that’s correct.
16 THE COURT: Well, that’s something that can be
17 discussed and thought about down the road. Obviously, it would
18 change the dynamics of much of this trial.
19 But that is such a serious decision, Mr. Moussaoui, I’m
20 not going to at this point accept this. You need to think about
21 that very carefully. And, again, that’s an issue that has
22 nothing to do with the things that you’re disputing with your
23 attorneys. You should talk to them about that.
24 But — wait. But even if you have come to the decision
25 that you want to waive the jury, the United States, if they want
0061
1 a trial by jury, has an absolute right to require — to request
2 that. And the Court can waive a jury only if both sides agree,
3 all right? So that’s what you need to understand.
4 THE DEFENDANT: I understand your point. The second
5 thing concerning the appointment standby counsel. The standby
6 counsel’s role is exactly to inform, okay, to inform the
7 defendant pro se on procedure, to relieve the judge of the need
8 to explain the way the Court works, but here what is happening,
9 what you’re doing is having them — appointing them as my lawyer
10 and going — making investigation on their own, okay, and this
11 will interfere tremendously.
12 I have a very quick example, okay? I know already that
13 they want to develop a line of argument —
14 THE COURT: Well, I don’t really think you should do
15 that.
16 THE DEFENDANT: This is my defense. I have long time,
17 four months to evaluate this kind of thing, okay? So they want
18 to talk to Mr. Attas, okay? They want to make him pass like he
19 have been cooperating in fact with the government. And all these
20 statements are not correct. And I have been opposing this,
21 because if this person is a truthful person, even if his
22 statements are harmful in a sense for me, I was not inclined to
23 demonize or to vilify or whatever somebody just because it suits
24 me, but they have a completely different set of principles.
25 For them, it was to approach Attas to make him believe
0062
1 that he will be a friendly witness and then to turn against him,
2 okay? And then saying that, in fact, because you have similar
3 profile with Mr. Moussaoui, you are from the Middle East and you
4 are also, of course, an Arab and you also are kind of
5 fundamentalist, okay, you find your way out of the case by giving
6 information to the government. And I oppose this. This is only
7 an example.
8 So it is impossible in practice to have them going
9 freely all over the world and trying to meet people that I know
10 and they have — and trying to do things that I’m against. And I
11 know that can damage my own preparation.
12 THE COURT: All right. That can be —
13 THE DEFENDANT: And I can, I can hire my lawyer to only
14 help me in the procedure.
15 What you are proposing, that them, after four months,
16 you tell me try to work with them. I’ve been trying for four
17 months, okay? And now you say carry on. Me, what I want is the
18 ability to hire counsel that will inform me on the matter of
19 procedure, okay. You will tell me how to come and draft a motion
20 properly according to United States law and you tell me how to
21 even, let’s say, adjust my presentation to the requisites of
22 United States law.
23 And, by the way, I’m born in France, educated — I have
24 a master’s degree in international business. I’m fully
25 acquainted with western system of justice, okay? I never live in
0063
1 the Middle East country or in Arabic country, okay? So I think
2 that the conception that I’m completely ignorant of the rule of
3 western system of justice and Anglo-Saxon, because I live in
4 London, okay, it’s not correct. I’m fully aware, okay, of the
5 western system of justice and so on.
6 So what you were proposing, in fact, is impractical,
7 and you will damage my defense and ultimately my chance to live.
8 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Moussaoui.
9 THE DEFENDANT: And I want to have immediately the
10 right to make an appeal and the information to address this
11 right, because it’s only to return to the cell and wait two
12 months so I lose any credibility again, okay? Then you cannot
13 work like that.
14 I want to be able to choose a lawyer, to contact this
15 Muslim association. This lawyer will be vetted, vetted by CIA,
16 FBI, whatever you want, and then he will access me and tell me
17 how to proceed.
18 But these people, I want the record to be clear I will
19 not receive them, speak to them from today, ever. And the record
20 is here to attest it. I want the right to hire my own lawyer.
21 And I know that the Muslim lawyer, knowing my situation, will
22 work free for me until I am released.
23 So the fact that I don’t have money, it is not at all
24 an issue, because I know that prevented me to open a bank account
25 in a Muslim bank because I wanted them, that the people, they
0064
1 will know that I need help and some money will be sent to me.
2 They said no, because the government will capture your
3 money. But the government, they didn’t capture my money within
4 some bank. Only if it’s in the Muslim bank the government will
5 capture it. But when the government sees that the money is put
6 by them, it’s okay, I have money in the bank, despite that’s
7 apparently forbidden.
8 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Moussaoui, what we’re going
9 to do, as I said, we’re going to have a psychiatrist checking you
10 over in the cell. And I’ll make my final decision about whether
11 I’m permitting you to proceed pro se based upon that report.
12 Thank you.
13 All right. We’ll remand — oh, Mr. Moussaoui, we want
14 a copy of the document that you read to the Court. If that’s
15 your only copy, we’ll make a photocopy and it will be returned to
16 you.
17 THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
18 THE COURT: Do you have it there? You can give it to
19 the marshal.
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. You want it now?
21 THE COURT: Actually go on into the cellblock and we’ll
22 go ahead and get it from you there. All right?
23 The marshals may take Mr. Moussaoui back to the
24 cellblock.
25 (Defendant out).
0065
1 THE COURT: All right, we’ll recess court.
2 (Which were all the proceedings had
3 at this time.)
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6 CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER
7 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the
8 record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
9
10
11
Anneliese J. Thomson
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Defense: Moussaoui Is Scapegoat

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/12/attack/main511972.shtml

Defense: Moussaoui Is Scapegoat

ALEXANDRIA, Va., April 26, 2002

"None of the acts Moussaoui is alleged to have committed, including the act of joining the conspiracy, regardless of the criminal intent of that conspiracy, can be said to have directly caused any deaths."
Defense motion

 
(CBS) In unusually harsh language, lawyers for the man indicted as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks contended Friday that the government wants to execute Zacarias Moussaoui because no one else is available.

The court-appointed lawyers, whom Moussaoui himself wants to dismiss, argued in a written brief that the government is ignoring provisions of the federal death penalty law in order "to pander to a public or a jury which it would like to overheat by waving the flag."

In papers filed in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va., Moussaoui’s defense team asked Judge Leonie Brinkema to bar the government from seeking the death penalty.

Last month prosecutors told the court Moussaoui — the only person indicted for the attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and killed some 3,000 people — should be executed.

Moussaoui has been charged with conspiring with Saudi-born militant Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network to carry out the hijacked plane attacks, in which 19 hijackers died. U.S. officials have said Moussaoui may have been preparing to be the 20th hijacker

"None of the acts Moussaoui is alleged to have committed, including the act of joining the conspiracy, regardless of the criminal intent of that conspiracy, can be said to have directly caused any deaths," Moussaoui’s defense team said in the motion.

Moussaoui, a 33-year-old French citizen who was in custody on immigration charges on Sept. 11, has been indicted on six counts — four of which carry a possible death sentence.

The defense response to the U.S. government’s decision to seek the death penalty came after Moussaoui told Brinkema on Monday he wanted to defend himself and fire his court-appointed lawyers, saying they did not understand him and were part of a conspiracy to kill him.

The defense team was ordered to remain in place pending results of a mental exam to determine Moussaoui’s competency to represent himself in court. The latest filing was signed by Moussaoui and all four lawyers.

CBS News Reporter Stephanie Lambidakis reports that there will be a hearing on this issue on May 15. The defense had until next Wednesday to file the motion, buy did it early because of their expected firing by Moussaoui.

The defense team said in its motion that the 19 suspected hijackers were in the United States and in contact with each other before Moussaoui arrived in the country, and noted that Moussaoui was in jail for an entire month before Sept. 11.

"The hijackers successfully completed the hijackings without any assistance from him," they said, noting that the U.S. government had not accused Moussaoui of contact with any of the 19 hijackers.

The defense said just joining a conspiracy — even one that contemplated causing many deaths — could not be punished by a death sentence under the Federal Death Penalty Act.

"When all is said and done, the government wants to execute someone so badly for the events of September 11 that, because no one else is available, it is willing to ignore the plain requirements of the law to make Moussaoui death-eligible not based on anything he actually did, but on what it insists he wanted to do," the motion said.

"If the government intends to rely on some acts other than the joining of a conspiracy as the predicate for his death eligibility, the fact is that no other specific act which he is alleged to have committed or in which he allegedly participated contributed in any way to the Sept. 11 attacks," it said.

The defense also disputed one of the non-statutory aggravating factors cited by prosecutors when they announced they would seek the death penalty.

In its March 28 court filing, the government said: "Moussaoui, a French citizen, entered the United States where he then enjoyed the educational opportunities available in a free society, for the purpose of gaining specialized knowledge in flying an aircraft in order to kill as many American citizens as possible."

The defense team said prosecutors want Moussaoui executed for his political beliefs.

"Beyond the inexplicable but unavoidable implication that the United States is a free society whereas France is not, this factor is constitutionally deficient because it plainly seeks to make Moussaoui’s citizenship an alleged … exploitation of American political values relevant to the death determination," the legal brief said. "The government’s attempt to put him to death based upon his French citizenship and his entry into the United States as a foreign national is unconstitutional."