Category Archives: Prostitution in the legal profession

Rwanda’s massacres preceded by a false-flag operation covered-up by the UN

Evidence of Kagame’s Crimes Suppressed by Chief Rwanda Prosecutor Louise Arbour – Affidavit of Michael Andrew Hourigan


Date of document:                                          27 November 2006

Filed on behalf of the Plaintiff by:            

Michael Hourigan

Carrington House

61-63 Carrington Street

Adelaide South Austrlia 5000


Ph: (08) 8237 0584

Mobile: 0415 668 732

Fax: (08) 8237 0555


Date and time of filing or transmission:    27 November 2006


I, MICHAEL ANDREW HOURIGAN Lawyer of 61-63 Carrington Street Adelaide 5000 in the State of South Australia Solicitor MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows:

1                    I am a qualified legal practitioner in the State of South Australia. I was also a former police detective before completing a law degree in 1995 after which time I took up a post as a Crown Prosecutor with the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P. Adelaide).

2                    In April, 1996 I left the D.P.P. in Adelaide and took up a position as an investigator with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

3                    Soon after my arrival in Rwanda I was put made a team leader in charge of a team consisting of about 20 members and the team was to be known as ‘the National Team’.

4                    I was directed by Judge Richard Goldstone (the then Chief Prosecutor) and Judge Honoré Rakotomana (the then ICTR Prosecutor) and Mr. Alphonse Breau (the then Director of Investigations) to focus my teams investigations on the following matters:-

4.1.            investigate the criminal conduct of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and then locate and arrest him;

4.2.            investigate the criminal conduct of Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva and then locate and arrest him;

4.3.            Investigate the murder of thousands of Rwandan elite in the first days of the genocide by the Rwandan Presidential.

4.4.            identify the person(s) responsible for the fatal rocket attack on 6 April 1994 killing President Habyarimana and all others on board;

5                    Together with my investigators we conducted investigations into these matters throughout the next year. During the course of 1996 I was called upon to brief Judge Goldstone and then his replacement Judge Louise Arbour and other senior prosecutors on the progress of our investigations into Bagosora, Nsengiyumva, the Presidential Guard and the rocket attack upon President Habyarimana’s aircraft.

6                    At no time did Judge Goldstone, Judge Arbour or any other member of the ICTR ever indicate to me that our investigations into the downing of the President Habyrimana’s aircraft were outside the ICTR mandate. On the contrary, it was made clear to me that our investigations into the rocket attack upon the President’s aircraft was an act of international terrorism which clearly fell within the ICTR statute Article 4 Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions:-

Article 4: Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:

a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;



d) Acts of terrorism;





7                    I am pleased to say that the National Team was successful and we achieved the following results:-

7.1.            Located, arrested and charged Colonel Theoneste Bagosora with Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity;

7.2.            Located, arrested and charged Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity;

7.3.            Gathered evidence against senior members of the Presidential Guard in relation to the killing of key Rwandan citizens, including but not limited to, UNAMIR-protected VIPS  Justice Joseph Kavaruganda, (President of the Constitutional Court) and Vice President  Lando Ndasingwa (the head of the Parti liberal);

7.4.            In late January or early February 1997 members of the National Team were approached by three (3) informants (either former or serving member of the R.P.F.) claiming direct involvement in the 1994 fatal rocket attack upon the President’s aircraft. Their evidence specifically implicated the direct involvement of President Paul Kagame, members of his administration and military. The informants also advised that the Kagame administration was actively involved in covert operations aimed at murdering high profile expatriate Rwandans – once such murder was the death of Seth Sedashonga in Nairobi.

8                    With respect to the highly sensitive information from the three informants regarding the plane crash I immediately informed my Commander Jim Lyons. My Director Mr. Alphonse Breau was out of the country and I arranged for him to be told by telephone.

9                    The information from the sources was very detailed and seemed very credible. I was very concerned about the sensitivity of the information and arranged for an urgent ‘secure’ telephone call to Judge Arbour.

10                Commander Jim Lyons and I attended at the US Embassy in Kigali and I made a call to Judge Arbour at the US Embassy in the Hague using an encrypted (‘secure’) STU III telephone. I informed Judge Arbour in considerable detail about the information implicating President Kagame. She was excited by the break through and advised me that the information corroborated some other information she had just learnt from Alison Des Forge the week before. At no time did she suggest that our investigations were improper. On the contrary, I would describe her mood as upbeat and excited that at last we were making significant progress into the events surrounding the plane crash.

11                Judge Arbour was concerned about the safety of the informants and my men. I advised her that the informants’ identities had been kept secure and if she so directed me I would arrange for my investigators involved in the plane crash to leave Rwanda. She directed that my investigators should leave and I agreed to have them travel from the country on suitable inquiries inNairobi. As for me I declined to leave Rwanda and advised her that I wanted to stay with my team and assist them complete other important investigations. She consented to this  but asked me to keep in touch with her while she considered what to do with this sensitive information.

12                During the next week I was directed by senior members of the UN in Kigali that I was required to travel to the ICTY in the Hague in order to meet with Judge Arbour and brief on her on our investigations in the rocket attack upon President Habyarimana’s aircraft.

13                Some days later I was approached at the ICTR headquarters in Kigali by Mr. Michael Hall, UN Deputy Security (NY). He advised me that I would be flying to Arusha the next day on the ICTR aircraft and from there board an international KLM flight to Amsterdam. Mr. Hall asked me to give him any information that I had on air crash and he would convey it to the airport in a UN diplomatic pouch. I then gave Mr. Hall a single floppy disc containing a memorandum I had prepared for Judge Arbour.

14                The next day Mr. Hall conveyed me to the Kigali airport where I checked in for the UN flight. There Mr. Hall and I were told that the flight was overbooked and that I could not to Arusha. Mr. Hall became agitated and told the UN flight officer that the UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan had personally ordered my attendance in Arusha for an international connection the next day. As a consequence I was given a seat on the UN flight and flew to Arusha.

15                The next day I flew to the Hague and over-knighted in a hotel near the ICTY.

16                The following morning I met with Mr. Al Breau and briefed him on the information concerning the plane crash. Together we discussed forming a special ICTR investigations unit based outside of Kigali to investigate the plane crash.

17                Following breakfast Mr. Breau and I attended at the ICTY and met with Judge Arbour. Also present was Mr. Mohammed Othman, Acting ICTR Prosecutor.

18                I briefed Judge Arbour on the informants and their information regarding the involvement of President Kagame and members of the RPF in the downing of President Habyrimana’s aircraft.

19                I presented her with a copy of a memo I had prepared entitled ‘Secret National Team Inquiry – Internal Memorandum’ and this document which is undated is attached to this statement. This document detailed the information provided by the three informants.

20                To my surprise Judge Arbour was aggressive and questioned me about the source of the information regarding the informants and the quality and potential reliability of their information. I advised her that the information was given to me by members from my team – the National Team. Those members were Amadou Deme and Peter Dnistriansky. I advised her that I held both investigators in the highest regard. I did say that I was not able to provide any advice as to the reliability of their information as it had not been tested. However, I did suggest that it was very detailed and this is itself meant that it could be subjected to considerable forensic examination.

21                Mr. Al Breau also expressed his strong view that both Amadou Deme and Peter Dnistrianksy were highly effective and reliable men.

22                Judge Arbour then advised me that the National Team investigation was at an end because in her view it was not in our mandate. She suggested that the ICTR’s mandate only extended to events within the genocide, which in her view began ‘after’ the plane crash.

23                I was astounded at this statement. I pointed to the temporal mandate of the ICTR being 1 January 1994 until 31 December 1994 and this clearly covered the time of the plane crash. I also addressed the ‘terrorism’ and ‘murder’ provisions of the ICTR statute.

24                More particularly I also told her that this was the first time she had ever suggested that this was outside the ICTR mandate. I reminded her that I had personally briefed her before about our investigations  into the plane crash and that she had never ever expressed a view that this matter should be part of an ICTR inquiry.

25                I expressed my strong view to her that these Rwandan informants were courageous and were deserving of our protection. I cautioned her that the UN had a history of abandoning informants in Rwanda and I specifically reminded her of the UN’s abandonment of Jean Pierre Turatsinze in 1994.

26                Judge then became hostile and asked me if I was challenging her authority to direct to end our investigations into the plane crash.

27                I told her that I was not questioning her authority only her judgement. I informed her that I was her servant and I would obey her direction.

28                Judge Arbour then asked me if the memo that I had prepared for her was the only copy. I told her that it was and she said she was pleased to hear that and placed in her office filing cabinet.

29                She then asked me to leave the room.

30                I was extremely concerned at Judge Arbour’s decision and felt that it was wrong both in law and policy.

31                I returned to Kigali and a short time later resigned from the ICTR.

32                After my resignation from the ICTR I was offered a position as an investigator with the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in New York. Soon after taking up my appointment I was asked to provide OIOS  investigators investigating corruption within the ICTR with a statement re my service in Rwanda for the ICTR.

33                On 1 August 1997 I prepared an internal memorandum detailing various issues which I felt lay behind some of the difficulties with the ICTR. A copy of this memorandum is attached here.

34                The OIOS leadership were not at all interested in the memorandum and they expressed their concern at some of the contents of the document implicating the Secretary General in some of the serious events inRwandain1994.

35                I completed six months with OIOS and resigned.

36                I feel that unknown persons from within the UN leadership and possibly elsewhere pressured Judge Arbour to end the National Team’s investigations into the shooting down of President Habyarimana.

37                Following my resignation my National Team was dismembered – the National Team investigations into the plane crash were brought to an end.

38                I have suffered at the hands of Judge Arbour and the UN because my career with the ICTR was brought to an untimely and ignominious end. I was proud of serving with the ICTR but I felt that I could not work for Judge Arbour when, in my view, she acted for personal reasons against the interests of the ICTR, the UN and world community which we served.

39                I know the facts deposed to herein to be true of my own knowledge, information and belief except where otherwise plainly appears.

Gradual privatization of criminal justice

Talia Fisher  “The boundaries of plea bargaining: negotiating the standard of proof”, in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Summer 2007

The author proposes to extend the system of plea bargaining by allowing defendants to negotiate a lowering of the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” to that of civil disputes.  The author examines the goals of the judicial process and places the designates for the truth as merely a means to pursue justice, not a goal per se.

From the Introduction:
“The public model of criminal procedure, which places the procedural aspects of the proccess beyond the reach of the defense and the prosecution, has given way to a new model: a semi-private paradigm that acknowledges the right of the parties to wield effective control over the procedural structure of the criminal trial. The adoption plea bargains expresses a readiness to open the criminal arena to contractual ordering. (1) Many features of the criminal process have turned into default rules and ‘bargaining chips’ (2) in the […] of the defense, including the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, (3) the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, (4) and the right to appeal. (5) In exchange for deviation from and waiver of these rights, the defendant may receive various concessions from the prosecution, including mitigation in the charge or the sentence.”

p. 14:
“The assumption is that since the prosecution reflects the public interest and the defense reflects the defendant’s interests, voluntary transactions between them represent pareto improvements in the situation of both the defendant and society at large. Another justification for opening the criminal justice arena to negotiation stems from recognition of the defendant’s decisional autonomy and his right to exert effective control over the manner in which his fate will be determined. The very exposure to criminal proceedings puts substantial limits on a defendant’s range of choices…Denying plea bargaining puts the poorer defendant in a double bind in this respect: On the one hand, the use he can make of his procedural rights within the trial apparatus is extremely limited in comparison to the wealthier defendant; on the other hand, in a world without plea bargains, where ‘realization’ of these procedural rights is contingent upon entrance to the trial arena, he is prevented from improving his position by ‘trading’ on these rights outside the trial arena.  In this sense, it is possible to view the closure of the criminal justice arena to negotiations as a sort of regressive taxation placed upon defendants from a lower socioeconomic bracket, in order to preserve the incommensurability and the use value of the procedural rights for the general class of defendants.”
[HERE the author purports to speak on behalf of the millions of poor defendants, whereas in practice, it is exactly the opposite]

p. 15 (Considerations against plea bargaining)

“A major market failure is attributed to principal-agent problems, which arise in plea negotiations. In the spirit of this critique, the criminal procedure is not merely a market institution; rather, it can be seen as a political instrument through which the prosecutor may advance his own private agenda. Such a private agenda is liable to be inconsistent with the public interest and may even collide with it head-on. Thus, for example, the interest of the prosecutor in high conviction rates for professional promotion purposes may clash with the public interest in non-conviction of the innocent.. [P]lea bargains give the prosecutor room to maneuver and reduce court supervision.  An additional agency problem that may arise in connection with plea bargains touches upon the tension between the interests of the defendant and his counsel. A combination of the fact that the prosecutor does not fully internalize the public interest in his utility function and the fact that the counsel for the defense may fail to promote the defendant’s interests may lead to two types of problematic results. On the one hand, the plea bargaining mechanism paves the way for the conviction of the innocent persons, with its accompanying costs and negative externalities [note the euphemism]; on the other hand, plea bargains may expose the criminal to a lesser punishment than is desirable from a social perspective.”

p. 15
“A related criticism is that negotiations in the criminal arena are coercive by their very nature. This is due to the power disparity between prosecution and defense…Critics argue that as a result of the coerciveness built into criminal justice negotiation, one cannot view it as an expression of the defendant’s free will…One can argue that procedural safeguards and rights touching upon the criminal trial are intended to advance public goals, such as arriving at the truth, and not aimed at leveraging benefits for the defendant.  The attempt to turn such rights into bargaining chips for the defendant, in order to bolster his position vis-a-vis the prosecution, is not legitimate…In sum, it is not surprising that the practice of plea bargaining has stimulated one of the stormiest controversies in the area of  criminal procedure; placing criminal disputes in the hands of prosecutors and defendants, to be settled by contractual means, can be seen as undermining basic concepts in the moral and political philosophy of criminal law….[Yet], the die has been cast. The fact that plea bargaining has taken root and expanded to its present magnitude indicates a normative choice in the matter. Such reality recognizes the legitimacy, in principle, of plea bargains and prefers the advantages, embodied in the opening of the criminal justice arena to contractual ordering, over its disadvantages. [Legitimacy? cui bono?].

p. 17  
“Changing the criminal standard of proof to a default rule from which the parties can negotiate deviations can be supported by the same considerations of efficiency, autonomy, and distributive justice that form the basis for recognizing the institution of plea bargaining.”

p. 23  “[M]ost criminal sentences under the existing system are in fact reached outside the courtroom…Plea bargains are negotiated between the prosecutor and the defendant [or his counsel], far form public view.”….In order for courts to fulfill their roles in a liberal society, their work must be properly structured [euphemism]. Judicial decision-making must be conceptualized as searching for truth and justice and must be in line with the criteria of rationality, accuracy, and fairness. The existing practice of plea bargaining does not impair the proper conceptualization of judicial decision-making because the mutual agreements on the question of criminal liability take place outside the courtroom…Due to the existence of such clear boundaries between the “world of agreement” and the “world of justice”, the present form of plea bargaining does not “stain” the perception of the craft of judging.”

p. 24   “The case can also be presented from a slightly different perspective: that of public confidence in the judicial system. There is room to claim that public trust is conditional upon conserving the basic outlines of the judicial decision-making process, as aimed at precision and ferreting out the truth.  Plea bargaining, in its current form, paves the way for the preservation of this notion. Even though, from a practical standpoint, this preference is not exposed to public scrutiny. Current plea bargains allow for the assumption that the parties have the best access to the information underlying the factual occurrence and, accordingly, that the agreement of criminal liability they reach reflects the truth.  The proposed model, on the other hand, may undermine the public image of the criminal trial.  Its adoption is a blunt declaration that a judicial decision may well be affected by inaccuracy – that the truth is not the only light held up to the court and that it may retreat in the face of agreement between the parties. Exposure of these inherent tensions within the court’s rulings may undermine the public’s faith in the judicial system. As soon as the conflict between ”truth” and “agreement” becomes visible, and the courts are perceived as preferring agreement to truth, public trust in the judiciary may well be lost.”

p. 27
“There is room to claim that the devaluation of the ‘criminal conviction’ label has already taken place with plea bargaining becoming the typical mechanism for disposing of criminal cases. In a regime where the overwhelming majority of criminal convictions derive from plea bargains, their stigmatizing effect can not longer be taken at face value.”

p. 28
“I would like to present an alternative, more ‘private’ or ‘civil’ approach, according to which the search for truth is not the be-all and end-all of the criminal process. Rather, the primary purpose of the criminal proceeding is the resolution of criminal disputes – whether defined as disputes between defendant and society or between defense and prosecution. In accordance with such private perception of the criminal proceeding, only when the parties are not in agreement on the factual happenings must the truth-seeking alternative be exhausted…In this sense, the goal of the criminal process is not accomplished when the truth is revealed: truth is only a way station on the road to the settling of the dispute.  The ultimate goal is the agreement, with truth being a means to achieve it….Naturally, this ‘private’ or ‘civil’ perception of the criminal process stands in stark opposition to the public paradigm, which view the agreement between the parties on question of fact merely as a means to discover the truth. Under the public model, where the prosecution and defense agree on facts, they are presumed to reflect the actual happenings.” [The last proposition is, alas, not always the case].

p. 29  
“Clearly, the ‘private’ or ‘civil’ approach to criminal trials conflicts with prevalent criminal theories, according to which the public nature of the criminal process is incontestable and cannot be infiltrated by private notions of justice…All that I wish to add at this point is that the recognition of the central role of agreement in criminal procedures, even overriding truth, is not foreign to the adversarial paradigm. According to the adversarial model, defense and prosecution share the prerogative of laying the whole factual basis before the court and mutually define the limits of the criminal dispute. Their agreement overrides the factual truth and the court is prevented, in principle, from examining it independently.  That is, the concept of truth in the adversarial model is relative and plays an instrumental, secondary role. This differs from the inquisitorial model, which relies on an absolutist notion of truth. In the light of the instrumental role truth plays in the adversarial model, there is no wonder that plea bargaining practices began to flourish in this legal climate.”…The very opening of the criminal arena to negotiation expresses a recognition that criminal justice is not only the product of the collective search for truth, but may also be the outcome of private, localized agreements between prosecution and defense.”

U.S. Judge John D. Bates outed as a political prostitute

Suit Over Targeted Killings Is Thrown Out
The New York Times,  December 7,  2010

WASHINGTON — A federal judge on Tuesday threw out a lawsuit that had sought to block the American government from trying to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, a United States citizen and Muslim cleric in hiding overseas who is accused of helping to plan attacks by Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen.

The ruling, which clears the way for the Obama administration to continue to try to kill Mr. Awlaki, represents a victory in its efforts to shield from judicial review so-called targeted killings, one of its most striking counterterrorism policies.

In an 83-page opinion, Judge John D. Bates said Mr. Awlaki’s father, the plaintiff, had no standing to file the lawsuit on behalf of his son. He also said decisions about targeted killings in such circumstances were a “political question” for executive branch officials to make — not judges.

Judge Bates acknowledged that the case raised “stark, and perplexing, questions” — including whether the president could
“order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization.”

But while the “legal and policy questions posed by this case are controversial and of great public interest,” he wrote, they would have to be resolved on another day and, probably, outside a courtroom. Judge Bates sits on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Matthew Miller, a Justice Department spokesman, praised the ruling for recognizing
“that a leader of a foreign terrorist organization who rejects our system of justice cannot enjoy the protection of our courts while plotting strikes against Americans. The court properly rejected that course and declined to intrude into sensitive military and intelligence matters.”

But Jameel Jaffer, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union, called the decision “a profound mistake” that would dangerously expand presidential power. The A.C.L.U. and the Center for Constitutional Rights represented Mr. Awlaki’s father, Nasser al-Awlaki, in the matter without compensation.

“If the court’s ruling is correct, the government has unreviewable authority to carry out the targeted killing of any American, anywhere, whom the president deems to be a threat to the nation,” Mr. Jaffer said. “It would be difficult to conceive of a proposition more inconsistent with the Constitution, or more dangerous to American liberty.”

But Judge Bates rejected the notion that his ruling granted the executive “unreviewable authority to order the assassination of any American whom he labels an enemy of the state.”

“The court only concludes that it lacks capacity to determine whether a specific individual in hiding overseas, whom the Director of National Intelligence has stated is an ‘operational member’ ” of Al Qaeda’s Yemen branch, “presents such a threat to national security that the United States may authorize the use of lethal force against him,” Judge Bates said.

Robert Chesney, a University of Texas law professor, said the limits of Judge Bates’ conclusion would be a matter of dispute. He portrayed it as “a sweeping argument against judicial review of targeted killing decisions.”

“The slippery slope is obviously the concern here,” Mr. Chesney said. “Judge Bates is at pains not to decide this question for other circumstances. But the question remains: what else besides this fact pattern would enable the government to have the same result?”

Mr. Jaffer said no decision had been made about an appeal.

Born in New Mexico in 1971, Mr. Awlaki moved to Yemen in 2004 and has made many public statements approving of terrorist attacks. Officials contend that he now plays an “operational” role with the group calling itself Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Treasury Department has claimed that Mr. Awlaki helped direct the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Dec. 25, 2009. After that failed attack, media outlets quoted anonymous officials as saying Mr. Awlaki had been placed on a list of terrorism suspects approved for killing.

Still, Mr. Awlaki has received no trial, and his father asked Judge Bates to bar attempts to kill his son unless he presented an imminent threat. The administration, while not confirming whether Mr. Awlaki is on any “kill list,” asked Judge Bates to dismiss the lawsuit.

The judge largely agreed with the government’s arguments. First, he rejected the father’s standing to sue, saying Mr. Awlaki could pursue such a case himself if he surrendered to American authorities — adding that there was no indication that Mr. Awlaki had sought the lawsuit.

Moreover, Judge Bates found, it would be inappropriate to second-guess, ahead of time, national-security officials’ evaluation of whether intelligence showed that some overseas person — even a United States citizen — poses such a threat that the person should be killed.

He sidestepped several issues, including whether the Congressional authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, covers Yemen or the terrorist group there, whose connections to the original Al Qaeda are hazy.

The opinion said it was unnecessary to decide whether the litigation should be dismissed under the state-secrets privilege, which allows the executive branch to block lawsuits that could reveal national-security information. The administration had invoked that privilege in its briefings, but urged Judge Bates to dismiss the case on different grounds.