U.S. ‘Global Leadership’: Euphemism for World Policeman
U.S. "Global Leadership":
A Euphemism for World Policeman
by Barbara Conry
Barbara Conry is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute.
Executive Summary
"Global leadership" has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle for American foreign policy. Yet the concept itself remains largely unexamined. Although "leadership" sounds benign, today’s proponents of global leadership envision a role for the United States that resembles that of a global hegemon–with the risks and costs hegemony entails.
Global political and military leadership is inadequate, even dangerous, as a basis for policy. The vagueness of "leadership" allows policymakers to rationalize dramatically different initiatives and makes defining policy difficult. Taken to an extreme, global leadership implies U.S. interest in and responsibility for virtually anything, anywhere.
Global leadership also entails immense costs and risks. Much of the $265 billion defense budget is spent to support U.S. aspirations to lead the world, not to defend the United States. There are also human costs. Moreover, it is an extremely risky policy that forces U.S. involvement in numerous situations unrelated to American national security.
There are no concrete benefits that justify the costs and risks of U.S. global leadership. Advocates’ claims that leadership enables Washington to persuade U.S. allies to assume costs the United States would otherwise bear alone and that failure on the part of the United States to lead would cause global chaos do not hold up under scrutiny.
There are several alternatives to global leadership, including greater reliance on regional security organizations and the creation of spheres of influence or regional balance-of-power arrangements. The United States would then act as a balancer of last resort. Such a strategy would preserve U.S. security without the costs and risks of an unrealistic crusade to lead the world.
Introduction: From Containment to Leadership
The U.S. foreign policy community has been grasping for a national security strategy since the end of the Cold War nullified the doctrine of containment. From former president George Bush’s proclamation of the "new world order" to the Clinton administration’s strategies of "enlargement" and "assertive multilateralism," Washington has found containment a tough act to follow. Gradually, though, a bumper-sticker approach to foreign policy has emerged upon which almost everyone can agree: U.S. "leadership" in world affairs.
Pundits of varying ideological persuasions and high-level policymakers from both parties have embraced the notion of global leadership as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Former secretary of state Warren Christopher has written, "America must lead. . . . American leadership is our first principle and a central lesson of this century. The simple fact is that if we do not lead, no one else will." [1] Republican presidential nominee Bob Dole echoed Christopher’s sentiments, declaring, "Only the United States can lead on the full range of political, diplomatic, economic, and military issues confronting the world." [2]House Speaker Newt Gingrich has joined the chorus:
We have to lead the world. . . . If we don’t lead the world I think that we have a continuing decay into anarchy, I think we have more and more violence around the planet, and I think it is highly unlikely anybody will replace us in leadership roles in the next 30 years. [3]
Christopher, Dole, and Gingrich have at times had serious disagreements about the conduct of foreign policy. Their agreement on the need for U.S. global leadership does not indicate consensus but instead reflects the ambiguity of global leadership as a basis for U.S. strategy. Anyone can invoke the mantra of U.S. global leadership because its meaning is in the mind of the speaker. As Jessica Mathews of the Council on Foreign Relations has pointed out, "Rhetorically, at least, nearly everyone agrees on the undiminished need for American leadership. But the word is used to mask profoundly different views of America’s role in the world." [4]
Conflicting Definitions of U.S. Leadership
There is nothing wrong with "leadership" per se. The United States can and should play a leading role in a number of arenas. Washington’s leadership since World War II of the global trade liberalization process, for example, has been highly constructive. Such economic leadership should continue. U.S. moral and cultural leadership–the American tradition of commitment to such ideals as democracy, individual liberty, and the other philosophical foundations of the Constitution–should also continue. Such American economic and moral leadership is both beneficial and sustainable.
Today’s proponents of "global leadership," however, are advocating something better described as hegemony than as leadership. Unlike moral or economic leadership, global leadership does not envision the United States’ leading by example or through diplomacy. Global leadership is essentially coercive, relying on "diplomacy" backed by threats or military action.
Global leadership also entails greater responsibility than does leadership in the economic or moral and cultural arenas. U.S. leadership in trade liberalization does not make the United States responsible for countries that practice protectionism. Nor does economic leadership demand that the United States use any means necessary to maintain its leadership role. Advocates of U.S. political and mili-tary leadership, however, have a much more ambitious view of the responsibilities global leadership entails and the actions the United States is obligated to take to preserve its role as global leader.
American political and military leadership can be defined in a number of ways, but two schools of thought dominate today. One school of thought, loosely associated with the Clinton administration and the Democratic Party, advocates exercising U.S. global leadership in a multilateral context to advance humanitarian or Wilsonian objectives. The other school of thought, loosely associated with the Republican Party, advocates unilateral U.S. leadership primarily for traditional realist–power and national security–objectives.
Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism
Clinton has said, "Unilateralism in the world that we live in is not a viable option." [5] Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has explained the administration’s position more fully:
We cannot afford to abandon either peace-keeping or a multilateral approach to solving difficult problems. As much as we would wish otherwise, conflicts are going to continue. The world is going to look to the United States for leadership. It will be in our interests to provide that leadership, but we cannot and should not bear the full burden alone. [6]
The multilateralists often condemn the unilateral approach as isolationism. Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s comment, "The isolationist impulse has risen from the grave, and it has taken the new form of unilateralism," is representative. [7]
Many Republicans, on the other hand, allege that "multilateralism [has become] something of a cover for U.S. retrenchment," in the words of Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). [8] House Majority Leader Dick Armey of Texas has warned, "The nation has gone too far in the direction of globalism and lost sight of its essential footings, and we [congressional Republicans] intend to change that." [9] Indeed, the only time unilateralists express enthusiasm about multilateralism is when it means inviting other countries to sign on to a U.S. initiative on Washington’s terms, as was the case in the Persian Gulf War. As Dole explains,
The choices facing America are not, as some in the administration would like to portray, doing something multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are false choices. The real choice is whether to allow international organizations to call the shots–as in Bosnia or Somalia–or to make multilateral groupings work for American interests–as in Operation Desert Storm. [10]
Global Social Worker or Global Cop?
The other major difference between the two views is the circumstances in which the United States should exercise leadership. The Democrats generally seem more comfortable leading Wilsonian crusades with idealistic objectives–promoting democracy, protecting human rights, or delivering humanitarian assistance–than with using force for traditional security agendas. Thus, they take a hard line on Haitian dictators but favor a conciliatory stance toward North Korea. As Michael Mandelbaum of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University has said of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy,
In [Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia] the administration was preoccupied not with relations with neighboring countries, the usual subject of foreign policy, but rather with the social, political, and economic conditions within borders. It aimed to relieve the suffering caused by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starvation in Somalia, and oppression in Haiti. Historically, the foreign policy of the United States has centered on American interests, defined as developments that could affect the lives of American citizens. Nothing that occurred in these three countries fit that criterion. Instead, the Clinton interventions were intended to promote American values. [11]
Republicans, on the other hand, tend to favor law-and-order and realpolitik leadership, advocating intervention to keep the world in line and to preserve America’s status as the world’s foremost military power. Instead of restoring democracy in Haiti or taking a stand against "genocide" in Bosnia, Republicans advocate tougher policies toward such international villains as North Korea and Iran. Whatever support they have given to the idea of American action in Bosnia has generally been not for humanitarian reasons but to preserve the prestige of the United States and NATO. Lugar, for example, has stated,
The policy dispute over Bosnia is no longer just about Bosnia, but rather about allied unity and the willingness of Europeans and Americans to adjust their Cold War political and security institutions and missions to the changing geo-strategic circumstances in and around Europe. In some ways, the details of such adjustments are less important than the pressing need to demonstrate and convince politicians and publics on both sides of the Atlantic that American leadership on European security issues is both possible and advantageous for Europeans as well as for Americans. [12]
Some on the right also hint that the United States should take a more active role in policing the world generally. Lugar has argued, "We have an unparalleled opportunity to manage the world." [13] Former U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop has been more specific: "If America’s presence and purpose in the world can be doubted, if we tolerate vacuums of power, they will be filled by others, and ultimately American blood will be spilled." [14]
It is important to point out that this description of the two approaches to U.S. leadership is extremely general. There are variations within each school of thought, and the two approaches correspond only roughly to the two political parties, with numerous exceptions. [15]And other prominent advocates of U.S. global leadership do not fit into either of the schools of thought outlined here.
Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute, for example, argues in favor of an expansive and costly version of global leadership that encompasses both Wilsonian and realist objectives. His book, The Imperative of American Leadership, opens with the proclamation:
This book is an argument. It is an argument for a certain kind of U.S. foreign policy now that the cold war is behind us. It is an argument for a foreign policy that is engaged, proactive, interventionist, and expensive.
This argument flies in the face of the shibboleth that American cannot be the world’s policeman. In truth, it must be more than that. A policeman gets his assignments from higher authority, but in the community of nations there is no authority higher than America. . . . America is the wealthiest, mightiest, and most respected nation. At times, it must be the policeman or head of the posse–at others, the mediator, teacher, or benefactor. In short, America must accept the role of world leader. [16]
Muravchik’s vision of American global leadership transcends those of both prominent Democrats and Republicans–whose notions of U.S. leadership Muravchik criticizes as disguised isolationism.
The fundamental disagreements about what constitutes global leadership underscore the ambiguity and elasticity of the term. The policy is vulnerable to both honest misinterpretation and deliberate misrepresentation–by the U.S. foreign policy community, the American public, foreign governments, and foreign populations. It is also dangerously easy to manipulate, allowing policymakers to disguise a misguided or foundering policy as a mysterious but necessary way of exercising or preserving American leadership. Vagueness may be useful for propaganda purposes, but basing U.S. foreign policy on such shifting sands is unwise.
Translating Leadership into Policy
The ambiguity of "leadership" is also one of the reasons it is so difficult to translate into policy. At its most extreme, leadership-driven foreign policy suggests that the United States is responsible to some degree for everyone, everywhere. It is unlikely that Washington could or would seek to take the idea to that extreme in terms of policy. The inescapable dilemma, then, is how to determine which situations demand Washington’s attention and which can be left to run their course.
The proponents of leadership cannot agree on the proper criteria for making such decisions. Of those who contend that the United States must exhibit leadership by protecting multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina against the secessionist Bosnian Serbs, for example, A. M. Rosenthal of the New York Times has asked, "Why only Bosnia?"
All over the world, rebel peoples are at war with their internationally recognized governments. They die to destroy regimes they detest–or just separate from them.
But in only one country has the West gone to war to block anti-government forces: in Bosnia, where the Serbian Christians seek separation from a Government they see as created and held by Serbian Muslims. [17]
Advocating U.S. intervention in the Bosnian war while ignoring other, similar regional wars is random at best. Such selectivity could, however, be perceived as having more sinister motives. Citing more deadly recent conflicts in such places as Sudan, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Angola, syndicated columnist Doug Bandow has observed, "For all of the passion exhibited by those who advocate military intervention to protect Bosnian Muslims, it seems strangely limited. Put bluntly, those who shout the loudest about genocide and war seem to care only when the victims are white Europeans." [18]
The decision about when and where to exercise American leadership–given the impossibility of applying it everywhere American values are offended–is inherently arbitrary unless it is linked to U.S. vital interests. Comments by Amb. Robert G. Neumann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies on the difficulty of deciding when to intervene against "evil" are especially revealing on that point:
If you decide that intervention by force is needed, a choice of where it is to be placed is always questionable and unfair, but we must not, in my opinion, prevent ourselves from acting at all because then evil really prevails. . . . You have to make a decision who are the guilty parties–never mind the details that others are guilty. There are always others guilty as well. That is an academic discussion. [19]
What Neumann dismisses as an "academic discussion" has tremendous and troubling real-world implications for those parties that are arbitrarily deemed guilty. The troubling moral implications of military action are generally accepted as a necessary evil when national security is at stake. When intervention is contemplated for essentially altruistic reasons, however–to stop "evil," for instance–it would seem that moral implications should take on considerably more importance. For the world’s leading power to exercise leadership by combatting "evil" (or "ethnic cleansing," "aggression," or the like) on a random or, at the very least, highly selective basis–which will at times entail punishing innocent parties for the sins of others–is not only ironic, it more closely resembles bullying than leadership.
Promise Now, Pay Later
Another policy problem involves the grandiose rhetoric that is a hallmark of global leadership and frequently results in policy dilemmas or embarrassing backpedaling. U.S. officials too often succumb to the temptation to make extravagant promises of future U.S. action–usually at times when the likelihood of having to act on those promises seems remote (or at least beyond the next election).
Colorado College political science professor David C. Hendrickson has described the danger of lavish promises. In the 1992 presidential campaign, he writes, Clinton
not only signed on to the idea of a "new world order," but added [other commitments] that, taken together, amounted to a considerably more ambitious agenda. He would press the Chinese on human rights by linking improvements to renewal of China’s most-favored-nation trade status, bring democracy to Haiti and Cuba by tightening the trade embargoes against both, and stop Serbian aggression in Bosnia by air strikes and by opposing any settlement that seemed to reward the Serbs for their misdeeds. [20]
One of the results of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, according to Hendrickson, has been a loss of U.S. prestige abroad, "stemming from the realization in foreign capitals that American policy cannot be taken at face value or need not be taken seriously (because, as J. P. Morgan said of the market, it fluctuates)." [21]
Extravagant Promises
Hendrickson’s criticism pertained to Clinton’s campaign promises, but Clinton’s failure to fulfill commitments he reiterated after becoming president is considerably more troublesome. One example is Clinton’s decision to link China’s most-favored-nation trade status to human rights, a policy he later abandoned. As Dole criticized, "In less than two years, China–and the world–saw a complete reversal of administration policy with an intermediate stop at indecision. The Chinese leadership, our allies, and our adversaries learned an important lesson: the President of the United States does not always mean what he says." [22]
The Clinton administration also was forced to back away from overly ambitious rhetoric about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Administration officials initially declared that North Korea would not be allowed to develop any nuclear weapons. Later, the administration conceded that Pyongyang may in fact already possess a small number of nuclear devices. [23]
In the cases of both China and North Korea, Washington overestimated both what it needed to do and what the United States was capable of doing. Human rights and nuclear nonproliferation are worthwhile goals, but they are competing with an array of other foreign policy objectives–many of which are more important. Because of China’s immense market potential, trade was a higher priority than human rights. And the risks associated with forcibly denying Pyongyang a nuclear weapons capability–conducting a preemptive strike, for example–were more dangerous than North Korea’s possession of a few nuclear devices. The lesson is that U.S. officials should not be seduced by the myth of Washington’s omnipotence into making commitments that the United States cannot meet or does not value enough relative to other priorities to meet.
Global leadership, however, demands U.S. involvement in many issues that have little or no impact on American vital interests. Consider the ambitious set of election-year foreign policy goals Christopher, invoking U.S. leadership, set forth in early 1996. Expansion of NATO, achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty, ratification of START II, and integration of environmental goals into diplomacy were designated as top diplomatic objectives. In addition, Christopher said, the administration would work to repair U.S. relations with China; crack down on narcotics trafficking; prosecute war criminals in Bosnia and Rwanda; end the Arab-Israeli conflict; and "pursue initiatives in such places and Northern Ireland, Haiti, Cyprus, Angola, Burundi, Peru, and Ecuador." [24] As the breathtaking expansiveness of the administration’s 1996 agenda suggests, foreign policy based on U.S. leadership perpetuates and encourages the myth that the United States can and should manage the rest of the world.
Wars for Credibility
Global leadership, then, requires both that the United States get involved in numerous conflicts around the globe and that it do whatever is necessary to prevail in order to preserve U.S. credibility. That is often overlooked. Hendrickson dismissed the significance of the failure of the U.S. mission in Somalia because "Somalia involved no great interest on the part of the United States; the intervention there could be abandoned with the same casualness as it was undertaken." [25] Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) displayed a similar attitude during the congressional debates over the U.S. operation in the former Yugoslavia: "We all recognize the mission may fail. But the real failure would be not to try." [26]
On the contrary, if leadership is the raison d’