Entry: Balfour Declaration [by Isaiah Friedman]

“The Declaration was a deliberate act of the British cabinet and part of the its general foreign policy. It was a national policy in the sense that it represented the views of the three British political parties. It had acquired international status since the principal Allies – Russia, France, Italy, and the United States – had given it their prior approval.”

“[Chaim Weizmann’s] scientific achievements early in [World War I] enabled him to render important services to the British government which brought him to the notice of David Lloyd George, minister of munitions. The latter’s personal admiration for Weizmann proved invaluable to the cause of Zionism when Lloyd George was serving as prime minister. Weizmann had met Arthur James Balfour for the first time in Manchester, in 1905. British statesmen, public men, and officials listened readily to Weizmann because he was able to show that he could influence Jewish opinion and that Zionism was advantageous to Britain.”

“C.P. Scott, the celebrated editor of the Manchester Guardian, was one of the leading public men whom Weizmann converted to Zionism. It was Scott who cemented Weizmann’s relationship with Lloyd George and introduced him to Herbert Samuel, then president of the Local Government Board, at that time the only Jewish member of the cabinet. Like Weizmann, Samuel realized that Turkey’s entry into the war on November 5, 1914, opened up great possibilities. He went furter than Weizmann and envisaged that, with the probable disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine could be laid.  He confided his views first to Sir Edward Grey, the foreign minister, and found him favourably disposed towards the idea.”

“[Herbert Samuel] advocated the annexation of Palestine to the British Empire, as only under British rule would Jewish colonization prosper and immigration be encouraged, so that in course of time when the Jews would become a majority they would be conceded ‘such a degree of self-government as the conditions of that day may justify.’”

“Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, a member of the World Zionist Executive who arrived in England in December 1914, pursued their activity in a low key, and it was only in 1916 that a collection of essays, edited by Harry Sacher, entitled Zionism and the Jewish Future, was published with the intention of enlightening public opinion on the essence of Zionism.”

“If the British government’s interest in Zionism persisted, it was not in order to establish a claim to Palestine, as was manifested a year later, but in order to win over American Jewry, whose influence was thought to be considerable in the press, in finance, and in politics…It was Horace Kallen, a professor at the University of Wisconsin and an ardent Zionist, who first put to the Foreign Office (November 1915) an alternative method of winning over the American Jews to the Entente: should the Allies issue a statement similar to German promises in favor of Jewish national rights in Palestine, it would, he was convinced, counter German moves and elicit pro-British and pro-French sympathies among the Jewish masses.”

“In America, [Lucien Wolf] conceded, Zionism had captured Jewish opinion, and in view of the forthcoming American Jewish Congress he thought it important that ‘in any bid for Jewish sympathies…very serious account must be taken of the Zionist movement…This is the moment for the Allies to declare their policy in regard to Palestine.’ On March 3, 1916, he suggested a formula as a basis for a public pronouncement.”

“Should the British government give concrete assurances on the Palestine question, [Eduard Suarès, a prominent businessman and head of the Jewish community in Alexandria,] told Sir Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner in Egypt, it would ‘convert the indifference, if not hostility of American and other Jews into enthusiastic support.’ Suarès’ scheme followed the familiar Zionist pattern but what made an impact on the Foreign Office, and particularly oin Grey, was the allusion to the prospect of a German protectorate in Palestine.”

“On Mach 11, 1916, Lord Crewe, who was deputizing for Grey, drafted a cable to the British ambassadors in Paris and Petrograd asking them to sound out the French and the Russian governments about making a joint declaration with regard to Palestine which would satisfy Jewish aspirations. He quoted Wolf’s formula but suggested instead a scheme which he thought would be far more attractive to the majority of Jews. It consisted of creating conditions which would Jewish settlers in Palestine to grow strong enough to cope with the Arab population.”

“[T]he broader aim of Lloyd George’s policy [of supporting Zionism] was to forestall the possibility of Turco-German predominance in Palestine. Herein lay the raison d’être of the alliance with British Zionism…The resounding defeat of Serbia by the German army and Bulgaria’s adherence to the Central Powers virtually opened the road from Hamburg to Baghdad. A German foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal would have placed British imperial communications in grave jeopardy. In these circumstances destruction of the Ottoman Empire became an unavoidable necessity. It was also essential that Palestina come under sole British control. Samuel’s thesis, expounded in his memoranda of January and March 1915, was now fully vindicated.

However, British strategic requirements clashed with the principle of non-annexation enunciated by President Wilson and upheld by the Provisional Government in Russia. It constituted the most serious threat to British war aims.  Henceforth, one of the greatest dilemmas of British diplomacy was how to achieve its desiderata without giving offense to its allies.  This could be done only by marriage with the principle of self-determination. It was here the importance of Zionism, as far as Palestine was concerned, came in.  It provided a cloak under which Britain could appear free from any annexationist taint.  The anti-Turkish crusade was essentially negative in nature, and as such could hardly commend itself to American and Russian opinion, but, when clothed in the ideological garb of struggle for the liberation of small nationalities, it acquired a different aspect.”

“The first step, wh8ich was to lead to a compact with Zionism, was taken by Sir Mark Sykes, a leading expert on the East and a signatory to the Agreement with his French opposite, François-Georges Picot. His conversion to Zionism was of particular importance…His crucial meeting with the Zionist leaders, which included Rabbi Moses Gaster, Lord Rothschild, Herbert Samuel, Harry Sacher, as well as Sokolow and Weizmann, took place on February 7, 1917.  He heard from them what he had expected. The common denominator in the spectrum of their views was the desire for a British protectorate of Palestine. This played directly into his hands…Sykes paved the way for Sokolow’s visit to the Vatican. On May 1, he was received by Cardinal Gasparri, the papal secretary of state, who reassured him that the Zionists need fear no opposition from the Church….Pope Benedict xv expressed himself in even warmed terms. ‘The return of the Jews to Palestine is a miraculous event. It is providential; God has willed it…I believe that we shall be good neighbors.’ Sokolow’s success did not go unnoticed by the Italian government and on May 8, Di Martino, the secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry, handed Sokolow an official declaration of sympathy with Zionist aspirations. Nor did the French government remain a passive onlooker…[T]he secretary-general of the French Foreign Ministry gave Sokolow a letter which for the Zionists constituted a political victory of the highest order. The Italian and French declarations enabled the British to follow suit.”

“Another factor that told strongly in the Zionists’ favor was the situation in Russia. Since April there were growing indications that Russia was drifting out of the war. Particularly disturbing was the demand by the Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies for the early conclusion of peace…[T]he conclusion of peace would have transformed the whole strategic situation and the moral effect would have been devastating. Propaganda therefore was badly needed but the British were handicapped in getting their message through. Anglophobia was deep-seated under the czarist regime. Nor did the March Revolution improve the situation…This helps explain why the Zionists were persona gratae at the Foreign Office. In return for meeting their wishes, they could produce in Russia and elsewhere an army of voluntary propagnadists, all the more effective since they had the obvious advantage of being citizens of their respective countries. Russian Jews disliked the war. It was not of their choosing and they had nothing to gain from its continuation. Both for political and economic reasons they were inclined more towards Germany than to England, but recognition of their rights in Palestine might make all the difference. Not only would it immunize them against German-inspired pacifist propaganda but their influence in the press and public life could be brought to bear. The military campaign in Palestine would be presented as an act of liberation and Britain’s presence there linked to the principle of self-determination.”

“After the March Revolution the position of Russian Jews, 5,000,000 strong, was transformed. The abolition of civic disablities released tremendous sources of vitality which became manifest in all fields of cultural and political activity. Although they comprised only four percent of the total population, their influence far exceeded their numerical strength. The most influential party in post-revolutionary Russia was the Zionist party.  Its rise was spectacular.  The number of enrolled members, which before the war amount to 25,000, rose steeply in the spring of 1917 to 140,000. By the beginning of 1918 there were 1,200 registered local Zionist societies all over the country with 300,000 active members…British Military Intelligence estimated [at the time] that ‘great mass of the 6,000,000 Jews in Russia have been more or less in sympathy with the Zionist cause.’”

“In the United States, too, the Zionist movement had made much headway…One of its greatest assets was Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States, who had come to believe that the Zionist program would help solve the Jewish question.”

“International complexities apart, there was another difficulty that hindered Balfour from issuing an official statement. Aware of the strong opposition to Zionism among influential Jews, he was wary of antagonizing them. It was not before the controversy was resolved in the Zionists’ favor at a meeting of the Board of Deputies [of British Jews] on June 17 and the dissolution of the Conjoint Foreign Committee that the British government could move freely on the road to a public declaration.”

“By June [1917] it became clear that a public statement by the British government could not longer be delayed. For some time the German press, ranging from the Conservative Reichsbote to the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, had been urging the Reich government to show a more accommodating attitude to the Zionist movement. On June 12 Weizmann called on Sir Ronald Graham, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, and told him that he had received some disquieting information. For Zionism to fall under German influence would have been a serious blow to his efforts to anchor the movement firmly to Britain…He insisted that it was essential for the British government to counter German moves and give public expression of its sympathy and support.  On June 19, Balfour invited Lord Rothschild and Weizmann to submit a draft proposal for a declaration of support.”