‘Terrorist" Lists’: Monitoring proscription, designation and asset-freezing

http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html

This website was launched in  June 2005 by Statewatch  in association with the Campaign Against Criminalising Communities and  the Human Rights and Social Justice Institute,  London Metropolitan University, to monitor the largely secret  development of the policy of "proscribing" groups and  individuals connected with "terrorism" (see press release). For updates since the launch, see latest  news.

It provides detailed information  and analysis of the "terrorist lists" operated by:
    •     the United Kingdom, which introduced  proscription in 1974 for organisations in Northern Ireland, extending  it to foreign organisations in 2000;
    •     the United States, which introduced  the proscription of foreign terrorists groups in 1995;
    •     the United Nations, which introduced  proscription as part of the Taleban sanctions regime – freezing  the assets of suspected associates – and then extended it in  the aftermath of "September 11";
    •     and the European Union, which,  after incorporating the UN sanctions into EU law, introduced  its own "terrorist" list.
    •     see: current  lists

The uncritical adoption of proscription  regimes by the UN and EU give the policy a global reach. This  is a prices known as "policy laundering" and other  states, for example Canada and Australia, have been quick to  follow the UK/US lead (see notes below).

Proscription, or "designation",  takes various forms and its legal effect differs according to  the jurisdiction, varying from complete bans for "terrorist"  groups that criminalise their members and supporters, to the  freezing of assets of individuals suspected of supporting terrorism.  Groups and individuals are added to the "terrorist"  lists on the basis of "intelligence" alone. The normal  judicial process governing such serious accusations, and their  prosecution, has been discarded. The UK and US governments are  obliged to "consult" with parliament and congress respectively,  though such consultation has been brief; the executive bodies  of the UN (Security Council) and EU (Council) agree their lists  on the basis of intelligence provided by their member states  without any parliamentary scrutiny. These lists and the related  sanctions are binding on all member states.

It is very difficult for those  included on the "terrorist lists" to have their names  removed or contest their inclusion. Those in the UK can appeal  to a security tribunal (government appointed judges, secret hearing  and secret evidence etc.) but the UN and EU lists contain no  mechanism of appeal to the courts whatsoever – groups and individuals  can only request individual member state governments to make  diplomatic representations on their behalf.

Proscription raises serious human  rights concerns and is clearly at odds with the European Convention.  Moreover, the lack of effective judicial remedies at the national  level and the minimal jurisdiction of the EU Courts mean that  no proscribed group has yet had full "access to court"  and the chance to challenge the underlying matters of law and  fact in full, whether domestically or in an international court.

Were the lists restricted to  "Al-Qaida", its known members and other groups most  people can agree are "terrorists", there would be less  cause for concern. But they are not – the lists are a recipe  for arbitrary and politically motivated decision-making. Hundreds  of groups and individuals have now been criminalised around the  world and the various lists are expanding as states attempt to  add all groups engaged in resistance to occupation or tyranny.  Those exercising what many people around the world see as a legitimate  right to self-defence and determination are increasingly being  treated – on a global basis – the same way as Osama Bin Laden.

This criminalisation extends  beyond the groups and individuals on the "terrorist lists"  to their supporters. The banning of "passive support"  goes as far as to criminalise all solidarity with any  of the groups named, regardless of the basis or motivation for  that solidarity. The effect can be devastating for entire communities.

See Statewatch analysis:  "Terrorising the rule of law:  the politics and practise of proscription".

Use the links on the left to  view:
    •     the current UK, EU, UN and US  lists;
    •     a comparative overview of the  four lists;
    •     legal analysis of the proscription  regimes;
    •     challenges to proscription by  groups, individuals and their supporters;
    •     latest news and links to relevant  sources of information

Notes

This site does not cover the  "no-fly" lists operated by a number of countries including  the US.

Please send comments and/or material  for inclusion to office@statewatch.org.

This research was produced as  part of the "Policy Laundering" project: